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1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite popular perception, the law in relation to 
"cheques in full and final satisfaction" is not a separate 
branch of the law of contract. The law pertaining to 
cheques in full and final satisfaction is simply an 
application of the common law principles of accord and 
satisfaction. It is perhaps for this very reason that 
prior to the landmark High Court decision in Homeguard 
Products (NZ) Limited v Kiwi Packaging Limitedl there 
were very few New Zealand decisions concerning the same. 
The factual situation which gives rise to such a scenario 
is relatively straightforward. A simple illustration 
would be that of a building contract, where the builder 
had been instructed to, and had built a house for another 
party to occupy. A dispute may then have arisen as to the 
quality of the workmanship, the owner asserting that a 
defective job had been done. The owner may then tender 
a cheque to the builder for a lesser sum than was due 
under the contract, asserting that the same is proffered 
in full and final settlement of the dispute. This letter 
and cheque may arrive in the mail and be opened by a clerk 
employed by the builder, who has authority to bank cheques 
but no authority to settle claims. This clerk may then 
without noting the terms of the letter, detach and bank 
the cheque. Several days later this letter may then come 
to the attention of the builder, who then writes back to 
the owner expressly stating that he does not accept that 
he has received the cheque in full and final satisfaction, 
has banked it on account, and will be pursuing the owner 
for the balance. 
On this scenario, if the proposition of Mahon J. in the 
case of Homeguard is correct, then upon the clerk employed 
by the builder banking the cheque tendered in full and 
final satisfaction an accord and satisfaction would have 
resulted, and despite the builder's protests to the 
contrary, he would be unable to sue for the balance he 
felt due to him under the previous contract. 
As the existing case law stands there is an onus on the 
creditor if he banks the cheque to inform the debtor that 
his payment in full condition is rejected. Some cases 
state this must be done at the time, others suggest that 
days is too late, and generally uncertainty reigns as to 
when a creditor will be taken to be bound by the debtor's 
payment in full offer. 
The most often quoted definition of accord and 
satisfaction is that of Scrutton L.J. in British Russian 
1[1981] 2 NZLR 322 
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Gazette and Trade Outlook Limited v Associated Newspapers 
Limited2 : 
n ••• Accord and satisfaction is the purchase of a 
release from an obligation whether arising under 
contract or a tort by means of any valuable 
consideration, not being the actual performance of 
the obligation itself. The accord is the 
agreement by which the obligation is discharged. 
The satisfaction is the consideration which makes 
the agreement operative ••• n 
Therefore, in other words, an accord and satisfaction is 
merely a peculiar type of contract. As with other 
contracts, it requires an offer, an acceptance and 
consideration. The consideration is often payment of a 
lesser sum where the debt is disputed or unliquidated. 
Payment of a lesser sum where the debt is undisputed and 
liquidated by virtue of Foakes v Beer3 is no 
consideration. This will be dealt with more fully in 
Chapter 5 (a) • 
In the typical case of a cheque proffered in full and 
final satisfaction of a disputed claim, the cheque 
accompanied by an appropriately worded letter, is seen as 
the offer. The difficulty occurs in determining whether 
or nor this offer has been accepted. Mahon J. stated in 
Homeguard that banking by a credi tor of such a cheque 
proffered in full and final satisfaction of a disputed 
claim amounted to an "irretrievable manifestation of 
assent" by the creditor to the condition upon which the 
cheque was proffered4• 
This paper will attempt to show that the decision in 
Homeguard and the many decisions after it which either 
attempt to follow, distinguish or decline to follow it are 
not in accordance with basic contract principles such as 
offer and acceptance, and what constitutes consideration. 
In doing so this paper will examine closely the Homeguard 
decision itself and whether the contract involved in a 
typical cheque "accepted" in full and final satisfaction 
of a claim, is a unilateral or bilateral contract. This 
paper will then examine the common law principles and 
reasoning behind the rules governing when a contractual 
offer has been accepted. In particular, this paper will 
attempt to show that the cases in relation to cheques 
tendered in full and final satisfaction, have overlooked 
the basic common law rule that acceptance needs to be 
communicated to the offeror before it is complete, and the 
2[1933] 2 KB 616, 643-644 
3(1884) 9 AC 605. 
4Supra Note 1 at page 333 line 32 per Mahon J. 
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rationale behind the rule in Felthouse v Bindley5 which 
stipulates that an offeror cannot stipulate silence to 
mean acceptance. The rationale for this rule is twofold. 
Firstly stipulating silence as notification of acceptance 
puts an onus on the offeree to do a positive act to reject 
the offer. Secondly, silence is equivocal and does not 
therefore objectively signify acceptance. The same is 
true of specifying a commonplace act to signify 
acceptance. 
It is the writer's view that the act of banking a cheque 
in full and final satisfaction is by itself equivocal as 
it could mean more than one thing. It could mean 
acceptance of the offer as payment in full and final 
satisfaction, and it could mean that the creditor merely 
wishes to take the money on account. Further, the onus 
should not be on the offeree to do a positive act to 
signify his rejection of the offer, as many of the cases, 
including Homeguard specify. 
This paper will then examine the consideration or 
"satisfaction" required to support such an accord and 
satisfaction. In particular this paper will examine the 
existing case law which specifies that settlement of a 
bona fide dispute affords consideration; whether there 
is consideration when a debtor merely pays a liquidated 
or undisputed portion of the debt and whether 
consideration in fact should be sufficient as one recent 
English Court of Appeal case has suggested. This paper 
will then examine the doctrine of promissory estoppel as 
it applies and has been considered in the cases on cheques 
tendered in full and final satisfaction and the doctrine 
of waiver. These are doctrines in which no consideration 
is necessary but specific other requirements need to be 
complied with. In doing so, this paper will attempt to 
show that in many of the cases in the area of cheques 
tendered in full and final satisfaction there has been 
insufficient consideration to support a finding that an 
accord and satisfaction has come into being. 
This paper will then examine section 21(2) (b) of the Bills 
of Exchange Act 1908 which was put forward as an 
alternative reason by Mahon J. for the finding in 
Homeguard, in support of the proposition that a creditor 
is deemed to have accepted an offer of a cheque tendered 
in full and final satisfaction when the same is banked. 
Mahon J. stated that this section provides that a cheque 
may be tendered on a condi tion. He held that if the 
cheque was banked and the condition repudiated, then the 
tort of conversion of the cheque had been committed and 
the offeree could not assert his own wrong, and was 
therefore estopped from denying that he had banked the 
cheque in accordance with the condition. This paper will 
5[1862] 11 CB(Nes) 869; affirmed (1863) New Rep. 401. 
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examine such argument to ascertain whether such affords 
a separate cause of action and whether conversion in such 
circumstances has been committed, and if so, the 
consequences of the same. 
This paper will then examine section 92 of the Judicature 
Act 1908 which is a statutory exception to the rule that 
a sum tendered in payment as full and final satisfaction 
of a larger amount which is owing, and which is undisputed 
and liquidated affords no consideration, and therefore no 
binding contract. 
In closing, this pape~ will examine the policy 
considerations inherent 1n any rule. The rule in 
Bomeguard even if wrong in principle had the benefit of 
certainty of application. The law in its present state 
is not only not in accordance with basic principles but 
affords no certainty to the parties. 
The rule in Bomeguard placed a greater onus on the 
creditor. The traditional common law rule placed a higher 
onus on the debtor. This paper will examine the policy 
considerations to determine on which party such onus 
should rest. In doing so ,this paper will examine the 
situation in the united States of America, which is the 
reverse of the common law position in New Zealand. 
The writer had originally hoped to examine the common law 
decisions in Australia and England subsequent to the 
decision in Bomeguard. The case law prior to Homeguard 
has been dealt with thoroughly by Professor D.W. 
McLauchlan in his paper Cheques in Full and Final 
Satisfaction: accord despite discord?6 However, despite 
a thorough search for the same the writer has been unable 
to turn up any decisions of moment. 
It will be submitted that if strict common law principles 
are applied, the result which would be achieved is capable 
of affording sufficient certainty, as a creditor will 
never be taken to have assented to the debtor 1 soffer 
unless he expressly states that he has, or has acted in 
such a clear unequivocal fashion, that on the balance of 
probabilities no other reasonable interpretation could be 
placed on his actions. 
6(1987) 12 NZULR 259. 
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2. The Decision in Homeguard Products (HZ) Limited v Kiwi 
Packaging Limited7 
This case had humble enough beginnings. A dispute had 
arisen as to the quantum of a sum owed by Homeguard to 
Kiwi Packaging for goods supplied to it. On 21 September 
1977, Homeguard wrote to Kiwi Packaging asserting that on 
its calculation the amount outstanding was $765.97. On 
27 September, Kiwi Packaging replied asserting that the 
final amount owing on the account was $ 9 01. 84 • On 4 
October Homeguard wrote to Kiwi Packaging enclosing a 
cheque for $765.97 "in full settlement of our account". 
Kiwi Packaging banked the cheque some days after the date 
of the letter but sent no reply. On 15 November Homeguard 
received a letter from Kiwi Packaging enclosing a 
purported statement of account as at that date showing a 
balance of $1, 187 • 60. The account further showed a credit 
of $765.97 described as "October cash"; however, no 
mention was made of the letter of 4 October. 
Kiwi Packaging then sued to recover the balance it alleged 
was owing. In the Magistrate's Court the learned judge 
had found as a fact that Kiwi Packaging had received and 
banked Homeguard's cheque for $765.97 sent in full 
settlement of its account and rejected Homeguard' s defence 
of accord and satisfaction. He held that there had been 
no "meeting of minds" between the two parties. Homeguard 
appealed. 
Mahon .J. on appeal reversed the decision of the 
Magistrates Court and held that the cheque had been 
forwarded in full satisfaction of the account, it had been 
banked and its proceeds credited to the account of 
Homeguard and these events constituted "an irretrievable 
manifestation. of assent" by Kiwi Packaging to the 
condition upon which the cheque was tendered by Homeguard. 
Therefore the whole of the debt in whatever amount had 
become extinguished by an accord and satisfaction. His 
Honour further held on an alternative or supporting basis 
that the delivery of the Homeguard cheque fell wi thin 
Section 21(2) (b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 as 
being "conditional, and for a special purpose only, and 
not for the purpose of transferring the property in the 
bill". He held, that therefore, the property in the 
cheque could not pass to Kiwi Packaging until it had 
complied with the condition. His Honour stated that by 
banking the cheque and then repudiating the condition Kiwi 
Packaging had converted the cheque, and was therefore 
precluded from asserting a right to disclaim the condition 
and to treat the cheque as payment only on account. 
Mahon J. stated that there were only two English cases 
which appeared to be on point. They were the decisions 
7Supra Note 1 
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of Neuchatel Asphalte Co. v Barnett8 and D & C Builders 
Ltd v Rees9 • In doing so, he overlooked a substantial 
body of Commonwealth authority on the pointlO • In 
particular although Mahon J • cited the English case of Day 
v Mcleall he overlooked the significance of this case 
which is perhaps the leading authority on the issue. 
The extensive body of Commonwealth case law in this area, 
held that in determining whether an offer of a cheque 
tendered in full and final satisfaction has been accepted, 
the same is a question of fact, and not of law. 
This paper does not propose to canvass the Commonwealth 
authority on point prior to Homeguard. The same has been 
extensively dealt with by Professor D.W. McLauchlan in his 
paper Cheques in Full and Final Satisfaction: accord 
despite discord?12. The writer concurs with the learned 
author's views expressed therein. 
Mahon J. in Homequard, although paying lip service to the 
principle that in determining whether such offer has been 
accepted, the dispute is "essentially a question of 
fact,,13, appeared to be giving such the status of a 
presumption of law. His Honour found that the rule in 
America in such cases reflected the law of England and New 
Zealand14 • The common law in the United States of America 
in such cases dictates that such is a question of law. 
It dictates that in such circumstances as a matter of law 
when the creditor banks such a cheque, an accord and 
satisfaction is complete and the creditor is unable to sue 
for the balance of the debt, notwithstanding that he may 
expressly state at the time of banking the cheque that he 
does not accept the condition upon which it is tendered15 • 
However, in the United States a divergence of opinion has 
arisen as to whether the common law still stands, 
8[1957] 1 All ER 362; [1957] 1 WLR 356 (CA) 
9[1966] 2 QB 617; [1965] 3 All ER 837. 
lOSee Cheques in Full and Final Satisfaction: accord 
despite discord?, D.W. McLauchlan (1987) 12 NZULR 259. 
11[1889] 22 QBD 610 
12Supra note 10. 
13Supra Note 1 at page 332 line 1 per Mahon J. 
14Supra note 1 at page 332 line 20 
15Corpus Juris Secundum (a contemporary statement of 
Americari law as derived from reported cases and 
legislation) volume 1, para 54 at page 540. 
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following the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (in 
particular section 1-207) by the majority of States in 
1968. This section states in effect that a party who 
assents to performance or actually performs in the manner 
prescribed or demanded by the other party does not thereby 
prejudice his rights if he reserves the same with such 
words as "without prejudice", "under pressure" or the 
like. A handful of the American States have held that 
this overrides the common rule in relation to cheques 
banked in full and final satisfaction, and allows a 
creditor to bank a cheque tendered on such condition and 
ignore the condition and sue for the balance. This will 
be dealt with more fully in chapter 9 of this paper. 
It is submitted, therefore, that in equating English and 
New Zealand law to American law, Mahon J. not only failed 
to follow a substantial body of Commonwealth case law, but 
further failed to identify and apply the common law 
principles in relation to what constitutes acceptance. 
As a general rule, acceptance to be complete needs to be 
communicated to the offeree. This may be by words or by 
conduct. The question Mahon J. should have been 
addressing was whether simply banking the cheque tendered 
in full settlement, amounted to conduct which a reasonable 
person in the shoes of the offeror would infer to mean 
acceptance of his offer. It is submitted, for reasons 
which will be enlarged upon later in this paper, that 
merely banking a cheque without more is insufficient 
conduct to amount to communication of acceptance to the 
offeror. 
It is interesting to note, that Mahon J. considered 
himself to be correctly applying legal principles when he 
held that the united States t law reflected the law of 
England and New Zealand. In doing so, however, instead 
of applying the contractual principles mentioned earlier, 
he applied the principle in the landlord and tenant case 
of Croft v Lumley16. In this case it was held that a 
landlord will be estopped from setting up forfeiture of 
a lease if he had, with knowledge of all the relevant 
facts, accepted from the tenant a sum of money as rent for 
any period following the event giving the right of 
forfeiture. 
In Croft v Lumley, a dispute had arisen as to whether or 
not the lease was liable to forfei ture. During the 
negotiations which ensued, the tenant (by his agent) 
handed to the landlord (by his agent), a sum of money 
representing half a year's rent. The landlord replied 
that he would not receive the money as rent, but only as 
compensation for occupation after forfeiture, and without 
prejudice to his rights of re-entry. However, the tenant 
insisted that the money be only tendered on the basis that 
16(1858) 6 HL Cas 672; 10 ER 1459. 
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it be received unconditionally as rent due and that the 
landlord must "take it or leave it". The landlord took 
the money and held it to his credit, but insisted he had 
not received it as rent. 
Professor D.W. McLauchlan17 states that Croft v Lumley is 
merely one of a number of landlord and tenant cases which 
played an important part in the development in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century of a complex body of law 
known as the doctrine of election. 
The learned author states of such doctrine18 : 
"In outline, that doctrine provides that where 
a person in his dealings with another is faced 
with making a choice between two alternatives 
and inconsistent rights, then the choice once 
made is irrevocable and the other al ternati ve 
right is extinguished." 
This case is interesting, as although the doctrine of 
election is undoubtedly a separate doctrine, the 
principles in relation to when a party is deemed to have 
made the choice between two alternatives are not 
altogether different in principle. The difference appears 
to be merely one of policy made by the courts. As 
Professor McLauchlan states a feature of the doctrine of 
election which is exemplified in this case is that in 
deciding whether conduct amounts to an election the courts 
have always adopted a hostile atti tude to attempts to 
exercise contractual rights coupled with a disclaimer as 
to an intention to affirm the contract. 19 
Mahon J. then went on to expressly hold that in the 
absence of evidence of misrepresentation or induced 
mistake which might afford relief to the respondent in law 
or in equity, and in the absence of any other relevant 
evidence which could go to qualify the creditor's 
conduct2o : 
.. the inference must be inevitable that the 
cheque was banked in conformity with the 
condition by which it was accompanied. The 
presence of the condition must necessarily be 
clearly proved and the banking of the cheque 
must be shown to have been an informed and 
17Supra note 10. 
18Supra note 10 at page 279. 
19Supra note 10 at page 279. 
20Supra note 1 at page 333 lines 14-20. 
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voluntary act, for it represents acceptance of 
the cheque as opposed to its mere receipt." 
The reference to "other relevant evidence" and the fact 
that Mahon J. states that the banking of the cheque must 
be shown to have been an informed and voluntary act would 
on the face of it suggest that for instance a flat 
rejection of the condition communicated to the debtor 
would be such evidence. However, the judgment as a whole, 
leaves the impression that Mahon J. felt that a creditor 
could not bank the cheque and reject the condition upon 
which it was offered. This, it is submitted, is 
strengthened by his view that it was important that there 
was no evidence of misrepresentation or induced mistake. 
Both these doctrines, are doctrines of relief, which can 
be afforded to the party, after a contract has come into 
being. 
Mahon J. also canvassed the criticism which has been 
levied at the rule in Foakes v Beer21 that payment of a 
lesser sum in the place of a larger undisputed and 
liquidated sum affords no consideration. In doing so he 
examined section 92 of the Judicature Act 1908, which is 
a statutory exception to such rule. This will be dealt 
with more fully in Chapter 8 of this paper. His Honour 
then examined the appellant's al ternati ve argument of 
promissory estoppel. Mahon J. stated that his first 
objection to the use of promissory estoppel in such 
circumstances was that it had not yet been sanctioned by 
the House of Lords and bypassed the common law rule which 
required consideration to be afforded. It is submitted 
that Mahon J.' s latter concern is unfounded and the 
doctrine of consideration and promissory estoppel can 
happily co-exist. 
His Honour's second objection regarding the use of 
promissory estoppel was that the High Trees22 decision 
which was the decision which founded or "revived" such 
doctrine related to an agreement before the monetary 
liability became due and Spencer Bower and Turner on 
Estoppel by Representation23 had expressed the view that 
estoppel could not be applied so as to negate the result 
which would accrue in a Foakes v Beer situation. It is 
submitted that such distinction is unreal and 
unnecessarily prohibitive. These points will be dealt 
with more fully in Chapter Sed) of this paper. 
21 ( 1884) 9 AC 60S. 
22Central London Property Trust v High Trees [1947] 1 KB 
130. 
233rd edition, 1977, at pp. 398-399. 
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Mahon J. went on to assert what he states to be "an 
additional ground" 24 to support his conclusion· that an 
accord and satisfaction had been effected. He felt such 
additional support came from section 21 (2) (b) of the Bills 
of Exchange Act 190825 • Mahon J. stated that the terms of 
delivery of Homeguard's cheque fell within section 
21(2){b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 as such was 
"conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for 
the purpose of transferring the property in the bill". 
He held that it therefore followed that the property in 
the cheque could not pass to Kiwi Packaging until it had 
complied with the condition. He held that by banking the 
cheque and then repudiating the condition, Kiwi Packaging 
had in his opinion converted the cheque. His Honour 
stated: 26 
"Thus it might be said that the respondent is 
precluded from asserting any right to disclaim 
the condition and to treat the cheque only as a 
payment on account, for it could only adopt that 
course by committing against the appellant the 
tort of conversion." 
Mahon J. I S reasoning of his "additional ground" he 
afforded only one paragraph in his judgment. Greig J., 
convincingly argued in the High Court decision of James 
Cook Hotel Limited v Canx Corporate Services Limited,27 
that such section is merely concerned with the delivery 
of a bill of exchange, and is merely a rule of procedure 
or evidence, not a rule of substantive law. It allows 
evidence to be given, that the delivery or transfer of the 
bill of exchange was not for the purpose of transferring 
the property in the bill, but was for some other purpose. 
He states a typical example of which would be the transfer 
in escrow or a payment on some other condition which means 
that the bill is not delivered and is otherwise 
incomplete. This will be dealt with more fully in Chapter 
6 of this paper. It is sufficient at this point to say, 
that the brief consideration of Mahon J. of this point, 
appears to suggest that he merely intended such argument 
to add additional support to his main, and fully argued 
proposition on accord and satisfaction. 
The decision in Homeguard, by Mahon J., appears to have 
created a great flurry of activity by debtors, if the 
24Supra note 1 at page 333 line 36. 
25This will be dealt with more fully in Chapter 6 of this 
paper. 
26supra note 1 at page 333, lines 49-51 
v[1989] 3 NZLR 213 
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frequency of the cases is anything to go by, in forwarding 
to creditors with whom they had a dispute, and indeed some 
with whom they didn't, a cheque in full and final 
satisfaction. One tends to suspect from a great number 
of the cases subsequent to Homeguard, that such is not so 
much the process of the law following standard commercial 
practice, but commercial practice following the law. 
Indeed, the law as laid down by the decision in Homeguard 
would seem from the writer's experience in practice to be 
the most publicly-known case. 
This paper now proposes to examine the common law 
principles which apply when one is determining whether an 
accord and satisfaction has resulted, and will then 
attempt to show that the decision in Homeguard, and many 
of the decisions prior to it, are not in accordance with 
such principles. 
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3 What type of contract is involved when a cheque is 
"accepted" in full and final satisfaction of a.claim. 
At common law, there are two "types" of contract. These 
are known as "unilateral contracts" and "bilateral 
contracts n • Unilateral contracts can be formed in one of 
two ways. The most common type of unilateral contract is 
that of an offer in exchange for an act. In this 
situation the consideration supplied by the offeror is the 
promise contained in his offer, and the consideration 
supplied by the offeree is the doing of the requested act. 
The doing of the requested act also signifies acceptance 
of the offer. 
The most famous case concerning a unilateral contract is 
that of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company28. In this 
case the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company advertised that they 
would pay £100 reward to anyone who caught influenza after 
having used a smokeball three times daily for two weeks 
according to the directions supplied with each smokeball. 
Mrs Carlill used the ball as prescribed and then caught 
influenza. The English Court of Appeal held that a 
unilateral contract had been formed. This was as the act 
requested and the consideration supplied by her was the 
use of the smokeball three times daily for two weeks. The 
Court held that as soon as she had completed that act she 
had a contract with the Company which continued as long 
as she persisted in using the smokeball as directed. The 
Court held that the Company was not obliged to do anything 
until she caught influenza, but that catching influenza 
was a condition of its liability not part of the 
consideration. 
Therefore as can be seen in a classic type of unilateral 
contract communication of acceptance of the offer does not 
have to be made expressly, but can only be done by 
performance of the requested act, which itself also 
constitutes the consideration supplied by the offeree to 
the offeror. 
However, as Anson rightly points out in his textbook Law 
of Contract29 a unilateral contract may also be formed by 
an offer of an act in return for a promise. The example 
he gives is the situation of a person offering goods or 
services which when accepted bind the acceptor to reward 
him for them. He gives the illustration of A allowing B 
to do work for him under such circumstances that no 
reasonable man would suppose that B meant to do the work 
for nothing. He states in this situation A will be liable 
to pay for the work. The doing of the work is the offer; 
m(1893) 1 QB 256 
2926th edition, 1984, p22. 
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the permission to do it, or the acquiescence in its being 
done constitutes the acceptance. 
However, although the writer agrees with the learned 
author that a unilateral contract can indeed be the offer 
of an act in exchange for a promise, it is submitted that 
the example given is perhaps not a good one. In all cases 
when one is considering whether or not an offer has been 
accepted, such is a question of fact. The question is 
always one of interpretation of the facts in the 
particular case. In interpreting the facts, one must ask 
the question as to whether a reasonable person in the 
shoes of B, would have understood that his offer was being 
accepted. It is submitted that acquiescence in allowing 
such an act to be performed is equivocal and therefore not 
tantamount to acceptance. 
In this latter type of unilateral contract, communication 
of acceptance of the offer to the offeror is needed before 
the contract is completed. This communication may be by 
words or conduct. In the first type of unilateral 
contract, communication of acceptance is taken to be 
impliedly waived by the offeror3o . 
In a bilateral contract such contract consists of an 
exchange of promises. The offeror makes promises to the 
offeree in return for promises to himself which he 
requests from the offeree. In such situation there is a 
general presumption that the offeree must communicate his 
acceptance of the offer to offeror before a contract comes 
into existence31 • 
It is a difficult question of interpretation to decide 
whether the typical scenario of a cheque being forwarded 
in full and final satisfaction of a dispute and being 
"accepted" by the. creditor is a unilateral or a bilateral 
contract. 
One possible interpretation is that such is a unilateral 
contract of the latter variety. That is an offer of the 
act of payment, in return for a promise to forbear to sue 
for the balance of the claim. If it was such a unilateral 
contract, then the same would not be complete until 
payment had actually been received on the cheque. That 
is executed consideration on the part of the offeror would 
be required. 
Alternatively such could be a bilateral contract in that 
forwarding of such cheque amounted to a promise of payment 
in return for a promise to forbear from suing on a claim. 
30J.C. Smith The Law of Contract 1989, 1st edition 
at page 27. 
31Ibid at page 28. 
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However, the difference may be one of semantics, as in any 
event it is usual in either type of contract, that 
communication of acceptance would need to be provided to 
the offeror. It is only in the first type of unilateral 
contract where acceptance is taken to be waived by the 
offeror. Therefore, it is submitted, that even if the act 
of payment is performed by the offeror, there would still 
need to be communication of acceptance of the terms upon 
which it was proffered. This will be examined more fully 
in the next chapter. 
Assuming for the present purposes that such offer has been 
accepted, is such accord and satisfaction still incomplete 
until actual payment, or crediting of the amount of the 
cheque to the creditor's bank account has been achieved? 
Before the latter half of the nineteenth century the 
original contractual obligation was held not to be 
discharged by accord and satisfaction until the accord was 
executed and the agreement to furnish the new 
consideration had been carried out. As was said in Lynn 
v Bruce32 : 
"Accord executed is satisfaction: accord 
executory is only sUbstituting one cause of 
action in the room of another, which might go on 
to any extent." 
Now the question is regarded as one of construction of the 
agreement. The promise of payment on its own might be the 
consideration and discharge of the original obligation if 
it is clear that the parties intended it to be so. If 
this is so then the original obligation or claim is then 
discharged from the date the promise is accepted. 
Therefore, if the promisor fails to perform the promise, 
the promisee's only remedy is to sue for breach of the 
promise, and he cannot return to the original obligation 
or claim. 33 
It is submitted, that when one is construing a contract 
to ascertain whether it was the promise or the act that 
the other contracting party was bargained for, that the 
same should be construed in the manner which one would 
interpret any other type of contract. The idea of parties 
bargaining for a promise is in itself a legal fiction. 
It is submitted, that if one asked most contracting 
parties what it was they had bargained for, they would 
claim it was the act not the promise. However, in the 
vast majority of situations it is the other party's 
contractual promise which supplies consideration for the 
~(1794) 2 Hbl 317 per Eyre LCJ at page 319. 
33Anson's Law of Contract 26th edition by A. G. Guest (1984) 
Oxford, England. 
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contract itself; the law of contract being seen as the 
law which enforces promises. 
However, in some situations it is necessary to give effect 
to the intention of the parties that the consideration be 
seen as the executed promise or act. This is the usual 
situation in unilateral contracts of the first variety; 
that is an offer of a promise in exchange for an act. A 
common example of the consideration in unilateral 
contracts of the first variety is seen in the "reward" 
cases. For example, a man may place an advertisement in 
a newspaper offering a reward of $100 to anyone who found 
his lost dog. Clearly, it would be a nonsense to suggest 
that a contract would come into effect if a person wrote 
to the man who had placed the advertisement stating that 
he would find the man's dog. In this situation, as a 
matter of interpretation, it is clear that the man who 
placed the advertisement did not intend to be 
contractually bound by a person merely promising to do the 
requested act. What he clearly required in exchange for 
his offer was the requested act of finding his lost dog. 
When one is examining such 'contract' to see if it is of 
the latter type of unilateral contract; that is the offer 
of an act in exchange for a promise, the terms of the 
contract are taken from the terms of the offer, which must 
be accepted. with the typical scenario of a cheque 
forwarded in full and final satisfaction, the offer will 
be contained in the letter which is forwarded with the 
cheque. Therefore, one has to examine this offer to see 
whether the offeror is offering the payment itself in 
return for the promise of the creditor not to sue for the 
balance or a promise of payment in return for such promise 
not to sue. As the actual cheque itself is being 
forwarded with such offer, it could indeed be interpreted 
that it is the actual payment itself that the debtor is 
proffering in return for such promise. Indeed, this is 
the way that the cases to date after Homeguard seem to 
have interpreted such contract , although, they do not 
expressly state they are doing so. 
In Dunrae Manufacturing Limited v C.L. North & Co. 
Limi ted34 , a cheque was sent to a creditor in "full and 
final settlement" of a disputed debt. The cheque was 
banked by the creditor's office lady without reference to 
the creditor. The creditor did not become aware of the 
condition until nearly two years later when action was 
brought to recover the balance. For several months after 
the banking of the cheque the creditor had sent out 
accounts rendered to the debtor for the balance and 
endeavoured without success to discuss the matter with the 
M[1988] 2 N~LR 602. 
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debtor. Eventually, the creditor issued proceedings in 
the District. Court for recovery of the balance. The 
debtor pleaded accord and satisfaction. 
In the District Court it was found there was no accord and 
satisfaction, however, this was reversed by Smellie J. on 
appeal to the High Court. Smellie J. declined to follow 
Homeguard and held that banking the cheque was not 
conclusive evidence of accord. However, he found that 
viewed objectively the banking of the cheque in that case 
did amount to an acceptance of the debtor's offer to 
settle. 
Smellie J. dealt primarily with the question of whether 
the offer of part payment in full satisfaction had been 
accepted. He did not give such detailed analysis to the 
question of when the consideration or satisfaction had 
been supplied. His Honour's finding in the third to last 
paragraph of his judgment supports the view, however, that 
payment is needed before consideration is supplied. His 
Honour held35 : 
"I find as a fact that the conduct of the 
respondent's agent in banking the cheque 
amounted to an acceptance of the offer and when 
the chegue was honoured the accord and 
satisfaction were complete." (emphasis added) 
In Budget Rent-a-Car Limited v Goodman and Alston36 , Mr 
Goodman had hired a rental car from Budget Rent-a-Car. 
A day after he had hired the car he allowed Mr Alston to 
drive it, in breach of the hire agreement he had with 
Budget Rent-a-Car. While Mr Alston was driving the car 
he had an accident. Summary judgment proceedings were 
issued against both Mr Goodman and Mr Alston. Mr Alston 
took no steps in the proceeding and summary judgment was 
entered against him by default. 
Before the summary judgment proceedings were issued, the 
debt collecting company handling the affairs of Budget 
Rent-a-Car had written to Mr Goodman claiming 
reimbursement for the then estimated net cost due to 
Budget as a result of the accident the previous year. Mr 
Goodman's solicitors had written back saying in effect 
that Mr Goodman had only just completed his University 
studies and was in straitened financial circumstances and 
therefore had no assets to meet Budget's claim and might 
even fact bankruptcy were the claim to be enforced against 
him. The amount in dispute was approximately $10,000. 
35Ibid at page 607. 
36Unreported, High Court Wellington, Master Williams, 
13 November 1990. 
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Mr Goodman's solicitor in the same letter offered Budget's 
credit controllers the sum of $5,000 in full and final 
settlement payable in one lump sum. 
There was then some further correspondence, as Budget's 
debt collecting agency seemed to have misunderstood the 
terms of the offer. Finally on 28 July 1989 Mr Goodman's 
solici tors wrote again to Budget's debt collector a letter 
almost identical to their previous one outlining the tight 
financial circumstances in which Mr Goodman found himself 
and enclosing their trust account for $5,000 "in full and 
final settlement of your client's claim". 
On 7 August the debt collectors for Budget wrote back a 
letter which showed that their solicitors had been reading 
the recent High Court decisions on cheques forwarded in 
full and final satisfaction and stated as follows: 
"Our solicitors have advised us that recent High 
Court decisions make it clear we are entitled to 
reject the basis of tender and accept the cheque 
on account. Full settlement depends on accord 
and satisfaction, and you certainly do not have 
such an agreement from us. 
Accordingly, we have receipted the cheque and 
intend to proceed against your client for the 
balance." 
At the summary judgment hearing, Mr Goodman raised the 
defence of accord and satisfaction. Master Williams not 
surprisingly held that there was no dispute in the present 
instance as to liability to pay had never been questioned 
and held therefore that Mr Goodman had afforded no 
consideration by such payment. 
However, notwithstanding this finding, Master Williams 
went on to consider whether actual payment on the cheque 
was necessary to provide the consideration in such accord 
and satisfaction, although not expressly stating that he 
was doing so. He stated at page 11: 
"It is clear from the authorities in the general 
law that payment is not received until a cheque 
is banked and cleared. It follows that payment 
was not received by Budget or its agents until 
8 August or later by which stage it had, or 
possibly, was in the process of advising Mr 
Goodman through his solicitors that it did not 
accept the cheque in full settlement of his 
obligations and indeed that it intended to sue 
him for the balance. 
In those circumstances, this court is of the 
view that it could not be said that the banking 
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of the cheque amounted to the irretrievable 
manifestation of assent such as the cases 
require in order to constitute accord and 
satisfaction." 
One possible interpretation of what Master Williams was 
saying, would be that he was impliedly holding that such 
was a unilateral contract of the second variety, and was 
therefore not effected until the consideration had been 
supplied by the offeror, the consideration being the act 
of payment and not merely the promise to pay. His Honour 
seems to be saying that if payment has not been received 
upon banking (which indeed it could not be) then the 
banking of the cheque could not amount to an irretrievable 
manifestation of assent, and before payment Budget or its 
agents had notified Mr Goodman through his solicitors that 
it did not accept the cheque on the basis tendered. 
In DFC New Zealand Limited & Anor v Wellington City 
Council37 , summary judgment proceedings were issued by the 
plaintiff against the Wellington City Council seeking 
specific performance from the City Council to do all 
things necessary to enable a title to issue to the 
ballroom forming part of the Plaza International Hotel 
complex in Wellington. DFC was the financier of the Plaza 
Hotel, and the land to the rear of the Plaza was owned by 
the Wellington City Council. 
The Wellington City Council had agreed to sell air space 
in a proposed car park to Forum on a planned subdivision. 
A dispute had arisen between the Wellington City Council 
and Forum and the balance of purchase money due to the 
City Council under this agreement was left outstanding. 
DFC was concerned, as due to the dispute and the City 
Council withholding the title, DFC could not register its 
first mortgage over the property. DFC decided to pay the 
balance outstanding to the City Council and therefore 
allow the unit title to the ballroom to issue so that the 
mortgage could be registered. 
The solicitor for DFC, Mr Shillson, spoke to Mr Jones, the 
solicitor for the Wellington City Council. He outlined 
the situation and said that DFC wanted the subdivision to 
proceed and would pay the money on the following 
conditions: 
1. That such payment was to be without prejudice to 
the Wellington City Council and Forum's argument 
over the amount outstanding. 
37Unreported, High Court Wellington, Master Williams, 
13 September 1990. 
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2. That the subdivision would proceed forthwith and 
that any requisitions would be satisfied 
promptly. 
Mr Shillson said that Mr Jones acknowledged that he 
understood DFC's view and sent him a copy of the 
settlement statement which had been sent to Forum showing 
the balance required to settle as at 10 July 1989 at 
$269,337.55. 
However after this date and prior to 22 September 1989 Mr 
Jones had received a memorandum from the Economic and 
Business Development unit of the Council asking for the 
title to be withheld or cash reserves maintained. 
On 22 September 1989 Mr Shillson called to see Mr Jones 
and explained and confirmed the conditions on which the 
cheque was tendered and handed him the cheque for 
$278,620.67 which was the balance required to settle on 
that date inclusive of interest for late settlement. At 
the same time he presented Mr Jones with a letter which 
recited that DFC felt it necessary to pay the money to 
complete the acquisition by Forum, that it was without 
prejudice to Forum's arguments with the Council and that 
it was done in order to facilitate the acquisition by 
Forum of the airspace above the Council car park. 
The City Council paid DFC's cheque into its account and 
it was collected by way of a debit to DFC's bank statement 
the day it was handed over. 
Towards the end of March 1990 Mr Shillson spoke with Mr 
Jones and was told that the latter had all the documents 
in hand but they "would not be lodged until defects in the 
Betty Campbell complex had been remedied". 
As can be seen, this is not strictly the scenario, as in 
previous cases, of a cheque being proffered on the basis 
that it be taken in full and final satisfaction of a 
disputed claim. However, although not considered strictly 
relevant the cases on cheques proffered in full and final 
satisfaction were considered by Master Williams in his 
judgment. Further, as stated earlier the case law on 
cheques in full and final satisfaction is merely an 
application of the principles of accord and satisfaction, 
which is itself a peculiar type of contract. 
The case is interesting due to the way that DFC pleaded 
its two causes of action. Firstly, it pleaded a contract, 
which on analysis would seem to be the second type of 
unilateral contract, that is an offer of an act in 
exchange for a promise. It pleaded it in the following 
way: 
"In consideration of the first plaintiff 
discharging the obligation of Forum under the 
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Airspace Agreement the Council agreed, by 
accepting the cheque on the terms tendered, to 
lodge all documents relating to the subdivision 
of the airspace with the District Land Registrar 
at Wellington and satisfy any requisitions 
relating to the deposit promptly. ,,38 
The word "discharging" infers that such act, that of 
payment, must actually have to be done, in order for the 
consideration to be provided. 
In the alternative, DFC pleaded that its cheque was 
tendered to the Wellington City Council on the basis that 
if the Council accepted the cheque it would accept the 
obligation set out in the letter. This was essentially 
an argument concerned with condi tional payment under 
section 21(2)(b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 and 
will be dealt with later on in this paper. 
Unfortunately, Master Williams did not consider this first 
argument in any detail. He stated39 : 
"There is, in this Court's view, Ii ttle 
difference in whichever approach is adopted." 
He held further, somewhat unhelpfully, that4o : 
". •• it is clear that the City Council is in 
breach of its contract with DFC and that DFC is 
entitled to an order for specific performance 
requiring the City Council to comply with its 
obligations 'to lodge all documents relating to 
the subdivision ••• and that any requisitions in 
relation to the deposit be satisfied promptly' 
or that the cheque was tendered and accepted on 
those conditions and that the City Council is 
bound thereby." 
In Webster Developments Limited (in Receivership and in 
Liquidation) v J.A.J. Bassili and Another41, the claim was 
for arrears of rent and other payments due under a deed 
of lease, by the defendants as guarantors of the lease. 
On 3 July 1989 the solicitors for the lessee wrote to the 
solicitors for the lessor concerning the agreement as to 
the rent. The letter went on to inquire whether the 
38I bid at page 16. 
39Ibid at page 17. 
40I bid at page 18. 
41Unreported, High Court Auckland, Hillyer J., 27 September 
1991. 
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lessor would be prepared to surrender the existing lease 
on certain terms. It was suggested that there were 
overpayments of rental and the letter outlined other 
considerations and in closing offered to pay a further 
$5,000 immediately in full settlement of such surrender. 
Subsequently receivers were appointed to the lessors. On 
18 August the solicitor for the lessee wrote to the 
receivers enclosing a copy of the earlier letter and 
asking for the matters therein to be considered and to let 
them have their thoughts on the same as soon possible. 
On 28 September 1989 no response had been received so the 
solicitors for the lessees once more wrote to the 
receivers noting that they had not heard from them since 
their letter of 18 August. They further stated: 42 
"We presume that the offer made in that letter 
is acceptable and therefore enclose our cheque 
for FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS in full settlement of 
our client's obligation to Webster Developments 
Limited in terms of the leases dated 3 July 1985 
and expiring respectively on 8 April 1990 and 22 
May 1990. 
Please note that your receipt of the enclosed 
cheque is only accepted on the basis set out 
above." 
This cheque was not banked. Subsequent statements were 
sent by the plaintiff to the defendant outlining the 
monies owing, and the solicitors for the defendant wrote 
back saying that some two months ago they had paid to the 
receivers in full and final settlement a cheque for $5,000 
for all monies owing under the lease. 
On 6 December the solicitors for the receivers wrote back 
to the solicitors for the lessees returning the cheque and 
saying that it was not accepted in full and final 
settlement as tendered and further stating that a Section 
218 notice had been issued for the arrears. 
The cheque proffered had never been presented nor had the 
receipt attached to it been signed. After further 
communications this proceeding was issued. 
The defendants submitted that an accord and satisfaction 
had arisen on the basis of the cheque being forwarded and 
had been held by the receivers for something over two 
months. 
42I bid at page 4. 
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Hillyer J. stated that he had dealt with the question of 
accord and satisfaction in the case of H. B. F. Dalgety 
Lind ted v Morton43 • 
The Plaintiff submitted that there was no dispute and 
therefore the case of Foakes v Beer44applied and the're was 
no consideration for any agreement by the creditor. 
Hillyer J. disagreed and held that there was a dispute in 
the present instance. He reaffirmed his earlier view that 
when deciding whether there was an accord and satisfaction 
the question was one of fact. He cited a number of 
earlier decisions on cheques proffered in full and final 
satisfaction and said that in all those cases the cheque 
sent had been banked and "the banking of the cheque had 
been taken, in the absence of clear indication to the 
contrary to be acceptance of the offer made, in other 
words there had been an accord" 45 
Hillyer J. then cited a passage from D. & C. Builders 
Limited v Rees46 where Lord Denning said: 
"Now, suppose that the debtor instead of paying 
the lesser sum in cash, pays it by cheque. He 
makes out a cheque for the amount. The creditor 
accepts the cheque and cashes it. Is the 
position any different? I think not. No 
sensible distinction can be taken between 
payment of a lesser sum by cash and payment of 
it by cheque. The cheque, when given, is 
conditional payment. When honoured, it lS 
actual payment. It is then just the same as 
cash. If the creditor is not bound when he 
receives payment by cash, he should not be bound 
when he receives payment by cheque." 
This case held that payment by cheque afforded no new 
consideration, as payment by cash would not have. Hillyer 
J. did not state why he was citing this passage, but it 
would appear to be in support of a proposition that 
consideration is not effected until the other party 
receives payment on the cheque. It is doubtful whether 
this case in fact affords such principle. Hillyer J. went 
on to say47: 
~[1987] 1 NZLR 417. 
44Supra note 3. 
45Supra note 43 at page 8. 
46[1966] 2 QB 617 at 623. 
47Supra at note 43, page 9. 
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"Until the cheque is presented the amount cannot 
be paid. until the cheque is presented the debt 
has not been satisfied. As Lord Denning said, 
the cheque was given as conditional payment, 
when honoured it is actual payment, it is then 
just the same as cash. Here therefore, in my 
view there has not been payment and the 
retaining of the cheque and the fact that it was 
not presented would indicate to an independent 
observer that the offer had not been accepted. 
There was therefore in my view no agreement 
between the parties. 
Another way of looking at the matter might be to 
say that the receipt of the cash from the cheque 
would be the satisfaction which made up the 
accord and satisfaction. until the cash was 
received either by a credit in the account of 
the person to whom the cheque was sent or by the 
banknotes being handed over, no payment was 
made. It was not an actual payment therefore 
there was no satisfaction even if, which I think 
would not be the case, the holding of the cheque 
for a period would amount to accord." 
/' 
There is therefore an express finding by Hillyer J. that 
satisfaction could not have occurred until actual payment 
was received on the cheque. He stated that he was 
conscious that in a number of cases the failure to advise 
the offeror over a period that the offer had not been 
accepted in full satisfaction amounted to an accord but 
he stated all those cases were ones in which the cheque 
had been cashed or banked. Therefore, the defendant's 
plea of accord and satisfaction failed. 
Therefore to date in the relatively few cases which have 
considered whether expressly or impliedly the question as 
to whether it is executed consideration, that is payment, 
which is necessary before an accord and satisfaction is 
complete or merely the promise to pay which effects the 
satisfaction, the Courts have found the former to be the 
case. 
Although, as submitted earlier the question is one of 
construction of the particular agreement, it is submitted 
that in the majority of cases the most reasonable 
interpretation would be that the creditor had bargained 
on payment, and not merely the promise to pay. This is, 
as a contract's terms are contained in the offer, the 
acceptance being mere agreement to those terms. In the 
typical case of a cheque proffered in full and final 
satisfaction, the offer would be contained in the letter 
sent with the cheque. The fact that the cheque is sent 
with the letter, thereby placing the means of payment in 
the creditor 1 shands, would lead , it is submitted, to the 
reasonable interpretation that it was the actual payment 
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that was being offered and not merely a promise to pay. 
Therefore, it is submitted, that the typical scenario of 
a cheque being proffered and "accepted" in full and final 
satisfaction of a disputed or an unliquidated claim is an 
example of a unilateral contract of the latter variety. 
That is the offer of an act of payment in exchange for a 
promise to forbear from suing for the balance. 
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4. Agreement 
In the previous chapter, this paper examined what type of 
contract was involved when the cheque was "accepted" in 
full and final satisfaction of a dispute. This chapter 
proposes to examine the phenomenon of "agreement" 
necessary in such an accord and satisfaction. For, in 
order for there to be an accord, there needs to be an 
offer and an acceptance. Despite the implicit finding in 
Homeguard the question as to whether or not there is 
acceptance is a question of fact not law48 • 
Since at least 1477 it has been the common law in England 
and subsequently in New Zealand, that acceptance of an 
offer needs to communicated to the offeror before the same 
is effective. That is49 : 
"There must be an external manifestation of 
assent, some spoken word or acts done by the 
offeree or by his authorised agent which the law 
can regard as the communication of the 
acceptance of the offer." 
The oldest case reported on such point appears to be the 
case in the Yearbooks of Anon50 • It was argued in that 
case that where the produce of a field was offered to a 
man at a certain price, if he was pleased with it on 
inspection, the contract was made and t~e property passed 
when he had seen and approved the subject of the sale. 
But Brian C. J. said51 : 
"It seems to me that the plea is not good 
without showing that you had certified the other 
of his pleasure, for it is trite learning that 
the thought of a man is not triable, for the 
devil himself knows not the thought of a man; 
but if you had agreed that if the bargain 
pleased then you should have signified it to 
such an one, then I grant you need not have done 
more, for it is a matter of fact." 
This dictum was approved by Lord Blackburn in the case of 
Brogden v Metropolitan Railway Company52 in support of the 
48Day v McLea (1889) 22 QBD 610. 
49Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract (1988), 7th edition, 
at page 56. 
5°(1477) YB Pasch 17 Edw 4, F.1, p12. 
51 Ibid at pp. 34-35. 
52(1877) 2 App. Cas. 666. 
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rule that a contract is formed not with the acceptor has 
made up his mind to accept, but when he has done something 
to signify his intention to accept. 
The main reason for the rule that acceptance is incomplete 
until it is communicated is that it would cause hardship 
to an offeror if he were bound by his offer without 
knowing that his offer had been accepted53 . 
Acceptance need not necessarily be expressed in words, it 
may be expressed by conduct. But conduct will only amount 
to acceptance if it is clear that the offeree did the act 
with the intention (actual or apparent) of accepting the 
offer54 • Further an offeror may waive the means of 
communication of acceptance: 
"He may himself 
obligation but 
another ... 55 
run the risk of incurring an 
he may not impose it on 
This waiver may be expressed or inferred from the terms 
of the offer. It is normally assumed the need for 
communication of acceptance is waived in the first type 
of unilateral contract. That is an offer of a promise in 
return for an act. It can also be taken to be waived in 
bilateral contracts. An example of the same is found in 
the case of Brogden v Metropolitan Railway company56. In 
this case it was said that if a man: 
" ••• sent an offer abroad saying: I wish to know 
whether you will supply me with goods at such 
and such a price, and, if you agree to that you 
must ship the first cargo as . soon as you get 
this letter, there can be no doubt that as soon 
as the cargo was shipped the contract would be 
complete." 
Further an offeror may specify the doing of a certain act 
to signify acceptance. For instance an offeror may state 
that if the offeree is to accept the offer he must stop 
at the end of the street and wave a flag three times. 
However, the above mentioned principles that an offeror 
may waive the need for communication, and that he may 
53Treitel The Law of Contract 7th edition, 1987, 
at page 18; Chitty on Contract 26th edition volume 1 
1989. 
~"Chitty on Contracts", 1989, 26th ed. 
55Cheshire and Fifoot The Law of Contract supra note 49 
at page 57. 
56Supra note 52 at page 691. 
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specify a certain act to signify acceptance, are subject 
to the following rule. It is that the offeror cannot 
stipulate silence to mean acceptance, nor can he stipulate 
a commonplace act to signify acceptance57 . The rationale 
for this rule is identical and can be traced back to the 
decision of Felthouse v Bindley58. The facts of that case 
were as follows: Felthouse had offered by letter to buy 
his nephew's horse for £30 ISs. adding 'if I hear no more 
about it I shall consider the horse mine at £30 ISs'. No 
answer was returned to this letter, but the nephew told 
Bindley, an auctioneer, to keep the horse out of the sale 
of his farm stock, as he intended to reserve it for his 
uncle Felthouse. Bindley sold the horse by mistake, and 
Felthouse sued him for conversion of his property. 
The court held that as the 
Felthouse his acceptance of 
took place, no contract had 
conversion could not occur . 
nephew had not signified to 
the offer before the auction 
been effected, and therefore 
Willes J. said59 : 
.. It is clear that the uncle had no right to 
impose upon the nephew a sale of his horse for 
£30 ISs unless he chose to comply with the 
condition of writing to repp.diate the offer." 
The rationale for the rule that an offeror cannot 
stipulate silence to mean acceptance nor can he stipulate 
a commonplace act to mean acceptance is, that the offeror 
has no right to impose an onus on the offeree to signify 
his non-acceptance of the offer. Secondly, it is 
submitted, silence and a commonplace act can be equivocal, 
even if specified to signify acceptance by the offeror. 
This is as such could signify acceptance of the offer, or 
in the case of silence it could signify that the offeree 
had not got round to, or could not be bothered replying 
to the offer. Similarly a commonplace act could signify 
acceptance, or that the offeree was merely doing such 
commonplace act as he would have in any event. 
However, although it is settled law that an offeree can 
stipulate the manner of acceptance, it is submitted that 
it would be running counter to principle to say he could 
stipulate the manner of rejection, as this would be 
tantamount to equating silence or the failure to do an act 
with acceptance and would therefore run counter to the 
rule in Felthouse v Bindley that a person cannot stipulate 
57J.C. Smith The Law of Contract 1989, 1st ed. at page 29. 
58Supra note 5. 
59Supra note 5 at page 875. 
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silence to indicate acceptance as there should be no onus 
on the offeree to reject the offer. 6o 
It is submitted, that in many of the cases after 
Homeguard, the court has overlooked the rule that silence 
cannot amount to acceptance even if specified to signify 
acceptance, and that likewise a commonplace act cannot be 
specified to specify acceptance. In doing so, the courts 
have further overlooked the rationale behind such rule 
which is that such is equivocal and secondly that there 
should be no onus on the offeree to reject an offer. 
This reinforces the further rule that communication of 
acceptance needs to be made to the offeror before such 
offer is accepted, such communication being by words or 
conduct, but being sufficiently clear and unequivocal that 
a reasonable person in the shoes of the offeror would take 
such to signify acceptance. 
Anson61 states that acceptance may be inferred where the 
offeree takes the benefit of an offered performance which 
he has had a reasonable opportunity to reject. The 
learned author gives the example that if the offeror sends 
an unsolicited pot of jam to the offeree in circumstances 
which show that he expects to be paid for it, he should 
be able to recover its price if the offeree accepts the 
benefit of his performance by consuming the jam. 
However, it is submitted, what if the offeree eats the jam 
and at the same time says "I am not going to pay for it", 
surely then no contract can come about as one is not able 
to infer agreement. Even, in the example given by Anson, 
surely the eating of the jam itself could be equivocal and 
the better solution would be to say that the offeror would 
be entitled to restitution for the value of the jam. This 
sum would likely equate to the same sum that would have 
been due under a contract had it been effected, but would 
have the benefit of not imputing acceptance of an offer 
on a party, and hence a contract, where it was unclear 
whether such acceptance existed. 
Although, as can be seen, the offeror may impliedly or 
expressly waive the need for communication of acceptance 
of his offer, it would seem that in such circumstances 
that although he, the offeror, cannot assert the existence 
of a contract against the offeree, the offeree may enforce 
such contract against the offeror. As was cited earlier: 
60See Professor J.F. Burrows, Update on Contract 1991, New 
Zealand Law Society Seminar at page 18. 
61Supra note 29 at page 39. 
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"He may himself run the risk of· incurring an 
obligation but he may not impose it on another. ,,62 
If such is true, then in the case of Felthouse v 
Bindley63, the nephew could have enforced such contract 
against his uncle, as the uncle had expressly waived the 
need for communication of acceptance of the offer, but, 
the uncle would still be unable to enforce such contract 
against the nephew. 
There is, however, some authority for saying that the 
offeror cannot any more than the offeree be bound where 
the offeree simply remains silent in response to an offer 
and no exceptional circumstances are involved. 64 
In most cases involving cheques proffered in full and 
final satisfaction of a disputed claim the "acceptance" 
of the offer of the cheque on the terms it is proffered 
is never expressly communicated to the offeree. The 
courts have inferred acceptance either from long periods 
of silence, or from the fact that the creditor (offeree) 
has banked the cheque. It is submitted, that in these 
cases the courts have overlooked the rule, and the 
rationale behind the rule, that silence cannot signify 
acceptance, and neither can a commonplace act, even if the 
offeror expressly stipulates that such will amount to 
acceptance. 
It is submitted, that the act of banking the cheque, is 
in itself, like silence and a commonplace act, equivocal, 
as it could mean that the offeree has accepted the cheque 
on the terms proffered, or just as likely, it could mean 
that the creditor has taken the cheque on account. It is 
submitted, that long periods of silence in this regard, 
by themselves after or before banking cannot aid the court 
in determining whether the creditor has accepted the 
cheque on the terms proffered and it is up to the debtor 
(offeror) to enquire or ascertain from the creditor 
whether his offer has been accepted. 
It is submitted that if the correct common law principles, 
as expounded, and the theory behind them, were adhered to, 
this would result in sufficient certainty of application, 
which the law in its present state lacks. The rule laid 
down by Mahon J. in Homeguard, al though incorrect in 
principle had the benefit of certainty of application. 
Some cases have followed Homeguard in holding that banking 
62Supra note 55. 
63Supra note 5. 
64Fairline ShippingCorporation v Anderson [1975] QB 180, 
189. 
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the cheque signifies acceptance of the offer at the time 
of banking. Others have held that long periods of silence 
with or without banking amount to such acceptance, and in 
still further cases delays of period of days after banking 
before the creditor writes back rejecting the offer, have 
been held to signify acceptance. However, in nearly all 
these cases, the judges seem to have followed Homeguard 
in holding that there is an onus on the creditor to reject 
the offer. Such principle expounded by the courts runs 
counter to the rationale behind the rule in Felthouse v 
Bindley65 that there should not be an onus placed on the 
offeree to signify his rejection of the offer, and the 
principle that acceptance needs to be communicated; 
whether it be by words or conduct. 
The Cases: 
Brown v Reardon66 concerned a dispute between a farm 
labourer, Mr Reardon, and his employers, the Browns, over 
arrears of wages due to the Mr Reardon and $700 he claimed 
was owing for the loss of his two dogs shot on the Browns' 
property. In a letter dated 4 March 1981, Mr Brown's 
solicitors conceded that some payment was due in respect 
of wages but denied liability for the shooting of the dogs 
and threatened to counter-claim for stock allegedly killed 
by the dogs. In conclusion the letter stated that: 
"In the meantime we are instructed without 
prejudice to offer the within two cheques 
totalling $176 in full and final settlement of 
all claims each might have against the other, in 
this connection." 
Mr Reardon's solicitors replied on 11 March 1981 raising 
further points about the disputed wages which called for 
further enquiry and confirmed that the claim for the dogs 
would be pursued and asked whether they should: 
11 • •• return these cheques or can we hold them in 
anticipation of a further cheque for the balance 
of our client's claim? Should it be your desire 
that the cheques be returned, we will be happy 
to do so on receipt of your further advice." 
The only other letter received from Mr Reardon's 
solicitors before court proceedings were instituted was 
a reply dated 3 April 1981 advising that their letter had 
been sent to the Browns for their comments and that they 
would be contacted once they had received further 
instructions. No further reply was ever received. 
65Supra note 5. 
~[1985] 2 NZLR 530. 
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On 29 April 1981 Mr Reardon's solicitors wrote to the 
Browns' solicitors threatening proceedings unless they 
heard from them within seven days. Then on 19 May, the 
Reardon solicitors commenced two default actions, and on 
the same day issued a receipt for the $176 crediting that 
amount to Mr Reardon on account of wages and making 
allowance for the payment in the statement of claim. 
The Browns sought to strike out the statement of claim on 
the basis that an accord and satisfaction had been 
effected. In the District Court it was held that there 
had been no accord and satisfaction and the application 
was dismissed. The Browns then appealed to the High 
Court. 
Casey J. on appeal held on the facts that the 
correspondence amounted to a modification, of the 
unequivocal condition about settlement originally imposed 
by the appellant's solicitors, to an arrangement that the 
respondent's solicitors could hold the cheques until they 
replied after seeking further instructions. Casey J. held 
that their action in banking the cheques was in breach of 
that arrangement but not of the original terms relating 
to settlement which were no longer operative. 
Casey J., however, stated nothing which could lead to the 
inference that he dissented at all with the views of Mahon 
J. in Homeguard. Indeed, like Mahon J. he cited the 
decision of Croft v Lumley67 in support of his view that 
a 68 : 
.. creditor cannot unilaterally alter the 
basis on which the tender was made and thereby 
claim there was no meeting of minds when he 
takes it, as distinct from receiving it." 
Although Casey J. seemed to express no dissent from the 
views of Mahon J. in Homeguard, he reached an entirely 
different conclusion. With respect, it is submitted that 
there should be no difference in principle in holding that 
the cheque was banked in acceptance of the later modified 
condition, and therefore Homeguard was not in reality 
distinguishable. 
However, Casey J. stated that the appropriation of the 
cheques in view of the correspondence and the two months 
of waiting for the promised decision, could not be treated 
as manifesting the respondent's assent to the terms on 
which the cheque was originally offered; as had been the 
case in Homeguard where the terms remained unequivocal 
between tender and acceptance. 
~Supra at note 16. 
wSupra at note 66, p.532 lines 36-38. 
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In Kirkland v Lindisfarne Landscape Limited69 an account 
had been rendered by Lindisfarne Landscape Limited for 
preparation and the service of a putting green at a golf 
course operated by Mr Kirkland. Mr Kirkland had replied 
by letter to this account on 15 March 1981 complaining it 
was excessive and pointing out that the company, 
Lindisfarne, had made a thorough inspection of the work 
and had estimated its cost would be about $500 but the 
account it had levied was for $1,252.20. The letter 
enclosed a cheque for $650 "as final payment". On 21 June 
1981 the Company sent Mr Kirkland a letter advising that 
"we are not able to accept your cheque as full and final 
settlement but do acknowledge receipt of $650 as part 
payment". The cheque for $650 was presented for payment 
the next day and duly honoured. Lindisfarne then sued Mr 
Kirkland for the balance of $602.20. In the District 
Court the Judge found that the Company was entitled to 
succeed and Mr Kirkland appealed. 
Vautier J. on appeal expressly followed the decision of 
Mahon J. in Homeguard and distinguished that of Casey J. 
in Brown v Reardon7o . His Honour held that despite the 
implication in Homeguard the question as to whether there 
was "agreement" to the terms upon which the cheque was 
sent was one of fact. 
His Honour stated that the District Court Judge's decision 
that there had been no "meeting of minds" appeared to 
overlook two important aspects. Firstly His Honour felt 
that the respondent's letter of 21 June made it completely 
clear that it was fully aware throughout that the cheque 
was forwarded on the basis that it was acce~ted in full 
settlement. VautierJ. stated secondly that 1: 
" • •• no account seems to have been taken of that 
fact that established principles as to estoppel 
would prevent the respondent with a full 
knowledge of the facts purporting to accept the 
payment upon a different basis from that on 
which it was tendered." 
Vautier J. further concluded that the respondent by its 
long silence must obviously have led the appellant to 
conclude that the offer of settlement was accepted. He 
further stated that the respondent had ample time to make 
enquiry to clear up any doubt as to the basis upon which 
the cheque had been sent. 
69[ 1985] 2 NZLR 534. 
70Supra note 66. 
71Supra note 69 at p.538 lines 21-24. 
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Finally, His Honour expressly adopted the language in 
Homeguard and held that the conduct of the respondent 
constituted an irretrievable manifestation of assent by 
it to the condition imposed by the appellant. 
With respect to the learned judge, the matter, it is 
submitted, was approached in completely the wrong way. 
Firstly, as submitted earlier there should be no onus on 
an offeree to reject an offer. Second, the fact that 
there was a long silence between the time of offer and 
that of rejection should be irrelevant for in accordance 
with Felthouse v Bindley, silence cannot signify 
acceptance. Thirdly, it is submitted, there are no 
"established principles as to estoppel" which would 
prevent payment upon a different basis than that upon 
which it was tendered. For an estoppel to have arisen 
there would need to have been conduct on the part of the 
respondent which led the appellant to believe a certain 
state of affairs existed. In this case there was a clear 
representation by the respondent before the cheque was 
banked that the cheque was not received on the condition 
upon which it was tendered. 
If this case were approached, as it is submitted it should 
have been on the established principles of offer and 
acceptance the opposite result would have been achieved. 
An offer was made and expressly rejected. Therefore it 
is submitted no accord existed and there could therefore 
be no accord and satisfaction. 
In H. B • F • Dalgety v Morton72 , Dalgety, a real estate 
agent, sold a farm for Mr and Mrs Morton. Pursuant to the 
agency contract, Mr and Mrs Morton became obliged to pay 
the Real Estate Institute's fee of $9,768.98, and an 
invoice for this amount was sent to them. 
Two weeks later the Mortons returned the invoice together 
with a cheque for $2,450. Mr Morton had written on the 
invoice "my estimate of costs for a 'work done' basis 
$2,450". This cheque was receipted and banked. 
At the same time as banking the cheque, Dalgety wrote a 
letter to the Mortons stating that the cheque was not 
accepted in full settlement. In due course Dalgety issued 
a summons claiming the balance of the commission. 
In the District Court the Mortons successfully raised a 
defence of accord and satisfaction. However, on appeal 
Hillyer J. found the defence of accord and satisfaction 
failed on three separate grounds. Firstly he found that 
there was no dispute as the contract was clear and precise 
as to the amount payable, therefore the case of Foakes v 
72[1987] 1 NZLR 411. 
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Beer73 applied, and there was no consideration for the 
accord. Secondly he held the statement on the cheque did 
not make it clear that it was tendered in full and final 
satisfaction. Thirdly Hillyer J. held that even if there 
was an offer it was not accepted. His Honour stated that 
whether or not there was an accord was a question of fact 
and the letter written by Dalgety made it clear that it 
did not accept the offer of the cheque tendered in full 
and final satisfaction. 
However, it is submitted, it is implicit in his judgment 
that Hillyer J. considered that it was necessary for the 
creditor to write back to the debtor stating he did not 
accept the cheque on the terms it was offered, and this 
he seemed to hold by implication must be done at the time 
of banking. Hillyer J. stated at page 417: 
" ••• but if the creditor does not agree, and if 
at the time that he accepts the amount he makes 
it clear to the debtor that he is not accepting 
it in full satisfaction, it seems to me that it 
cannot be said that there has. been accord and 
satisfaction." (emphasis added). 
In Dunrae Manufacturing Limited v C.L. North and Co 
Limited74 , the facts of which have been dealt with 
earlier75 , it will be recalled that Smellie J. on appeal 
declined to follow Homeguard and held that banking of a 
cheque was not conclusive evidence of accord. However, 
he did find that viewed objectively the banking of the 
cheque in that case did amount to an acceptance of the 
debtor's offer to.settle. 
His Honour stated further in reference to the District 
Court Judge's decision that he failed to see how what had 
been done after the cheque had been banked was relevant, 
as once an offer had been accepted a contract had come 
into being. 
Although, Smellie J. made no mention of presumptions to 
be taken from the banking of the cheque, he held that 
viewed objectively the conduct of the plaintiff's agent 
in banking the cheque amounted to an acceptance of the 
offer. He further held that when the cheque was honoured 
the accord and satisfaction was complete. 
This case highlights the difficulties in the reasoning of 
the cases subsequent to Homeguard which state that they 
are declining to follow the rationale in Homeguard that 
73(1884) 9 App. Cas. 605. 
74Supra, note 34. 
75Supra at page 15. 
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the banking of the cheque amounts to acceptance of the 
offer. If the banking of the cheque does not by itself 
amount to acceptance of the offer, then when is the offer 
deemed to have been accepted? Is it for instance, after 
two or three days' silence following the banking of the 
cheque? 
In this case Smellie J. took the easy way out, and stated 
that in the particular circumstances of the case the 
banking had amounted to acceptance of the offer. However, 
it is submitted, that this is doubtful, and in reality 
what led him to this finding was the absence of a 
rejection of the offer expressly for some two years from 
the date of banking. If one accepts that, banking of a 
cheque is in general equivocal and could not by itself be 
taken to be acceptance of the offer, then long periods of 
silence following the same cannot due to the rule in 
Felthouse v Bindley76 create such acceptance. 
In this case, accounts rendered had been sent out, 
presumable monthly, after the cheque was banked, and this 
conduct, it is submitted, was clear evidence, if any is 
needed, that the offer had not been accepted. 
Broadlands Finance Limited v St. John's Motors (Wanganui) 
Limited77 was another appeal from a District Court 
decision. In this case the appellant (the plaintiff in 
the District Court) had sued the respondent for damages 
for breaching an agreement to lease a key-cutting machine. 
The respondent had raised many defences, but the one of 
accord and satisfaction had succeeded in the District 
Court. The District Court had held that a payment of a 
cheque offered in full and final satisfaction for $1,000 
in February 1983 had effected an accord and satisfaction. 
This decision was upheld in the High Court. 
In this case there had been a default in payment under the 
lease agreement and the appellant had repossessed the 
machine. There then arose a dispute as to the amount 
payable under the lease, and some correspondence about 
possible settlement ensued. 
Subsequently a letter was sent explaining the respondent' s 
view as to how the net liability was to be calculated. 
The letter further contained an offer to settle the 
dispute for $1,000, and enclosed a cheque for the same. 
The letter finally said: 
76Supra note 5. 
77Unreported, High Court Wanganui, Greig J., 14 March 1988. 
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"We enclose herewith our cheque for $1,000 on 
the explicit understanding that it is either to 
be accepted by you in full and final settlement 
of this claim or else returned to us." 
On 21 February 1983 the letter and cheque were received 
by the appellant and dealt with by its clerk "in the 
administration department. Evidence was given which was 
not disputed that the person dealing with the cheque did 
not read the letter attached to it, and the cheque was 
simply removed from the letter and banked to the account 
of the respondent. There was no evidence as to when the 
cheque was banked. 
On 23 February the letter was received by Mr Brook, who 
was horrified when he read its last sentence. He wrote 
a reply which was dated 25 February. This was a Friday 
which meant that the letter could not have reached the 
appellant's office until Monday 27 February. 
In this letter Mr Brook stated he did not accept the offer 
of the cheque for $1, 000 in full settlement of the 
dispute, and advised that the same had been receipted in 
error. He suggested that the respondent: 
1. Reverse the cheque, or 
2. Treat it as part payment, or 
3. They would refund the $1,000 in exchange for full 
settlement. 
There was no further communication until 19 May 1983 when 
the respondent's solicitors wrote to the appellant 
referring to a letter not produced and demanding return 
of the $1,000. The appellant's solicitors refused to do 
so in their letter of 24 May 1983. 
It is significant, that there was no dispute between 
counsel for appellant and respondent that Mahon J. had 
correctly expressed the relevant principles in Homeguard 
as to how the question of accord and satisfaction was to 
be decided. However, Greig J. stated of Homeguard that78 : 
"with respect, I agree that puts the matter in 
the clearest way in a case such as this." 
Greig J. held that in the circumstances, in the face of 
the explicit conditions in the letter of 18 February, the 
dealings with the cheque in receiving it, crediting it to 
the respondent's account with the appellant and banking 
it, were enough to amount to an informed and voluntary 
acceptance of the money. 
~Ibid at page 5. 
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The appellant argued that Mr Brook I s letter of 25 February 
was an explicit declaration that the appellant did not 
accept the payment in full satisfaction. He submitted 
further that the invitation to reverse the cheque was 
equal to its return. Greig J. stated79 : 
"As to the latter point that cannot be right 
even assuming there was time to act effectively. 
Stopping a cheque requires some action by the 
drawer and, as I believe, payment of a fee. It 
cannot be the same as the passive receipt of the 
return of the cheque or the money. II 
This reasoning clearly runs counter to the rationale 
behind the rule in Felthouse v Bindleyso that you cannot 
place the onus on an offeree to reject the offer. 
Further, this case goes further and states that the 
reverse is true, and an onus cannot be placed on the 
offeror to do a positive act. 
Greig J. touched on the unreasonableness of such a rule 
as he was promulgating. He statedS1 : 
"It may seem that this rule and its application 
has a stringency which borders on the 
unreasonable when there is on the one hand a 
clear rejection of the proposed settlement and 
suggested alternatives which do not on their 
face disadvantage the debtor. The point, 
however, is that the payer is entitled in this 
situation to impose the terms on which payment 
is tendered and the payee must comply strictly 
or risk the consequences." 
However, although it is true that the offeror is entitled 
to specify the terms upon which his offer is to be 
accepted, Greig J. is ignoring the rule in Felthouse v 
Bindley that one cannot specify silence to signify 
acceptance, as the same is equivocal, and cannot signify 
acceptance. It is submitted, that banking of a cheque is 
also equivocal. This does not mean in such situations 
that the offeror is left without a remedy, but that 
remedy should be restitution or conversion for the value 
of the cheque, rather than imposing agreement on the 
parties where it is probable and indeed often clear, that 
none existed. 
79Ibid at page 6. 
SOSupra note 5. 
SlSupra note 77 at page 7. 
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In Parmenter v Carter82 , the plaintiff was suing on a 
guarantee. The defendant raised a defence of accord and 
satisfaction. On 4 May 1988 the defendant had forwarded 
to Rudd Watts and Stone a cheque for $1,000 in full 
satisfaction of this proceeding. This was the first time 
the defendant had indicated any evidence of wishing to 
settle the matter. 
It had been banked by the office system on 5 May. and 
passed through the account on 10 May. Inquiries had been 
made prior to the hearing but the plaintiff had been 
unable to find the person who had banked the cheque. 
On 24 May Rudd Watts wrote to the defendant advising that 
they had made an error in banking the cheque. 
Master Gambrill canvassed the recent case law concerning 
cheques proffered in full satisfaction. She held on the 
facts that "the defendant was induced to believe a 
settlement had been made,,83 
Master Gambrill concurred with Smellie J. in Dunrae84 that 
the subsequent events in the letter maintaining there had 
been a mistake were not a basis on which the plaintiff was 
entitled to rely. She stated further: 85 
"The relevant facts to establish accord and 
satisfaction are before me in respect of receipt 
of the cheque and the fact that the plaintiff 
took no further steps at the time of receipt to 
amend what they now say is their error." 
(emphasis added) 
Therefore the defence of accord and satisfaction was found 
to be reasonably arguable and the summary judgment 
application was dismissed. 
As can be seen from this case, the Master felt the fact 
of banking, without the plaintiff taking further steps at 
the time of banking was sufficient to amount to acceptance 
of the offer. As stated above, this runs counter to the 
rationale behind the rule in Fel thouse v Bindley that 
there should be no onus on the offeree to signify his 
rejection of the offer. Further, it overlooked the rule 
that acceptance of an offer needs to be communicated 
either expressly or by conduct. Again, it is submitted 
82Unreported, High Court Auckland, Master Anne Gambrill 
15 August 1988. 
83Ibid at page 11-
84Supra note 77. 
85Ibid. 
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that banking the cheque without more is equivocal and 
therefore insufficient conduct to amount to acceptance. 
In Haines Haulage Co • Limited v Gamble86 a dispute had 
arisen over the performance of a contract. After an 
exchange of correspondence the debtor wrote enclosing a 
cheque in full and final settlement together wi th a 
detailed account of how such amount was calculated. This 
letter was received by a Director of the creditor. After 
a delay of ten days the Director replied that the cheque 
was received on account only (there was no evidence before 
the court of the date of the banking of the cheque). The 
plaintiff then sued for the balance it claimed was owing. 
The defendant successfully pleaded an accord and 
satisfaction in the District Court. The District Court 
Judge in holding for the defendant had relied on 
Homeguard. The Plaintiff appealed. 
Barker J. on appeal in the High Court stated that he 
thought it correct that the decision of Mahon J. on the 
point did not represent the current view of the Court. 
Barker J. stated:~ 
"The question really is, whether the delay of 
some ten days on the part of Mrs Haines in 
writing to the debtor, saying that the cheque 
was not received on that proffered basis, was in 
the circumstances a sufficient rejection of the 
offer to rebut the inference created by the 
banking of the cheque on some unknown date 
before the date of the rejection letter. II 
Barker J. stated that the authorities show that although 
accord and satisfaction is solely a question of fact, the 
mere banking of the cheque does "raise a weighty 
inference 1188 
It is submitted that there are two major fallacies in the 
reasoning of Barker J. The first is that he states that 
there is an inference raised which must be rebutted by the 
creditor on the banking of the cheque, that such is an 
acceptance of the offer. As stated above, this runs 
counter to the rationale behind the rule in Felthouse v 
Bindley that there should be no onus placed on the offeree 
to signify his rejection of the offer. The second is, 
that there was no evidence as to the date of banking, 
merely evidence that there had been a ten-day delay in the 
~[1989] 3 NZLR 221. 
87Ibid at page 224. 
88Ibid. 
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creditor writing to say that the offer was rejected. 
Barker J. found in the circumstances that the rejection 
of the offer should have been notified earlier89 • This 
seems to be equating a ten-day silence with acceptance, 
and goes against the rule in Felthouse v Bindley that 
silence cannot signify acceptance. As MCLauchlan states 
in his article, 90 Barker J. seemed to have viewed his 
task as to determine whether the conduct of the creditor 
was reasonable in all the circumstances, not what was the 
reasonable impact that conduct had on a particular debtor. 
The principle that there is a weighty inference on banking 
that the offeree has accepted the offer was further 
supported in the case of D. F. C. New Zealand Limited & Anor 
v Wellington City Council, the facts of which have been 
canvassed earlier91 • In that case, Master Williams cited 
Haines and said: 92 
..... the Court is entitled to draw an inference 
in favour of the debtor from the banking of the 
cheque especially where there is no clear and 
prompt expression from the creditor of non-
acceptance or dissent from the basis on which 
the cheque was sent." 
This, it is yet again submitted, runs counter to the 
rationale behind the rule in Fel thouse v Bindley that 
there should not be placed on the offeree an onus to 
reject the offer. 
In Budget Rent-a-Car Limited v Goodman and Alston93 , 
payment and not banking was taken as the crucial time of 
acceptance. The facts of this case have been dealt with 
earlier94 • In that case there was a delay of just over a 
week before the creditor wrote back rejecting the basis 
on which the cheque was proffered. Master Williams held 
that although the cheque was receipted on 7 August it was 
not banked until 8 August. 
As stated earlier95 Master Williams in this case 
considered the date of payment and not the date of banking 
MIbid at page 224 line 20. 
90Supra note 10. 
91Supra page 18. 
92Supra note 37 at page 25. 
93Supra at note 36. 
94Supra at page 16. 
95Supra at page 16. 
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to be the crucial date. He stated that therefore it 
followed the payment was not received by Budget or its 
agents until 8 August or later by which stage it had or 
possibly was in the process of advising Mr Goodman through 
his solicitors that it did not accept the cheque in full 
settlement of-his obligations and that it intended to sue 
him for the balance96 • 
Therefore Master Williams seems to be holding that the 
creditor must at the same time or possibly very soon after 
the date of payment notify the debtor that his offer is 
not accepted. This still places an onus on the offeree 
to do a positive act, it merely delays the date at which 
this positive act must be done to the date of payment and 
not to the date of banking. As outlined above, this runs 
counter to the rationale in Felthouse v Bindley that the 
offeree should not have to do a positive act to signify 
his rejection of the offer. 
Almare Car Sales Limited v McCulloch97 is yet another 
decision of Master Williams. In that case Mr McCulloch 
signed an agreement to purchase a 1977 Mercedes Benz for 
$19 , 990 • The contr act required that he pay a I non-
refundable deposit' of $7,000 on signing and the balance 
was to be paid in cash. The contract further provided 
that " in the event that the agreement becomes 
unconditional and the purchaser does not complete the 
transaction, the deposit shall be forfeited to the 
dealer" • 
When Mr McCulloch got home he and his wife had a strong 
disagreement and she forbade him to buy the car. Because 
of this he subsequently stopped the cheque for the 
deposit. From that point on there was a dispute as to the 
facts. 
Mr McCulloch went into the plaintiff's car yard. He gave 
the plaintiff a cheque for $400. Mr McCulloch said that 
this was to compensate the plaintiff for the "hassle" that 
they had and the money which the plaintiff had expended 
on the vehicle. 
Mr Almare stated that there was no question at all in the 
discussion he had with Mr McCulloch that he was going to 
buy the car, but that he had to talk his wife around. Mr 
Almare said the payment of the $400 was made quite clearly 
as a goodwill gesture on account for the costs already 
incurred by the plaintiff. 
%Supra note 36 at page 11. 
97Unreported, High Court Wellington, Master Williams, 
13 December 1990. 
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In any event the plaintiff banked Mr McCulloch's $400 
cheque. There was no evidence that there was any other 
contract at all between the parties until the plaintiff 
issued these proceedings about eight days later. 
In mitigation the vehicle was sold, but no details were 
given of the sale. The court had no knowledge as to 
whether the vehicle was sold at a profit or at a loss. 
The question for the court was whether the banking of the 
$400 cheque amounted to an accord and satisfaction. 
Master Williams went through the recent cases after 
Homeguard on the issue. He stated that it essentially 
came down to a question of fact to be judged objectively. 
He stated one of the matters of great moment in that 
evaluation is whether or not there has been any delay on 
the part of the creditor in rejecting the cheque or in 
objecting to the reason for its being proffered. 
The Master further stated that: 98 
" ••• there appears to have been no rejection of 
Mr McCulloch's position or any objection to the 
basis on which he says the cheque was given to 
Almare over the period which led up to the issue 
of these proceedings. That issue and service, 
of course is the clearest possible evidence that 
Almare did not accept Mr McCulloch's 
cancellation of the contract, but even so, as 
the authorities discussed above show, the delay 
of some eight days tells against Almare's 
version of events to some extent at least." 
However he held that it was not necessary to reach a 
conclusion on this issue as the application for specific 
performance had been abandoned, and the only claim before 
the court was that on the dishonoured cheque. He then 
went on to deal with the law in relation to dishonoured 
cheques and eventually dismissed the application for 
summary judgment. 
One criticism, it is submitted, which could be levied 
against the obiter statement of Master Williams, that an 
accord and satisfaction is likely to have arisen, is that 
even on Mr McCulloch's version of the facts it is not 
altogether clear that the cheque was expressly offered in 
full and final settlement of the claim. It is submitted, 
that this is yet further evidence of the fact that the 
courts in deciding cases on cheques proffered in full and 
final satisfaction, appear to be divorcing themselves 
somewhat from the strict rules of contract. 
98Ibid at page 9. 
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Once more, Master Williams asserted his view of the case 
law, from which he expresses no dissent, that there is an 
onus on the creditor to reject the condition upon which 
the cheque was proffered. It is submitted, as Master 
Williams himself expressly states, that in this instance, 
the issue of the proceedings some eight days later was the 
clearest possible evidence that Mr Almare did not accept 
the basis on which the cheque was proffered. Indeed, it 
is the writer's experience in practice that a delay of 
only eight days before the issue of proceedings, is quite 
extraordinary and could only have occurred if Mr McCulloch 
had given his solicitor explicit instructions to prepare 
and file the proceedings on an urgent basis. If the 
rationale in Felthouse v Bindley was applied, and it was 
held that there should be no onus on the creditor to 
signify his rejection of the offer, then it should have 
been held that banking of the cheque in those 
circumstances was equivocal and could not objectively be 
viewed as communication of acceptance. 
In Webster Developments Limited (in Receivership and in 
Liquidation) v J .A. J. Bassili & Anor99 , the facts of which 
have been dealt with earlier1oo , Hillyer J. appears it is 
submitted, to have got it partly right. As will be 
recalled from that case, the debtor had sent a cheque in 
full and final satisfaction. The Receivers of the 
plaintiff held on to this cheque for some two months 
without banking it. They then returned the cheque and 
stated that it was not accepted in full and final 
satisfaction. Hillyer J. held that the retaining of the 
cheque and the fact that it was not presented would 
indicate to an independent observer that the offer had not 
been accepted. He stated in his view there was no 
agreement between the parties. 
Although, this case is more of an authority, for the fact 
that executed consideration was needed to effect such 
accord and satisfaction, Hillyer J. declined to hold, as 
some of the cases had previously that the mere retaining 
of a cheque, together with silence over a long period 
amounted to acceptance. In doing so, al though not 
expressly stating that such was the case, he was applying 
the rule in Felthouse v Bindley that silence cannot amount 
to acceptance. 
As can be seen from the vast majority of cases to date 
following the landmark decision in Homeguard the common 
law principle that acceptance must be communicated in 
order to be effective has been overlooked. Further, the 
courts seem to have overlooked the rule, and the rationale 
behind the rule in Fel thouse v Bindley that silence cannot 
99Supra note 41. 
lOOSupra at pp 20-23. 
44 
amount to acceptance. The most striking case in this 
regard is that of Haines where there was no evidence as 
to the date of the banking of the cheque, but Barker J. 
held that a delay of ten days in the creditor rejecting 
the offer amounted to acceptance. This, it is submitted, 
is tantamount to a finding that the creditor's silence 
amounted to acceptance. Nearly all the cases to date have 
stated that there is an onus on the creditor to reject the 
offer. This, as submitted earlier, runs counter to the 
rationale in the rule in Felthouse v Bindley that there 
should be no onus on the offeree to signify his rejection 
of the offer. Further, as submitted earlier, in general 
the mere banking of the cheque cannot amount to conduct 
which signifies communication of acceptance, as the same 
is equivocal. In this regard, it is further submitted 
that even if a creditor were to specify, which is 
sometimes the case, that banking of the cheque will amount 
to acceptance of the offer, that he is not permitted to 
do so. This is due to the rationale behind Felthouse v 
Bindley, that also applies where the offeror specifies a 
commonplace act to signify acceptance, that silence or the 
doing of such an act is equivocal. 
It is submitted, that if the correct common law principles 
are applied, the banking of such a cheque in general could 
not amount to acceptance by itself, neither could further 
periods of silence. This rule is capable of certainty, 
as a creditor would not be taken to have accepted such 
offer unless he expressly states he has or acts in such 
a clear and unequivocal fashion that on the balance of 
probabilities, no other reasonable interpretation could 
be placed on his actions. In such a case, the debtor is 
not left without a remedy but such should be in 
restitution or in conversion for the value of the cheque. 
This would have the benefit of not imposing an agreement 
on a party where it is unclear whether the offer has been 
accepted and that such agreement has in reality come into 
being. This would also be achieved by applying settled 
contract principles. 
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5. Considera~ion 
The previous chapter dealt with the concept of agreement. 
This chapter proposes to deal with the consideration 
necessary to effect such an accord and satisfaction. 
In doing so it will deal with many different aspects of 
such consideration. Whether executed or executory 
consideration is required in such contracts has already 
been dealt with earlier in this paper. lOl This chapter 
proposes to deal with firstly the question as to what 
amounts to a disputed debt. The rule in Foakes v BeerI02 
states that acceptance of a lesser sum in full and final 
satisfaction of a larger liquidated and undisputed amount 
affords no consideration. However , it is settled law that 
payment of a lesser sum in satisfaction for either a 
disputed or an unliquidated debt does afford good 
consideration. This chapter proposes to deal with the 
question as to what in law amounts to such disputed debt. 
Secondly this chapter then proposes to deal with further 
related consideration questions. For instance, is there 
good consideration if the debtor merely pays a liquidated 
or undisputed portion of the debt. Further, should it be 
sufficient if there is consideration 'in fact' although 
not in law. A recent English Court of Appeal case felt 
that such was so. Finally this paper proposes to examine 
the doctrines of promissory estoppel and waiver. No 
consideration is necessary for either of these two 
doctrines but specific other requirements must be met. 
a) Dispu~ed Deb~ 
It is settled law that payment of a lesser sum in 
satisfaction for~either a disputed or an unliquidated debt 
does afford good consideration. The rationale being that 
both sides are giving something up: the creditor is 
giving up payment of the balance of the money, and the 
debtor is giving up his claim. However, it is still 
questionable whether the debtor in order to give good 
consideration must have merely an honest belief in his 
claim, or an honest belief based on reasonable grounds. 
From Elizabethan times until the early part of the 
nineteenth century forbearance to sue upon a groundless 
101Supra at Chapter 3. 
lO2Supra note 5. 
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claim was considered no consideration103 • Maule J. stated 
in Wade v Simeon104 : 
"Forbearance to prosecute a suit in which the 
plaintiff has no cause of action (and in which 
••• he must eventually fail), according to the 
authorities is no consideration. It is no 
benefit to the defendant; and no detriment to 
the plaintiff." 
The policy issue which was involved was stated by Tindall 
C • J ., also in the case of Wade v Simeon 105. He stated: 
If [ it] is almost contra bono mores, and 
certainly contrary to all principles of natural 
justice, that a man should institute proceedings 
against another, when he is conscious that he 
has no good cause of action." 
In the middle part of the nineteenth century, the emphasis 
shifted away from whether or not the claim that was 
relinquished had any validity to whether or not there was 
an honest belief in the validity of the claim on the part 
of the person giving it Upl06. Bowen L.J. in Miles v New 
Zealand Alford Estate Companyl07 outlined that: 
"It seems to me that an intending litigant 
bona fide forbears the right to litigate a 
question of law or fact which it is not 
vexatious or frivolous to litigate, he does give 
up something of value. It is a mistake to 
suppose it is not an advantage which a suitor is 
capable of appreciating, to be able to litigate 
his claim, even if he turns out to be wrong. It 
seems to me it is equally a mistake to suppose 
that it is not sometimes a disadvantage to a man 
to have to defend an action where if in the end 
he succeeds in his defence; and I think 
therefore that the reality of the claim which is 
given up must be measured, not by the state of 
the law as it is ultimately discovered to be, 
but by the state of the knowledge of the person 
103Filcocks v Holt (1589) 1 Leo 240; 74 ER 219; Peck v 
Loveden (1602) Cro. Eliz. 804; 78 ER 1013; Barber v 
Fox (1670) 2 Wms Saund. 136; 85 ER 860; Jones v 
Ashburnham (1804) 4 East 455; 102 ER 905. 
104(1846) 2 CB 548 at 566; 135 ER 1061 at 1068. 
105Ibid at page 565; 1067. 
106See Cook v Wright (1861) 121 ER 822 at 825-826. 
w7(1886) 32 Ch. D. 266 at 291. 
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who at the time has to judge and make the 
concession. Otherwise he would have to try the 
whole cause to know if a man had a right to 
compromise it, in this regard to questions of 
law it is obvious he could never safely 
compromise a question of law at all." 
There can be found many cases which express the rule 
solely in terms of the good faith of the forbearer108 • 
Many more cases seem to place some restriction on the good 
faith principle. For example the requirement that the 
claim itself is reasonable in itself and not "vexatious 
or frivolous". The reference to vexatious or frivolous 
comes from the judgment of Bowen L. J. in Miles v New 
Zealand Alford Estate Company109, which has been cited 
earlier. Cotton L.J. in that same case expressed the 
statement slightly differently. He saidllo : 
"If there is in fact a serious claim honestly 
made, the abandonment of the claim is a good 
consideration' for a contract." 
Fry L. J • in Miles considered there was no difference 
between the view of the other two judges. He stated 
thatll1 : 
" when a real claim is made and is a bona 
fide compromise that is ample consideration." 
It is difficult to ascertain whether there is much 
distinction in practice between the varying statements of 
principle. As a claim is unlikely to be held to be 
honestly held if there were no reasonable grounds for 
believing the same to be true. It is submitted, there is 
a great deal of truth in the observation of Mason J. in 
Wigan v Edwards112 where he states: 
II [the] different expressions of principle do 
not reflect an important conceptual difference. 
There will be few cases involving an honest or 
108NG Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78 at 96, 
Jayawickreme v Amarasuriya [1918] AC 869 at 873-
874 per Lord Atkinson, Binder v Alachouzos [1972] 
2 QB 151 at 159, 160 per Phillimore and Roskill JJ. 
109Supra at note 107. 
110Ibid at page 283. 
l11rbid at page 298. 
112(1973) 37 ALJR 586 at 595. 
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bona fide belief in a claim which is vexatious 
or frivolous." 
Perhaps the most that can be said is 
exceptional case, the court might hold 
additional element had not been satisfied. 
that in an 
that this 
The leading case in New Zealand on such issue is the case 
of Couch v Branch Investment (1969) Limited113 • In that 
case Mr Couch, for the purpose or purchasing a launch, 
arranged a loan from the plaintiff finance company for 
$6,500. This was due in one payment. A hire purchase 
agreement was drawn up, where Mr Couch's company was 
described as the hirer, Mr Couch as the guarantor, and the 
plaintiff as the owner. These descriptions were not 
correct. 
The launch sank in circumstances where insurance was not 
recoverable. The repayment due was not made. 
A director of the plaintiff visited the home of Mr Couch 
to discuss the matter. An agreement was then executed by 
Mr and Mrs Couch "in consideration of the plaintiff 
forbearing to take court action against Mr Couch for 
$6,500". 
Mr and Mrs Couch agreed to pay that sum on demand with 
interest at ten percent per annum and to give the 
plaintiff a mortgage over two properties they held in 
joint names, and to put the properties on the market for 
sale. 
The agreement was prepared by a firm of solicitors 
instructed by Mr Couch on behalf of himself and his wife. 
She was not separately legally advised. 
Later Mr Couch was adjudicated bankrupt and Mr and Mrs 
Couch separated. One of the properties was sold at a 
mortgagee sale with no surplus. The other property was 
awarded to Mrs Couch under the matrimonial property 
settlement. 
The plaintiff called upon Mrs Couch to give a mortgage 
over the second property and she refused. Proceedings 
were then commenced against her and Mr Couch. Mr Couch 
gave evidence for Mrs Couch in the proceeding but 
otherwise took no part. 
In the High Court judgment was awarded for the plaintiff 
in damages but not specific performance. 
113[1980] 2 NZLR 314 (Court of Appeal). 
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The High Court had held that although the original 
contract was unenforceable as it was in breach of the Hire 
Purchase and Credit Stabilisation Regulations 1957, the 
plaintiff honestly believed that the document described 
as a hire purchase agreement was valid and enforceable. 
Holland J. found no improper pressure had been placed on 
Mrs Couch by the plaintiff and that Mrs Couch had offered 
the security over the property if the plaintiff would 
allow her further time to pay and Mrs Couch had signed the 
agreement to assist her husband in obtaining time. He 
found she had signed it solely at his request and not at 
the request of the plaintiff. 
The judge considered that a claim brought by the plaintiff 
against Mr Couch pursuant to the original agreement could 
not be regarded as vexatious, frivolous or unreasonable 
although it was bound not to succeed. 
In the Court of Appeal, Cooke J. (as he then was ) noted 
that Holland J. accepted as correctly stating the law the 
followin~ passage from Cheshire and Fifoot Law of 
Contract 14: 
"A plaintiff who relies upon the surrender of a 
claim to support a contract must prove: 
If (i) That the claim is reasonable in 
itself and is not I vexatious or 
frivolous / , 
II (ii) that he himself has an honest 
belief in the chance of its success, 
and 
.. (iii) that he has concealed from the 
other party no fact which, to his 
knowledge, might affect its validity." 
Cooke J. then examined the question as to whether an 
honest belief was enough. He examined the leading cases 
which stated it was, as long as the claim was not 
vexatious, frivolous or unreasonable. He further stated 
the cases which held that reasonable grounds also were 
needed. 
Cooke J. statedl~: 
.. [the] ultimate question must 
public policy. A person who 
be one of 
extorts a 
1M9th edition, 1976 page 76, 5th edition 1979 at page 69. 
115Ibid at page 319-320. 
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compromise of a claim which he knows to be 
spurious is not allowed to profit from his own 
wrongful conduct. The law could conceivable go 
further and hold that it is unjust to enforce 
settlement of hopeless claims brought by 
obviously misguided people and having only a 
nuisance value. Or it might be thought that a 
doubt as to a party's motives, even if a 
positive finding of bad faith cannot be made, 
justifies the court in looking at whether there 
is any substance at all in the claim not 
pursued. Whether such further steps should be 
taken or not is perhaps not clearly settled in 
any jurisdiction from which cases are available 
to us. The experience of the courts shows that 
it has not found it essential to lay down an 
absolute rule. There is much to be said for 
leaving room for an exceptional case in which, 
without quite attracting the stigma of lack of 
good faith, a claim is so unmeritorious or 
unconscionable that forbearance from pursuing it 
should not be treated as consideration." 
Cooke J. accepted Holland J.'s conclusion that there was 
consideration for Mrs Couch's agreement, although, had the 
plaintiff tried to sue on the original contract it would 
have been doomed to fail. 
However, His Honour held that as Mrs Couch had no 
independent legal advice, to treat the agreement as 
binding on her would be tantamount under the circumstances 
to allowing undue advantage to be taken of her. 
Richardson J. conducted a thorough examination of all the 
cases on this issue, starting with Cook v Wright116. 
Richardson J. stated117 : 
"In principle there is much to be said for the 
view that the unenforceability of compromises 
and forbearances where there is an absence of 
honest belief in a cause of action or absence of 
any real intention to pursue such a claim is 
based on public policy rather than want of 
consideration. It is obviously of benefit to 
the promisor to be relieved of a need to defend 
a suit, even one he considers ill-founded (as 
the promisor did in Cook v Wright). Indeed the 
greater the embarrassment and expense to him of 
having the claim publicly litigated, the greater 
the argument for enforceability of the 
1~(1861) 1 B & S 559; 121 ER 822. 
117Supra note 113 at page 326. 
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compromise or forbearance if viewed simply in 
terms of the benefit/detriment test of 
consideration. And relinquishment of a claim is 
patently detrimental to the promisee if the 
possibility of success in litigation or the 
possibility that an even unfounded claim may be 
admitted may justify pursuing the claim. But to 
regard the benefit to the promisor of not being 
vexed by the promisee's claim as sufficient 
consideration warranting the enforcement of a 
promise, without any requirement of honesty of 
belief and conduct on the part of the promisee, 
would open the processes of law to abuse and 
encourage extortion. The foundation for the 
test of enforceability of compromises and 
forbearances, al though formulated in various 
ways and cases, seems to me to lie in 
considerations of that kind." 
McMullin J. felt that it might be difficult to formulate 
a general rule to cover the various circumstances of 
individual cases. However, he felt from an analysis of 
the cases to date, the law was that except in cases where 
the agreement in respect of which the forbearance to sue 
was a sham or so frivolous or vexatious that it was 
patently obvious even to a layman it could not succeed so 
as to make its assertion incompatible with honesty and a 
reasonable degree of intelligence, the courts would not 
inquire into the merits of a course of action upon which 
the forbearance to sue was based. He felt that it would 
be sufficient if the promisee honestly believed that he 
had a good cause of action118 . 
Therefore, it can be seen, all three judges in the Court 
of Appeal felt that in essence the giving up of any claim, 
afforded good consideration, the restriction that there 
must be an honest belief in the cause of action and that 
the same must not be vexatious, frivolous or unreasonable 
was merely a requirement of public policy more than want 
of consideration. 
The reality of the situation, appears to be that the 
courts will find there is consideration where the promisee 
gives up his right to a cause of action which is doomed 
to fail, if he honestly holds the belief that such will 
succeed, or has a chance of succeeding, unless some 
exceptional case occurred where it might feel obliged not 
to do so. The court, in this case by adding the rider 
that such claim must not be vexatious frivolous or 
unreasonable, it is submitted, has merely left the door 
open, as is stated by Cooke J. for an exceptional case 
which without quite attracting the stigma of lack of good 
faith is so unmeritorious that the courts would wish to 
118rbid at page 345. 
52 
hold that forbearance from pursuing it should not be 
treated as consideration. 
Surprisingly, the cases concerning cheques proffered in 
full and final satisfaction, do not seem to contain any 
detailed analysis as to whether the claim given up by the 
debtor, affords good consideration for the release 
provided by the creditor. The courts merely seem to have 
made blanket rulings that there is either a dispute or 
there is not. 
The case of Couch v Branch Investments (1969) Limited1l9 
was discussed in the further Court of Appeal decision of 
Moyes & Groves Limited v Radio New Zealand Limited120 • In 
that case a buyer had ordered goods from a seller in June 
1973. The goods had to be manufactured in India. In the 
normal course of events the goods would have arrived some 
nine months after the order, but due to unexplained 
reasons the goods arrived in June 1976; by this time both 
the buyer and the seller had forgotten about the contract. 
The costs of the goods had originally been $400 but had 
increased to $2,737. The buyer wanted to obtain the goods 
at the original price, but the seller was only prepared 
to supply them at the cost it would have to pay to receive 
them which had now substantially increased. The seller 
stated that if this was unacceptable it would return the 
goods to India. 
On 1 December 1976 after Customs had given the seller ten 
days to pay the duty and uplift the goods, the buyer 
replied by letter: 
If ••• appears no alternative but to accept your 
price under protest." 
Having obtained the goods the buyer only paid $400 and the 
seller sued for the balance. 
In the Magistrate's Court judgement was entered for the 
seller holding that the original contract had been treated 
by the parties as not existing, and in 1976 there had been 
a new contract or a variation to a new price in 
consideration for the seller refraining from returning the 
goods to India. The learned judge also rejected a defence 
of duress. 
On appeal Casey J. held that the seller had no right to 
insist on a unilateral variation of the price. The seller 
was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
119Supra at note 113. 
120 [1982] 1 NZLR 368. 
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In the Court of Appeal it was held that there was a 
genuine disagreement on substantial grounds between the 
parties and the question as to the effect the delay had 
on the contract was a difficult one, as the law on the 
subject was not at all clear. In this case, Cooke J. 
held that the parties had not consciously treated the 
original contract as at an end but had both completely 
overlooked it. Cooke J. stated that121 : 
" ••• prima facie the seller might well have had 
a right to reject the goods for undue delay by 
the manufacturers." 
As can be seen, this is not the situation which existed 
in Couch of a bona fide compromise of a hopeless claim, 
as it was held that the claim compromised had a great deal 
of merit. Indeed, Cooke J. stated further that122 : 
"In these circumstances I do not think that 
anyone could have said with confidence in 1976 
whether or not the 1973 contract between the 
seller and the buyer was still in force. This 
is borne out by the different conclusions 
reached by the Magistrate and the Judge." 
Cooke J. went on to state that a compromise of disputed 
rights where there were genuine and substantial claims on 
both sides may undoubtedly constitute good consideration. 
He stated that the cases cited in the Supreme Court 
judgment did not entrench that principle. He further 
stated that the court had to consider the principle in 
Couch with particular reference as to whether forbearance 
to sue could constitute good consideration if the party 
forbearing bona fide believed in the claim which was in 
truth totally unfounded. 
The discussions, His Honour stated, in that decision 
concerned tenuous claims where epithets such as 
, frivolous', 'vexatious', 'hopeless' and 'unreal' were 
used. His Honour stated that the case and the authorities 
collected there indicated putting the point at its lowest, 
that the courts are very slow to reject a compromise of 
a bona fide claim for consideration on the mere ground 
that on subsequent analysis may seem that it had very 
small prospect of success. Indeed, Cooke J. himself 
admitted that the case was a very far cry from the kind 
of tenuous claims under discussion in Couch. 
Cooke J. held that there was no doubt as to the bona fides 
of the seller. without deciding expressly the merits of 
the claim, he found that the seller had substantial 
U1lbid at page 379 lines 26-27. 
122supra at note 120 page 371 lines 28-31. 
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grounds for taking the position he did which was evidenced 
by the decision at first instance whether right or wrong. 
Therefore, he held that in his view the seller when he 
gave up such proposed course of action, provided 
consideration for the buyer's promise to pay the higher 
price. Indeed, it is submitted, that it is noteworthy and 
implicit support for Couch that Cooke J. did not feel it 
necessary to decide the eventual merits of the claim. 
The buyer in Moyes had further contended that any 
agreement given by it to pay the higher price was given 
as a result of economic duress. Cooke J. however found 
that this was not a case of coercion of the buyer's will, 
rather it was a prudent and sensible compromise of a 
difference on which there is much to be said on both 
sides. 
Somers J. agreed with the decision of Cooke J. and held 
that he was satisfied that the correspondence amounted to 
a compromise of a disputed claim and as in the case of any 
other contract the existence of a compromise was a matter 
of objective fact. 
Ongley J. agreed with the judgments of Cooke and Somers 
JJ. and had nothing further to add. 
Although, there were reasonable grounds for the seller's 
original stance in Moyes, it is submitted, that such 
highlights the desirability of the decision in Couch that 
a bona fide compromise of a disputed claim should be 
sufficient and that it should not matter whether such was 
on reasonable grounds. It is submi tted that it is 
significant that the court did not feel it necessary to 
decide who would have been eventually successful had the 
compromise not been reached. Due to the decision in Couch 
a court does not have to entertain arguments on the merits 
of such claim, merely the honest belief of the parties 
involved, as long as the same is held not to be vexatious 
or frivolous. This has the benefit of enforcing 
compromises parties have agreed to, and taking such out 
of the already overloaded court system. 
Possibly the most recent case to consider the Court of 
Appeal decision in Couch v Branch Investments (1969) 
Limi ted123 is the High Court decision of Master Hansen in 
Thermaseal Double Glazing Limited v Gilbert Lodge and 
Company Limited124 In this case the plaintiff sought 
summary judgment relying on a cause of action in 
conversion. Essentially a machine had been sold by the 
123Supra at note 113. 
124Unreported, High Court Christchurch, Master Hansen, 22 
April 1992. 
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defendant during 1991 to a company called Eastwick 
Holdings Limited subject to a reservation of title clause. 
The price payable was. $7,195.50 of which only $1,500 was 
ever paid. In September 1991, the plaintiff purchased 
from Eastwick the double glazing side of its business and 
the machine in question was included in the sale. The 
sale did not involve the plant being removed physically 
as the plaintiff took over the premises previously 
occupied by Eastwick. 
On 25 November 1991 in an attempt to follow up Eastwick's 
non payment of the balance owing a representative of the 
defendant visited the premises where the machine was 
operating. The representative learned that the machine 
had developed a leak and he stated he would take it to his 
workshop to repair it and return it the next day. The 
Plaintiff agreed to this course of action. 
The defendant said that after taking the goods to its 
workshop it discovered Eastwick had been placed into 
receivership and it then sought legal advice, and was 
informed that it was entitled to retain possession of the 
machine under its reservation of title clause. 
Acting in reliance on its legal advice the defendant 
informed the plaintiff on 26 November that because of the 
reservation of title clause the defendant owned the goods 
and that it required the outstanding balance on the June 
transaction to be paid before it would return the machine. 
The plaintiff in turn consulted its legal advisers who 
faxed a letter to the defendant asserting that the 
defendant's reliance on the reservation of title clause 
was misplaced and that the plaintiff had title. Return 
of the machine was also demanded in this letter. 
On the morning of 27 November at approximately 10.30 a.m. 
the plaintiff made the payment demanded, being the sum of 
$5,695. It would appear that this was done without 
reference to its solicitors. Such payment was made 
without any reservation or condition attached to it. 
After the plaintiff's solicitor had learned of the payment 
it sent a fax to the defendant reiterating the statements 
made in the earlier fax and demanding return of the money 
paid over. 
The defendant's response was that the payment had closed 
the matter. The plaintiff then commenced this proceeding 
in which it sought damages for lost production, exemplary 
damages and liquidated damages for the sum of $5,695. In 
the summary judgment proceeding judgment was merely sought 
on the question of liability and for the liquidated 
damages of $5,695, and directions for the trial on the 
quantum of the remaining damages. 
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The defendant at the hearing did not press any argument 
as to the effectiveness of the reservation of title 
clause, which appeared to have an implied power of sale 
in any event or any argument that conversion had not 
occurred. The defendant however argued that an accord and 
satisfaction had been effected. The plaintiff had offered 
to release the machine if the payment was made. Payment 
had been made and at that time the contract had been 
completed. The consideration it was submitted was the 
bona fide compromise of a disputed claim. In doing so the 
defendant relied on the case of Couch v Branch Investments 
(1969) Limited125 • The plaintiff in turn argued that as 
the defendant had received the full balance of the monies 
outstanding, it had given up nothing and therefore 
afforded no consideration. The plaintiff further argued 
that the decision in Couch was merely a case concerning 
forbearance to sue and not compromises generally. 
Master Hansen rejected those submissions and held that the 
distinction between a permanent forbearance and a claim 
that was compromised was more apparent than real. He 
stated126 : 
II Forbearance of the claim may be the 
consideration in a contract of compromise, but 
as suggested in the extract from Cheshire, I 
consider it logical that the withdrawal of a 
claim is consideration and an agreement of 
compromise should be treated in the same way as 
the forbearance of a claim." 
It is submitted, that this is indeed correct, as although 
Couch was expressly concerned with a forbearance to sue, 
many of the decisions relied on by the learned judges were 
in fact compromise decisions. Secondly, at least McMullin 
J., phrased his decision in terms sufficiently wide to 
cover both scenarios. He stated127 : 
" ••• I think it more consistent with authority 
to deal with the matter on the wider basis of 
public policy which requires that bargains 
entered into by individuals be enforced by the 
Courts unless they fall wi thin the exceptions 
already discussed. That kind of approach would 
result in the courts lending their aid to the 
enforcement of compromises which parties have 
made for themselves at the same time as holding 
support in cases where enforcement would result 
in the maintenance of a fraud." 
125Supra at note 113. 
126Supra at note 124 page 7. 
127Supra at note 113, p.336 line 32. 
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Further, in relation to the latter point raised that if 
the plaintiff had received all the monies due it had in 
fact not given up anything, it is submitted, that this is 
the incorrect way to approach the problem. 
Consideration, on a more basic level, it is submitted, 
need not be the giving up of something by one party, but 
can be the bestowing of a benefit by that party on the 
other party, or as Richardson J. stated in Couch, the 
avoidance of a detriment. 128 
In this case, although the defendant had received all the 
monies due to it , it had in return given back to the 
plaintiff, the machine it desperately needed for its work. 
Therefore, it had bestowed a benefit on the defendant. 
This was the direct result of the consideration it 
supplied in releasing its claim to the machine. 
In H.B.F. Dalgety Limited v Morton129 , a case concerning a 
cheque proffered in full and final satisfaction of a 
claim, the facts of which have been dealt with earlier130 
Hillyer J. held that no dispute existed. As will be 
recalled in that case a real estate agent claimed to be 
due to him, the sum of $9,760.98 for the commission on the 
sale of a property which had been effected through its 
agency. Some weeks later Mr Morton had returned the 
invoice together with a cheque for $2,450. written on the 
invoice was the following: 
"My estimate of costs on a 'work done' basis 
$2,450." 
The District Court Judge had held that there was a dispute 
as to the debt based on the words inscribed by Mr Morton 
on the invoice. Hillyer J. on appeal to the High Court 
rejected such claim. He stated131: 
"If an amount is owing there is an obligation to 
pay that amount. If there is a genuine dispute 
as to the amount owing, or as to whether it is 
owing, then an agreement to accept a lesser 
amount, coupled with a payment of that lesser 
amount may be accord and satisfaction. If a 
debtor gives a cheque for a lesser amount, 
acceptance of that cheque and banking it could 
be evidence of such agreement. 
128Supra at note 117. 
129Supra at note 43. 
130Supra at page 33. 
131Ibid at page 413. 
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If however the creditor's claim is for a 
liquidated sum which is not genuinely disputed 
by the debtor, then prima facie, under the rule 
in Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App.Cas. 605, there is 
no consideration for any agreement by the 
creditor to accept the cheque in a full 
satisfaction. Unless one of the exceptions to 
Foakes v applies, the creditor can recover 
the balance of the debt. 
There must be a genuine dispute, it is not 
sufficient for the debtor to be reluctant to 
pay. " 
Hillyer J., cites as authority for the last paragraph in 
the quote, the case of D & C Builders Limited v Rees132 • 
In that case the Plaintiff did work for the defendant for 
which he was owed the sum of £482. Later the defendant's 
wife on behalf of her husband offered to pay him the sum 
of £300 in settlement, knowing that the plaintiff was in 
financial difficulties and taking advantage of this fact. 
She stated that if he refused this offer he would get 
nothing. The plaintiff reluctantly agreed to accept the 
cheque for £300 and then sued for the balance. The Court 
of Appeal held he was entitled to do so. 
It is certainly clear, that where a debtor raises no 
dispute of such a debt, but merely states that he has 
insufficient funds to pay that there will be no genuine 
dispute. However, it is submitted, that just because a 
judge finds that he feels the sum is genuinely owing under 
a contract, does not mean that the debtor does not have 
a bona fide belief that he has a genuine defence to such 
claim although the same may be doomed to fail. 
Hillyer J. referred to the finding of the District Court 
Judge that there was a dispute as to the debt in this 
case, based on the note made by Mr Morton at the bottom 
of the Dalgety invoice. He stated: 133 
"In my view, with respect, this is not a proper 
inference from what is written. The amount 
payable pursuant to the real estate scale of 
charges, is an amount which can be accurately 
and exactly quantified. It was not suggested in 
the court below or before me, that the amount 
claimed as being the amount of commission, was 
not accurately calculated in accordance with the 
scale. Equally, in the terms of Cl. 11 which I 
have recited, there is no room for any doubt but 
132[1966] 2 QB 617. 
133Supra note 43 at page 414. 
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that Dalgety whose name did appear on the front-
page of the agreement, was entitled to 
commission. The fact that the respondents did 
not wish to pay the amount did not mean that 
there was a genuine dispute. Debtors frequently 
are unwilling to pay amounts, there must be some 
proper basis for such an attitude before there 
will be a genuine dispute. 
It is submitted that this statement by Hillyer J. is not 
wholly in keeping with the leading Court of Appeal 
authority in New Zealand of Couch v Branch Investments 
(1969) Limited. 134 It is submitted that just because there 
are no reasonable grounds for such dispute, does not mean 
there is not a genuine dispute. 
Nevertheless, Hillyer J. went on to hold, it is submitted, 
on much stronger ground, that the statement "my estimate 
of costs on a 'work done' basis" did not make it clear 
that the amount paid was paid only on the basis that it 
was in full and final satisfaction. 
It is submitted, that Hillyer J. would have been on much 
stronger ground had he held that the absence of any 
reasonable grounds for such dispute, led him to believe 
that the belief as to the validity of his claim was not 
genuinely held by Mr Morton. 
In Equitable Securities v Neil135 a debtor owed a creditor 
monies which were secured under first and second 
mortgages. A mortgagee's sale was effected by the 
creditor under its first mortgage but it realised 
insufficient funds to repay the creditor in full. 
Bankruptcy proceedings were instituted against the debtor, 
and the claim subsequently settled. 
The debtor's solicitor sent in a cheque for the settlement 
sum and stated that it was in full and final settlement 
from the balance outstanding from the debtor to the 
creditor. The cheque was banked by the creditor's 
solicitor. 
A short time later the credi tor wrote to the debtor I s 
solicitor acknowledging the cheque but seeking a 
substantial amount due under the second mortgage. The 
debtor's solicitor had been unaware of the second mortgage 
but he responded saying the cheque had been in full and 
final settlement of all claims. 
134Supra at note 113. 
135[1987] 1 NZLR 233. 
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In the District Court, Callander J. entered judgment for 
the debtor. The debtor had argued two defences existed. 
Firstly he had argued an accord and satisfaction had 
arisen when the cheque was banked, following the decision 
in Homeguard. The District Court judge rejected this 
claim as he held there was no consideration for any such 
agreement as the debt in question was undisputed and 
liquidated. However, the defendant succeeded on an 
argument that section 21(b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 
1908 applied. This will be dealt with later. 
The Plaintiff then appealed to the High Court. Chilwell 
J. upheld the appeal, but on somewhat unhelpful grounds. 
His Honour held that the condition accompanying the cheque 
was unclear and a fair interpretation would be that it was 
in full settlement of the bankruptcy proceedings. 
In this case, it is submitted, that a finding that the 
debt was undisputed was wholly justified. The debtor had 
never raised any dispute as to the amount owing, the claim 
was merely settled as tpe debtor had insufficient funds 
to pay the whole of the monies outstanding, and the facts 
of the case were completely within the realms of Foakes 
v Beer. 
It is submitted, that on the facts in the subsequent case 
of Almare Car Sales Limited v McCulloch136 which has been 
dealt with earlier137 , it is doubtful whether a genuine 
dispute did exist. 
As will be recalled, in that case on the defendant's own 
statement of the events, he had given Mr Almare a cheque 
for $400 as a goodwill gesture on account of the costs 
already incurred by him. The contract provided that: 
"In the event that the agreement becomes 
unconditional and the purchaser does not 
complete the transaction the deposit shall be 
forfeited to the dealer." 
Here, the deposit had been paid but the cheque stopped. 
Even on Mr McCulloch's own version of the events, he had 
subsequently handed over a $400 cheque to Mr Almare as a 
goodwill gesture on account of the costs incurred by him. 
This does not necessarily mean that he genuinely disputed 
that the sum was owing under the contract, and the 
question as to whether there was a genuine belief by him 
that there was a dispute was not addressed. 
136Supra at note 97. 
137Supra at pages 41 and 42. 
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In the case of N. Z. I. Finance Limited v Barber138 it was 
stated that Mr and Mrs Barber and the companies controlled 
by them had "suffered severely from the then current 
farming and economic climate" and as a consequence due to 
their financial situation were forced to discuss their 
financial affairs with their creditors. They then 
undertook refinancing and ultimately had to sell the land 
which they owned. 
N.Z.I. Finance was one of such creditors with which they 
had discussions. It had lent the defendant the sum of 
$50,000 pursuant to a term loan agreement. As part of the 
defendants' refinancing they borrowed $300,000 from N. Z. I. 
Finance on a three-month term. This was secured by a 
mortgage over two titles owned by the defendants' 
companies. The land was subsequently sold at a mortgagee 
sale and summary judgment proceedings were issued for the 
balance unsatisfied after such sale. 
By way of defence the defendants claimed monies paid to 
N.Z.I. on the sale of their properties were agreed to be 
accepted by it in full and final satisfaction. 
Previously, when such land was sold at mortgagee sales 
N.Z.I. Finance had offered the defendants alternatives 
regarding repayment in a letter sent to them. The same 
letter had reserved its right to sue for the balance if 
the offer was accepted and a sale did not occur. 
There was further correspondence between the parties: 
then on 8 August 1988 the plaintiff offered a discounted 
settlement figure which was open for one week if further 
information was supplied to it. In the reply to this 
letter by the defendants an extension of time was sought. 
There was then further correspondence and subsequently a 
sum was sent to the plaintiff which was less than the full 
amount. The plaintiff sued for the balance owing to it 
and the defendants argued accord and satisfaction had 
occurred. 
It was held firstly that there could be no suggestion as 
to any agreement to accept less than the full amount by 
N.Z.I. Finance which it claimed it was owed in a manner 
which precluded it, under section 92 of the Judicature Act 
1908, from proceeding. 
Master Williams then went on to cite a passa~e from 
Hillyer J.'s judgment in H.B.F. Dalgety v Morton19 where 
he stated, inter alia, that there must be a genuine 
138Unreported, -High Court Palmerston North, 8 February 
1991, Master Williams. 
139Supra at note 43. 
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dispute not merely a reluctance on the debtor's part to 
pay. Master Williams held that there was not at any time 
a dispute as to the debt owed or as to the amount of it. 
This finding, it is submitted, is justified on the facts 
of the case. The debtors never appeared to have at any 
time disputed the debt, merely pleaded the fact that they 
were in financial difficulties. However, the question of 
the bona fides of their belief and the Court of Appeal 
decision in Couch were never examined. 
The case of Webster Developments Limited (in Receivership 
and in Liquidation) v J.A.J. Bassili and Another140 , the 
facts of which have been dealt with earlier141 , is yet 
another case where there merely appears to have been a 
blanket ruling that there was either a dispute or was not 
without the bona fides on the defendant's belief ever 
being discussed. 
In this case, counsel for the plaintiff had submitted that 
there was no dispute as to the amount due and that 
therefore the principle in Foakes v Beer applied as there 
was no consideration for any agreement by the creditor to 
accept a cheque in full satisfaction. Hillyer J. stated 
he had deal t wi th this principle in H • B . F. Dalgety v 
Morton, which has been discussed earlier. 
In Webster, it will be recalled, the plaintiff had been 
suggesting that a number of credits should be given 
against the rent said to be due. Hillyer J. had stated 
that there was also the possibility that the property 
would be let for the balance of the term at a lower rental 
but one sufficient still to provide with the other amounts 
that had been paid a profit for the period over and above 
the amount the lessor could have expected to receive from 
the lessee had the lease continued. 
In those circumstances, Hillyer J. felt that he was unable 
to accept there was no dispute as to the amount owing. 
As can be seen, the cases concerning cheques proffered in 
full and final satisfaction, after Homeguard, do not seem 
to have dealt in any detail with the question as to 
whether or not a genuine dispute exists as to the amount 
owing. Indeed, none of the cases since and including 
Homeguard seem to have even cited the leading authority 
of Couch v Branch Investments (1969) Limited14 • 
140Supra at note 41. 
141Supra at pp 20 to 23. 
142Supra at note 113. 
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It is submitted, that the reasoning in Couch v Branch 
Investments (1969) Limited is correct, and that if one 
were to hold that the debtor's belief as to his claim had 
to be based on reasonable grounds, then in the majority 
of cases such claim would actually have to be tried to 
ascertain whether it would have succeeded. This, would 
hinder the compromise of suits. The outlet of providing 
that the same must not be vexatious or frivolous leaves 
the door open as Cooke J. stated in Couch to an 
exceptional case, in which, while not quite attracting the 
stigma of lack of good faith is so unmeritorious or 
unconscionable that forbearance from pursuing it should 
not be treated as consideration. 
Therefore, it is submitted, that it is insufficient for 
a court to hold, as was done in H.B.F. Dalgety v Morton143 
that it found that the sum was genuinely owing under the 
contract. As was submitted when this case was considered 
earlier, a better way to state the same, would be to hold 
that the lack of reasonable grounds for such a dispute led 
the judge to believe that the dispute was not genuinely 
held. 
b) Is there Good Consideration if the Debtor merely pays a 
Liquidated or Undisputed Portion of the Debt? 
Professor Brian Coote f in his article Cheques "in full 
satisfaction" of a larger Sum144 examined the High Court 
decision of Mahon J. in Homeguard and the Court of Appeal 
decision in James Wallace Pty. Limited v William Cable 
Limited145 • 
Professor Coote submits of Homeguard which has been dealt 
with in some detail earlier that the debtor afforded no 
consideration, as all he did was pay a sum which on his 
own calculations he admitted to be owing. 
The Court of Appeal case of James Wallace pty. Limited v 
William Cable Limited was a case decided one month after 
Homeguard and, appears to have been delivered in ignorance 
of Mahon J.' s decision in Homeguard. In that case, 
William Cable had contracted to manufacture and supply 
steel framing to Wallace pty. who were the contractors for 
the construction of the Postal Centre in Wellington. 
Later William Cable claimed that part of the work it was 
required to perform under the contract was extras. James 
Wallace did not accept this claim. By September 1970 
William Cable had completed performance of its sub-
143Supra at note 27. 
144[1981] NZLJ 20. 
1~(1980) 2 NZLR 187. 
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contract, so wrote to James Wallace making "formal 
application for the payment of all outstanding monies", 
which it stated to be $57,623. About a week later James 
Wallace sent a cheque for the amount claimed less a small 
deduction, which William Cable did not question, and 
stated it was "final payment". William Cable duly banked 
the cheque without comment, and twel ve months later 
resurrected its claim for extras and sought to recover the 
sum of $47,530. 
In the High Court, Jeffries J. made a finding that the 
acceptance of James Wallace's cheque did not constitute 
an accord and satisfaction barring William Cable's claim 
for extras, and made an order that James Wallace join in 
appointing an arbitrator to resolve the alleged dispute. 
However, in the Court of Appeal it was held by a majority 
(Woodhouse and Richardson JJ) that as a result of the 
September 1970 correspondence James Wallace were 
discharged from any further obligations to William Cable 
under the contract. It was held that the correspondence 
constituted an agreement between the parties as to the 
final amount owing under the contract which included 
extras. 
McMullin J. dissenting held that the correspondence did 
not indicate an intention on the part of William Cable to 
give up their claim for extras. He held that all Wallaces 
had done was to pay William Cable an amount which both 
sides acknowledged to be due according to the original 
schedule of prices made from the extras claim. 
Therefore, as can be seen the judgment in itself is not 
particularly helpful as it merely turned on the 
interpretation of the correspondence. 
As Professor Coote points out only Richardson J. dealt 
with the question as to whether consideration had been 
afforded by James Wallace. His Honour merely held that 
the rule in Foakes v Beer146 did not apply as at September 
1970 William Cable's claim was not for a liquidated or 
ascertained amount. 
Professor Coote makes the point that this finding is not 
a complete answer to the consideration problem. He states 
that from all of the three jUdgments, the inference can 
be drawn that the quantification of the sum owing under 
the sub-contract, apart from the claim for extras, was a 
matter of accounting only and that it was because the 
figure claimed by William Cable in their letter of 
September 1970 did not include anything for extras that 
Wallaces paid it as it did. Professor Coote states that 
if those inferences are correct it is not easy to see how 
146Supra note 5. 
6S 
the payment by Wallaces of the sum due 
about which there was no dispute 
consideration for that abandonment. 
states147 : 
under the contract 
could constitute 
Professor Coote 
"By itself, the mere performance of a contract 
by one party cannot be his consideration for a 
second and subsequent contract between the same 
parties." 
It is submitted, that this is indeed a very interesting 
point, as even though one could view the whole amount of 
any debt as one sum and therefore hold that if there is 
any dispute as to any part of that sum then there is a 
dispute, this often would not be a thorough enough 
analysis of the problem. In many cases when there is an 
amount in dispute, there will be a certain sum which the 
debtor concedes to be due. 
This could happen in any court proceedings claiming a sum 
of damages. For instance, in the statement of claim, the 
creditor/plaintiff could plead certain sums to be due and 
owing. A debtor in his statement of defence could admit 
some of the claims and deny others. Could it therefore 
legitimately be said that a debtor in merely paying sums 
which he conceded to be owing in his statement of defence 
in full satisfaction had afforded consideration for the 
creditor relinquishing him from the obligation to pay the 
remaining outstanding sum? It is submitted, that it could 
not in reality, and indeed in law be said that he had 
given up anything for the creditor's forbearing to sue for 
the balance. The same reasoning should apply where there 
is one debt, and the debtor has conceded that a certain 
amount is due and owing, and likewise where part of a 
claim is partly liquidated and partly unliquidated. 
The authors of Chi ttyl48 , themselves, makes this point. 
They states that a creditor may have two claims against 
the same debtor, one of them liquidated and the other 
unliquidated, or a single claim which is partly liquidated 
and partly unliquidated. The authors of Chitty state that 
if the debtor pays no more than the liquidated amount and 
if his liability to pay this amount was undisputed, the 
payment will not constitute consideration for a promise 
by the creditor to accept the payment in full settlement 
of the whole claim in question. 
147Supra note 144 at page 21-
148Supra at note 54 at page 229, para 231. 
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The authors of Chitty cite in support of this proposition 
the case of Arrale v Costain Civil Engineering Limited149 , 
a case in which an employee had been injured at his place 
of work. The legislation in force gave him a right 
against his employers to a fixed sum of £490 for which the 
employers did not dispute liability. It was further 
assumed in that case that the worker also had a right to 
common law damages. In that case the court held that any 
promise which the worker may have made not to pursue the 
common law claim was not binding by payment of the £490 
as the employers had provided no consideration for such 
promise, they had merely done that which they were already 
bound to do. 
Maclauchlan150 deals with Professor Coote's argument as it 
affects the decision in Homeguard. He states that he 
feels that Professor Coote's argument is an interesting 
one and should have been addressed in the case but does 
not feel his point is incontrovertible. Maclauchlan does 
not seem to feel that it is the common law that there is 
no consideration for a compromise where all the debtor 
does is pay the lowest amount which he admits to be due. 
Maclauchlan goes on to state that it should not really 
matter that the debtor does not see fit to revise upwards 
his II opening bid II • 
It is submitted, however, with respect, that the two 
matters are completely different. If the debtor pays an 
amount he concedes to be due, then clearly there has been 
nothing given up by the debtor as he is paying no more 
than that he concedes he is bound to pay. If however, 
genuine confusion reigns as to what is indeed owed, and 
the debtor without concession or admission as to any 
portion of the debt offers a certain sum in settlement, 
then the creditor is not able to point to one specific 
portion of the debt being unliquidated or undisputed, and 
consideration would be afforded. The distinction may seem 
a fine one, but it is submitted that it is an important 
one. 
The doctrine of consideration is an important cornerstone 
of our common law of contract, and requires that in order 
to create a contract both sides must give up something of 
value to themselves or bestow a benefit on the other 
party. Therefore, it is submitted that it is important 
for any court to be able to analyse such contract to see 
if the consideration has in fact been provided. This does 
not mean, of course that a debtor may be left high and 
dry, it simply means that if the court was to find that 
he has not in fact given up anything for the creditor's 
forbearance he must rely on other more uncertain remedies, 
149[1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 98. 
150Supra at note 10. 
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such as the doctrine of promissory estoppel or waiver 
which will be dealt with later. Further, if the 
acceptance of such sum in full and final satisfaction is 
put in writing by the creditor, then by section of 92 of 
the Judicature Act 1908 the creditor may not sue him for 
the balance. 
It is submitted, further, that one case following 
Homeguard which cried out for the reasoning of Professor 
Coote to be applied to it completely overlooked such 
reasoning. Such is the case of Dunrae Manufacturing 
Limited v C.L. North & Company Limited151 the facts of 
which have been dealt with earlier152 • In that case, as 
will be recalled there was a dispute over the amount due 
to Mr North for engineering and electrical work. Dunrae 
made two payments totalling $11,458.48 and attached to the 
second cheque a handwritten note reciting that the cheque 
was tendered in full and final payment of its account with 
C.L. North & Company Limited. In the District Court the 
judge had found that two invoices had been sent out, and 
the cheque sent in full satisfaction was the exact amount 
of one of the invoices which was not in dispute. Smellie 
J. in the High Court dismissed this finding as irrelevant. 
Smellie J. stated that there was one contract and 
therefore one amount in dispute. Therefore, he held that 
prior to the payment being made by the debtor whole amount 
was in dispute. 
However, it is submi tted that the reasoning of the 
District Court judge in this regard was correct. Two . 
invoices had been sent out, and the amount of the first 
one was not disputed. A cheque was sent in full and final 
satisfaction for the exact amount of this invoice. 
Therefore, it is submitted it cannot possibly be said that 
debtor was giving anything up as he was merely paying an 
amount he conceded to be due. 
c) Should Consideration 'in fact' be Sufficient? 
The writer .submitted above that the strict rules as to 
consideration should be applied when dealing wi th the 
issue as to whether accord and satisfaction has arisen 
when a cheque is banked "in full and final satisfaction" 
of a disputed debt, and has further submitted that in some 
cases this would lead to a finding that no accord and 
satisfaction had arisen. However, it just this type of 
reasoning that has led the Court of Appeal in England in 
a recent decision to attempt to bypass the existing law 
of consideration, that holds that performance of an 
existing duty is no consideration for a fresh contract. 
151Supra at note 34. 
l~Supra pages 15 and 16. 
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In that case the Court of Appeal held that it was 
sufficient as the party had given a benefit in fact 
although not in law. The case in question was that of 
Williams v Roffey Brothers153 • 
In that case the defendant was a building contractor who 
had entered into a contract to refurbish a block of flats 
and had subcontracted the carpentry work to the plaintiff 
for a price of £20,000. It was held to be an implied term 
of this subcontract that the plaintiff would pay interim 
payments related to the work it had completed. After the 
plaintiff had completed the carpentry work on the roof in 
nine of the flats and carried out other preliminary work 
for which it had received substantial interim payments, 
the plaintiff found that he was in serious financial 
difficulties as the price for which he had contracted was 
too low, and further that he had failed to supervise his 
workmen properly. The defendant was aware of the 
plaintiff's difficulties. It had a penalty clause under 
its main contract under which it would be liable if it had 
not completed the main contract on time. It therefore 
called a meeting with the plaintiff and agreed to pay him 
an extra £10,300 at a rate of £575 per flat on completion 
to ensure that the plaintiff was able to complete the work 
on time. 
The plaintiff continued with the work and completed eight 
further flats and the defendant made one further payment 
of £ 1,500. The plaintiff then stopped work on the 
remaining flat and brought an action claiming £10,847. 
The defendant denied it was liable and in particular 
denied that the defendant could claim the additional money 
as the agreement to pay it was unenforceable for lack of 
consideration. 
The judge at first instance held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to eight payments of £575 less a small deduction 
for defective and incomplete items, together with a 
reasonable proportion of the amount outstanding under the 
original contract, making a total after the deduction of 
£1,500 which had already been paid of £3,500. The 
defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
In the Court of Appeal all three judges, Glidewell L.J., 
Russell and Purchase JJ. dismissed the appeal holding good 
consideration had been supplied, although all expressed 
their views somewhat differently. The defendant also 
submitted on the appeal that the additional payment was 
only payable if each flat was completed, and on the 
judge's finding eight further flats had been 
, substantially' completed. He argued that as substantial 
completion was something less than completion, none of the 
eight flats had therefore been completed and no further 
153 [ 1990] 2 WLR 1153. 
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payment was due from the defendant. However, this 
argument was quickly done awa~ with by Glidewell L.J. on 
the authori ty of Ward v Byham 54. 
Glidewell L.J., on the consideration argument, quoted 
extensively from the judgment of Lord Scarman in the Privy 
Council decision of Pao On v Lau YiU155 • That was a case 
principally concerning the doctrine of economic duress. 
However, the case also touched upon the question of 
whether or not the promise to perform an existing duty to 
a th{rd party could be valid consideration. Lord Scarman 
stated that an agreement to do an act which the promisor 
is under an existing obligation to a third party to do, 
may well amount to valid consideration as the promisee 
obtains the benefit of a direct obligation. 
Glidewell L.J. stated156 that although Pao On v Lau Yiu was 
a case concerning a tripartite relationship, that is a 
promise by one person to perform an existing contractual 
obligation owed by it to a third person in return for a 
promise from that third person, Lord Scarman's words he 
felt seemed to be of general application and equally 
applicable to a promise made by one of the original two 
parties to a contract. 
However, in that case Lord Scarman seemed to recognise 
that it may be much harder to find a legitimate 
consideration for a promise to perform an existing duty 
between the same contracting parties. Further , it is 
submitted that there is a clear and distinct difference 
between one party promising to perform an existing duty 
he already owes to that party, and the same party 
promising to perform that obligation to the third party. 
The law of contract is recognised as being the law of 
obligation, and has been described as a facility which 
allows parties to assume legal contractual obligation in 
a way in which the law recognises157 • Therefore in the 
case where a party is promising to perform an existing 
duty to a third party, he is assuming an obligation to 
perform that duty to the third party in addition to his 
assumption of obligation to perform that obligation to the 
original contracting party. Therefore, the third party 
as well as the party to which he has originally promised 
he will perform this action will both have an action 
against him for breach of contract should he fail to 
perform such duty. However, in the case of a promise 
to perform an existing contractual duty to the same party, 
154 [1956] 1 WLR 496, [1956] 2 All ER 318. 
155[1979] 3 All ER 65, [1980] AC 614. 
~6Supra note 153 at 521. 
157B. Coote, The Essence of Contract NZULR ••••• 
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that party gains nothing in law if the promise is broken 
as he already had a remedy against this party for breach 
of contract should the same eventuate. 
Glidewell L.J. also placed reliance on the majority view 
in the decision of Ward v Byham158 and the whole court in 
Williams v Williams~neither of these cases concerned 
the promise by one party to perform an existing 
contractual duty to that same party. 
Glidewell L.J. stated that the present state of the law 
in this sUbject could be expressed in the following 
proposi tion16 : 
"(i) If A has entered into a contract with B to 
work for, or supply services to B in return for 
payment by Band (ii) at some stage before A has 
completed his obligations under the contract B 
has reason to doubt whether A will be able to 
complete his side of the bargain and (iii) B 
thereupon promises A an additional payment in 
return for A's promise to perform his 
contractual obligations on time and (iv) as a 
resul t of giving his promise to B obtains in 
practice a benefit, or obviates a disbenefit, 
and (v) these promises are not given as a result 
of economic duress or fraud on the part of A, 
then (vi) the benefit to B is capable of being 
consideration for B's promise so that the 
promise will be legally binding." 
Glidewell L.J. stated that counsel for the defendant had 
accepted that by promising to pay the extra sum the 
defendants had secured benefits. He further stated that 
there was no finding and no suggestion in the case that 
the promise was given as a result of fraud or duress. He 
stated that in his view the proposition outlined above did 
not contravene the principle in Stilk v Myrick161 • He 
stated all the proposition did was refine and limit the 
application of that principle while leaving the same 
unscathed, which would apply for example where B secures 
no benefit by A's promise. 
However, it is submitted that if this proposition was left 
to stand the case of Stilk v Myrick would have been 
decided differently. As will be recalled that case was 
one where two seamen had deserted, and the Captain of the 
158Supra at note 154. 
159 [ 1957] 1 WLR 148, [1957] 1 All ER 305. 
160Supra at note 153 at page 521. 
161(1809) 2 Camp 317. 
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ship had agreed with the rest of the crew that if they 
worked the ship back to London without the two seamen 
being replaced he would divide between them the pay which 
would have been due to the two deserters. However, on 
arrival at London the Captain refused to pay this extra 
pay and the plaintiffs' action to recover the extra pay 
was dismissed on the ground that no consideration had been 
supplied for this promise, as the seamen were doing no 
more than they were already contractually obliged to do. 
Therefore, as will be seen in that case, there were indeed 
extra factual benefits provided to the Captain of the 
ship, such as the balance of the seamen not deserting or 
staging a mutiny. 
Russell L.J. stated that there was no hint in the pleading 
of the defendants that they were subject to any duress. 
He posed the question that could it be said that the 
defendants could now escape liability on the grounds that 
the plaintiff undertook to do no more than he had 
originally contracted to do although, quite clearly, the 
defendants on 9 April 1986 were prepared to make the 
payment and only declined to do so at a later stage? His 
Honour stated that it would certainly be unconscionable 
this were their legal entitlement. His Honour further 
stated that he would have welcomed any argument if it 
could properly have been raised on the basis that there 
was an estoppel. 
It is the writer's view that this is indeed the path which 
the court should have taken. The doctrine of 
consideration, and more particularly the principle that 
performance of an existing duty to that same party affords 
no consideration, has been a cornerstone of our common law 
for over two hundred years. Further, it seems 
unnecessarily tortuous, to firstly state that such promise 
is enforceable, but may be not enforced if it was obtained 
by virtue of the doctrine of economic duress. If one 
party has made a bad bargain, then it is submitted that 
it should be on that party to bear the risk of the bad 
bargain. 
A strict application of such principle, it is conceded, 
could be unnecessarily harsh, but it is further submitted 
that the best way to afford relief in such situation is 
not to do away with such long-standing principle, but to 
afford relief on the slightly less certain doctrine of 
promissory estoppel. In that situation, if it truly was 
unconscionable for such promise to be resiled from then 
such should be enforced by virtue of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel. Such doctrine being extended to be 
available as a cause of action in its own right. However, 
as such doctrine is really one of relief rather than 
right, then it will be the party who has made the bad 
bargain who will be left with the uncertainty as to 
whether the further promise will be enforced. 
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If Williams v Roffey Bros. is correct, then this would 
greatly restrict the operation of Foakes v Beer and in 
particular would have wide-reaching effects on law in 
relation to cheques in full and final satisfaction. On 
the authority of Williams v Roffey Bros. it would be open 
to a debtor to argue that although he merely tendered a 
cheque for a lesser sum in full and final satisfaction of 
a larger undisputed and liquidated sum, that he had 
afforded consideration for the creditor accepting such 
cheque in full and final satisfaction. The debtor could 
submit that this consideration was supplied as he was in 
dire financial straits, and the creditor obtained the 
benefit in fact of receiving some money as opposed to 
none. Further, he could argue that the creditor obtained 
the benefit of getting payment now as opposed to having 
to sue him for the balance and incur legal fees in the 
case and enforcement of the judgment. 
As mentioned above , it is the writer's view, that the 
long-standing doctrine of consideration and more 
particularly the principle that performance of an existing 
duty to that same party affords no consideration should 
remain. If the same causes any injustice then this should 
be relieved inter alia by virtue of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, which leads us neatly into the next 
area for examination. 
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d) Promissory Estoppel and Waiver 
The law of promissory estoppel has come a long way from 
its "revival" by Lord Denning in the case of Central 
London Property Trust v High Trees162 • In that case a 
landlord had promised to accept half the rent due during 
the wartime as he was having difficulty in finding 
tenants. Subsequently the landlord issued proceedings for 
recovery of the difference between the lower rent he had 
agreed to accept and that due under the lease. There was 
clearly no consideration to support the promise by the 
landlord and such was not a mutual variation. It was 
noted that the common law doctrine of estoppel by conduct 
was only available on promises of existing fact not for 
promises of future action or intention. Denning J. (as 
he then was) "adopted" old equitable authority to enforce 
the promise not to require full payment of the rent. 
Further cases modified this doctrine and held that the 
same could only be used as a defence to a cause of action 
and not as a cause of action in itself .163 
However, in recent times the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel has been released somewhat from its case law 
shackles, and recently the High Court of Australia has 
held in Wal tons Stores (Inter State ) Limited v Maher164 
that the doctrine may be used as a cause of action and not 
merely as a defence. The doctrine of promissory estoppel 
in that case was formulated in the following way: 
"i) that if a plaintiff has assumed or expected that 
a particular set of circumstances exists between 
it and the defendant or that it would exist and 
in the latter case that the defendant would not 
be free to withdraw from the expected legal 
relationship, 
ii) and if the defendant has induced the plaintiff 
to adopt that assumption or expectation, and 
iii) the plaintiff acts or abstained from acting in 
reliance on the assumption or expectation, and 
iv) The defendant knew or intended him to do so, and 
v) the plaintiff's action or inaction will occasion 
detriment if the assumption or expectation is 
not fulfilled, and 
162 [ 1947] 1 KB 130. 
163Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215. 
164[1988] 62 ALJR 110. 
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v) the defendant has failed to avoid the detriment 
either by fulfilling the assumption or 
expectation or otherwise then the promise or 
assumption will be enforced ... 165 
The law in New Zealand has moved very close to the 
position adopted by the High Court of Australia in Waltons 
Stores 166. As was agreed by the wri ter in the last 
chapter, the strict enforcement of the doctrine of 
consideration can lead to injustices in certain 
situations, however, it is submitted that if one wants to 
alleviate this injustice it is important that such be done 
in a reasoned and principled way. It is submitted, that 
the decision in Williams v Roffey Bros167 which held in 
essence that consideration in fact although not in law is 
sufficient is not a correct way to proceed. As has been 
submitted by the writer in an earlier paper168 a far better 
way to cure the injustice in the law is by virtue of the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel. The law of contract 
should be left intact, as it provides a useful mechanism 
for parties to assume legal contractual obligations to 
each other, and the law of promissory estoppel should be 
developed so as to impose a remedy in certain situations 
where the non-enforcement of such promise would lead to 
injustice. 
In cases concerning cheques proffered in full and final 
satisfaction, promissory estoppel has often been pleaded 
in the alternative to accord and satisfaction, however the 
defence of promissory estoppel does not appear yet to have 
succeeded in one case not even in the decision of 
Homeguard itself. 
In Homeguard, the facts of which have been dealt with in 
some detail earlier169 Mahon J. dealt with the decision of 
Lord Denning M.R. in the case of D & C Builders Limited 
165This is the six-stage test expounded by Brennan J. in 
Waltons Stores (Inter State) Limited v Maher, ibid 
at page 127. 
166See Gillies v Keogh (1989] 2 NZLR 327, Burbery Mortgage 
Finance and Savings Limited v Hindbank Holdings Limited 
(1989] 1 NZLR 356, Westland Savings Bank v Hancock 
[1987],2 NZLR 21 Harris v Harris Unreported, High Court 
Christchurch, Fraser J. 15/12/89. 
167Supra at note 153. 
168Promises Enforceable without Consideration Research 
Paper, 1990-91, Master of Law, Law of Torts. 
169Supra at pages 5-12. 
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v Rees170 where Lord Denning M.R. had stated of promissory 
estoppel: 171 
"This principle has been applied to cases where 
a creditor agrees to accept a lesser sum in 
discharge of a greater. So much so that we can 
now say that, when a creditor and a debtor enter 
upon a course of negotiation, which leads the 
debtor to suppose that, on payment of the lesser 
sum, the creditor will not enforce payment of 
the balance, then on the faith thereof the 
debtor pays the lesser sum and the creditor 
accepts it as satisfaction: then creditor will 
not be allowed to enforce payment of the balance 
when it would be inequitable to do so." 
In D & C Builders Limited Lord Denning, however, held that 
promissory estoppel did not assist the defendant as there 
had been no "true accord", as the purported agreement had 
been obtained by undue pressure and there was therefore 
no real agreement by the creditor to forego the balance 
of the debt. 
Mahon J. stated that his first obj ection to the invocation 
of promissory estoppel in such circumstances was that the 
common law rule requires consideration for the release if 
not under seal of an admitted or liquidated debt and it 
was a principle which had been considered and specifically 
reaffirmed by the House of Lords. He stated that the same 
should not be abrogated by an equitable doctrine not yet 
sanctioned in that form by the House of Lords. 
However, as has been submitted by the writer above, the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel can happily coexist beside 
the law of contract, and more particularly the doctrine 
of consideration. 
Mahon J. went on to say that the second objection he had 
to this doctrine was that the High Trees decision itself 
related to an agreement made before the monetary liability 
had become due, whereas in the Foakes v Beer the agreement 
express or inferred, necessarily applied an existing 
liability. He stated further that Sir Alexander Turner 
speaking editorially in S~encer Bower and Turner on 
Estoppel by Representation17 had expressed the view that 
the High Trees decision for the reasons stated could not 
be applied so as to negate the result which would accrue 
in a Foakes v Beer situation. It must be noted, however, 
170Supra at note 9. 
171Ibid at page 2QB 617, 624-625; 3 All ER at 37, 840-841 
1723rd edition, 1977 at pp 398-399. 
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that in making this statement, Sir Alexander Turner seems 
to be referring to whether an accord and satisfaction 
could exist and not whether an estoppel could exist. 
However if Sir Alexander Turner was making reference by 
implication to an estoppel situation, the writer struggles 
to see the necessity for such a fine distinction. with 
respect there appears to be little if no difference in 
principle in agreeing to forego something you will be 
entitled to and agreeing to forego something you are 
entitled to. If this has ever been the law, then it is 
submitted that it has moved on somewhat from the statement 
of Sir Alexander Turner speaking editorially in a textbook 
published in 1977. Indeed, the Court of Appeal case in 
Burbery Mortgage Finance and Savings Limited v Hindsbank 
Holdings Limited173 expressly concerned a promise by a 
receiver not to enforce his existing legal rights. 
Mahon J. went on to state that in any event as long as any 
requirement prevails that there must be detriment suffered 
by the promisee as a result of relying upon the promise, 
it was difficult to see how that can occur where a debtor 
has paid only part of the debt alleged to be due. It is 
submitted, that this is indeed a very valid point. If the 
debt was genuinely in dispute one can see, however, how 
there might be detriment as the debtor may be paying more 
than in fact actually due. However, if the debtor's 
claim, although bona fide is held to have no merit the 
principle in Couch v Branch Investments174 will not avail 
the debtor, as such is a contractual principle. It is in 
any event difficult to see how such could have occasioned 
detriment. If any detriment had occurred, surely this 
could be remedied by payment of damages, and it would not 
be necessary for the promise of such to be strictly 
enforced. 
Further, it is submitted that the very reason why in most 
instances an argument as to accord and satisfaction. should 
not succeed is also a very strong reason why promissory 
estoppel should not succeed in such cases. This reason 
is that the supposed "representation" that the creditor 
would not sue for the balance of the debt is normally the 
banking of the cheque with or without a period of silence 
by the creditor. This, as it has been submitted earlier, 
is equivocal and it is for this reason that it is 
submitted a court should hold that no representation has 
been made by the creditor nor has the creditor caused the 
debtor to assume that a certain state of affairs exists. 
173Supra at note 166. 
174Supra at note 113. 
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In N. Z • I. Finance Limited v Barber & Anor175 the facts of 
which have been dealt with earlier176 the defendants 
attempted to argue in the alternative that a promissory 
estoppel had been established. As will be recalled in 
that case, the defendants' primary submission was that an 
accord and satisfaction had occurred as it was submitted 
the defendants had paid the monies over to N.Z.I. Finance 
on the sale of certain land, and N. Z • I. Finance had agreed 
to accept the sum in full and final satisfaction. Master 
Williams held that no such agreement had taken place as 
there was no clear offer to accept. His Honour further 
held that the cheque had not itself been proffered in full 
and final satisfaction. 
Master Williams stated that promissory estoppel required 
a clear and unequivocal representation made with the 
intention to affect the legal relations between the 
parties and be acted on with action taken as a result. 
He stated that if these requirements were satisfied then 
the maker of the representation was precluded from 
asserting his legal rights until reasonable notice had 
been given. In this regard he cited the decisions of 
Burbery Financel77 and Gillies v Keogh178 • 
Master Williams held that as no clear representation had 
been made by N.Z.I. Finance the argument as to promissory 
estoppel must fail. 
A similar result had been reached in an earlier decision 
of Master Williams in Budget Rent-a-Car Limited v Goodman 
& Alston179 although the facts were somewhat different. In 
that case as will be recalled Mr Goodman was being sued 
by Budget Rent-a-Car for damage to a hire car which had 
been occasioned by his friend Mr Alston. Mr Goodman never 
denied that the money was owing, merely pleaded poverty. 
Mr Goodman sent a cheque in full and final satisfaction 
to Budget Rent-a-Car stating that the cheque was being 
proffered in full and final satisfaction of the dispute. 
Budget Rent-a-Car banked the cheque and a couple of days 
later sent a letter stating that the cheque was received 
in part payment. Master Williams held that it was the 
fact of payment which was important and payment was not 
received until a cheque was banked and cleared. He held 
that by the time payment had been received by Budget or 
its agents it had or possibly was in the process of 
175Supra at note 138. 
176Supra at page 61. 
177Supra at note 166. 
178I bid. 
179Supra at note 93. 
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advising Mr Goodman through his solicitors that it did not 
accept the cheque had been received in full and final 
satisfaction of his obligation. 
However, although the cheque was in fact banked only a 
couple of days before the creditor1s reply, the reply was 
in fact sent out over a week after the letter and cheque 
had been sent to the creditor • Although, Master Williams 
had held that it was payment that was being bargained for, 
and therefore effectively no contract could have come into 
being until the payment of the monies itself had occurred, 
this, it is submitted, did not necessarily exclude the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel as consideration was not 
needed for the same. Master Williams stated that the 
elements of a plea of promissory estoppel were adequately 
defined in the judgment of Richardson J. in Gillies v 
Keogh180 • The Master stated that it was now clear that 
there was a general test of unconscionability underlying 
the three necessary elements: 
"Namely: 
" encouragement (of a belief or 
expectation) reliance and detriment ••• " 
Master Williams held that there was no encouragement by 
the plaintiff which could have created any belief or 
expectation. He further held that there was no reliance 
nor detriment. It had been submitted by the defendant 
that it had suffered detriment in that he had borrowed 
$5,000 and incurred an obligation to repay it. Master 
Williams held that it was clear that he had borrowed that 
sum before his solicitors wrote to Budget's agents and 
therefore any detriment was not occasioned by an act on 
Budget Rent-a-Car1s part. 
It is submitted, however, that the issue as to whether a 
promissory estoppel had arisen was not dealt with properly 
in the case. If, as the cases have held mere banking of 
a cheque together with silence is sufficient to amount to 
an agreement to accept the offer of a cheque proffered in 
full and final satisfaction, why could the same not lead 
to a finding that such conduct carried with it a clear 
representation that the cheque was being so accepted. 
Here, of course, the answer would be that such conduct was 
not sufficient to lead the defendant to believe that his 
offer had been accepted, and further that no detriment had 
been occasioned as the defendant had always to pay this 
money and had not altered his position in reliance on any 
alleged representation. Therefore it would not be 
unconscionable to renege on such a promise even if made. 
180Supra at note 166. 
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In the much earlier decision of Master Anne Gambrill of 
Parmenter v Carter181 promissory estoppel was not pleaded, 
further, having regard to the findings of the Master it 
seems that such might have succeeded in the alternative. 
In that case as will be recalled the defendant forwarded 
a cheque to the plaintif f ' s solicitors for $1,000 in "full 
and final satisfaction" of the proceeding. The cheque was 
banked by the office system on 5 May 1988. On 24 May 1988 
the solicitors wrote to the defendant advising that they 
had made an error in banking the cheque. Master Gambrill 
held on the facts that182 : 
" the defendant was induced to believe a 
settlement had been made. I am not satisfied 
that the plaintiff can shelter behind the 
situation where it said that if it was not aware 
of the settlement it could not make an accord 
with the defendant." 
Therefore, although as submitted earlier by the writer it 
is submitted that the above finding on the facts is 
incorrect, it would seem that the holding, prima facie 
would lay the ground for a promissory estoppel claim, as 
it was held that the defendant was induced to believe by 
the plaintiff that a settlement had been reached. 
However, one still runs into the problem as to what 
detriment would have been suffered by the defendant in 
paying the sum of money, if it can be shown that he was 
bound to pay this sum in the first place. 
In D.F.C. New Zealand Limited & Anor v Wellington City 
Council183 the plaintiff had pleaded an estoppel as its 
second cause of action. The facts of this case have been 
dealt with earlier184 . The first plaintiff claimed that in 
reliance on the arrangements reached between Messrs Jones 
and Shillson coupled with the terms of Mr Shillson' s 
letter of 22 September 1989, the City Council's acceptance 
and banking of D • F • C. ' s cheque and the City Counc iI's 
subsequent conduct up to the end of March 1990, the first 
plaintiff took no steps to protect its interests as 
debenture holder over Plaza International Hotel Limited 
or Forum Developments Limited or both. 
The first plaintif f therefore said that it had al tered its 
position in reliance on those matters and that the City 
Council was thereby estopped from disclaiming the terms 
181Supra at note 82. 
182Ibid at page II. 
183Supra at note 37. 
184Supra at pages 18 and 19. 
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on which it received the second plaintiff's cheque. The 
first plaintiff therefore sought a declaration to that 
effect, coupled with an order for specific performance. 
The defendant argued, inter alia, firstly that estoppel 
could only be used as a shield and not a sword, and 
secondly that the first plaintiff had not demonstrated 
that it had suffered detriment or altered its position in 
reliance on the defendant's actions. 
Master Williams cited the Australian High Court decision 
in Walton stores (Interstate) Limited v Maher185 in support 
of the proposition that estoppel had been utilised as a 
cause of action and not just as a defence. However, he 
stated its status as such was by no means clear-cut and 
that the summary judgment procedure was only intended to 
be available where such was the case. However, he stated 
that putting that to one side the law in the area had 
recentl~ been clarified by the Court of Appeal in Gillies 
v Keogh 86 where Richardson J. after reviewing the classic 
test held that .. there has been a trend away from the 
strict application of those five probander to a more 
flexible test of unconscionability". He then stated that 
Richardson J. went on to hold in the context of de facto 
relationships that the approach: 187 
..... involves determining whether the elements 
of encouragement (of a belief or expectation), 
reliance on that, and detriment were present." 
Master Williams in this case held that the first element 
was present as the City Council had clearly encouraged 
D.F.C. in the belief or expectation that it would, as it 
did, lodge the necessary documents to effect deposit of 
the air space survey plan without delay and promptly 
satisfied, as it did up until the end of March or early 
April 1990, requisitions in relation to that plan. 
However, Master Williams found difficulty in holding that 
the necessary detriment was present. D.F.C. had said that 
the detriment arose because it paid the cheque to the City 
Council, handed over a title to enable the subdivision or 
plan to be lodged, refrained from appointing receivers 
until May 1990 and refrained from negotiating with Forum 
Developments or the City Councilor both. Master Williams 
stated that the difficulty he had with that was that the 
payment of the cheque was no more than was required of 
D. F. C. through its contract with or tender to the Council, 
the handing over of the title did not seem to him to be 
l~Supra at note 164. 
W6[1989] 2 NZLR 327. 
187Ibid at page 346. 
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a matter of detriment since D.F .C. could recover the title 
as mortgagee if it wished and the delay in appointing the 
receiver and negotiating with Forum or the Council was 
only expressed tentatively by Counsel for the first 
plaintiff. Master Williams stated that even when D.F.C. 
appointed receivers for Plaza its action did not arise out 
of the City Council resiling from its agreement with 
D.F.C. 
In those circumstances Master Williams stated that the 
Court's conclusion was that it could not be said that the 
City Council had no defence available to it pursuant to 
the estoppel argument and therefore the summary judgment 
in respect of that cause of action was dismissed. 
Therefore, as can be seen although promissory estoppel 
looks as if it may develop into a very useful cause of 
action, the same would be difficult to make out and indeed 
has not been made out as yet in an action where a cheque 
has been tendered in full and final satisfaction of a 
disputed debt, or indeed an undisputed debt. The reasons 
for this as can be seen are two-fold. Firstly, the same 
set of facts that would be relied on by a debtor to show 
that the creditor had agreed to accept the same on the 
terms it was proffered, would be relied upon by it to 
establish a promise or encouragement by the creditor 
leading it to believe that certain state of affairs 
exists. As was submitted earlier, even in most of the 
cases where it has been held that the creditor's conduct 
has led the debtor to believe that such agreement exists, 
such is wrong in principle. Therefore, if such agreement 
cannot be inferred from the conduct then a promise or 
encouragement in the belief that the creditor would not 
pursue its claim for the balance could not be made out. 
Secondly, although there is authority to the effect that 
compromise of a dispute however hopeless does afford good 
consideration if the debtor honestly believed he had a 
good cause of action188 , no such principle exists to help 
the debtor establish detriment in action alleging 
promissory estoppel. 
The difference between promissory estoppel and waiver is 
by no means clear-cut. Indeed, Denning L.J. (as he then 
was) sought to assimilate the two in Charles Rickards Ltd. 
v Oppenheim 189. If anything the doctrine of waiver is 
more easy to satisfy than that of promissory estoppel as 
on one view it would seem that the requirement of 
detriment does not need to be satisfied. The difficulty 
IMand the same is not vexatious or frivolous: Couch v 
Branch Investments (1969) Ltd., supra note 117. 
189 [ 1950 ] 1 KB 616. 
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with waiver, however, is that the person waiving 
compliance may seek compliance upon giving reasonable 
notice. Therefore, if a creditor had led a debtor to 
believe that it would not be relying on its right to sue 
for the balance of the debt, then upon giving reasonable 
notice it would be entitled to do so. This, however, can 
also be true of promissory estoppel. 
Cheshire and Fifootl~ states that the doctrine of waiver 
is awaiting a clear modern statement. However, the 
authors state that recent New Zealand cases have made the 
following points: 
1. Like promissory estoppel, a waiver requires a 
clear unequivocal representation191 
2. As in the case of promissory estoppel a waiver 
can be retracted if this can be done without 
causing injustice to the other party. Thus it 
may be able to be withdrawn before the other 
party has done anything in reliance on it. 192 
3. The waiver takes place before the departure from 
the strict terms of the contract, although it 
can take place after the departure. If the 
waiver precedes the departure it may have played 
a part in causing the departure and justice may 
more readily be held to demand that there be no 
retraction. The learned authors state that 
where the waiver takes place after the departure 
from the terms of the contract it can readily 
become confused with other similar concepts in 
particular election to affirm the contract and 
estoppel. 
It is perhaps because of the as yet uncertain definition 
of the doctrine of waiver and its unclear distinction from 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel that none of the cases 
subsequent to and including Homeguard have raised or dealt 
with it in any way. 
190Law of Contract supra note 49. 
191Connor v Pukerau Store Ltd [1981] 1 NZLR 385; Neylon 
v Dickens [1978] 2 NZLR 35 (P.C.). 
192Connor v Pukerau Store Ltd, ibid. 
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6. Section 21(2)(b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 
Mahon J. in Homeguard relied for additional support for 
his decision on Section 21(2)(b) of the Bills of Exchange 
Act 1908. Section 21 provides as follows: 
"21. Delivery-(1) Every contract on a bill, 
whether it is the drawer's, the acceptor's, or 
an indorser's, is incomplete and revocable until 
delivery of the instrument in order to give 
effect thereto: 
"Provided that where an acceptance is written on 
a bill, and the drawee gives notice to or 
according to the directions of the person 
entitled to the bill that he has accepted it, 
the acceptance then becomes complete and 
irrevocable. 
11(2) As between immediate parties, and as 
regards a remote party other than the holder in 
due course, the delivery-
" (a) In order to be effectual must be made 
either by or under the authority of the 
party drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as 
the case may be: 
"(b) May be shown to have been conditional, or 
for a special purpose only, and not for the 
purpose of transferring the property in the 
bill. 
"(3) If the bill is in the hands of a holder in 
due course, a valid delivery of the bill by all 
parties prior to him so as to make them liable 
to him is conclusively presumed. 
n(4) Where a bill is no longer in the possession 
of a party who has signed it as a drawer, 
acceptor, or indorser, a valid and unconditional 
delivery by him is presumed until the contrary 
is proved." 
Mahon J. stated that the terms of delivery of the 
appellant's cheque fell within section 21(2)(b) of the 
Bills of Exchange Act 1908 as being "conditional, or for 
a special purpose only, and not for the purpose of 
transferring the property in the bill". Mahon J. stated 
that it therefore followed that the property in the cheque 
could not pass to the respondent until it complied with 
the condi tion. Mahon J. stated that by banking the 
cheque and then repudiating the condition, the respondent 
in his opinion converted the cheque. He stated that it 
might therefore be said that the respondent was precluded 
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from asserting any right to disclaim the condition and to 
treat the cheque only as a payment on account, for it 
could only adopt that course by committing against the 
appellant the tort of conversion. 
It is submitted that Mahon J.'s cursory examination of 
section 21(2)(b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 failed 
to deal properly with the issues in hand. The questions, 
it is submitted, which needed to asked and were not are 
as follows: 
1. Whether pursuant to section 21 (2) (b) delivery 
was incomplete if the cheque was delivered with 
a condition attached to it. In other words an 
analysis of the subsection. 
2. If delivery was incomplete if the cheque was 
sent with a condition attached to it what is the 
consequence of such incomplete delivery? 
3. If the cheque is banked and the condition 
repudiated, has conversion been committed? 
4. If conversion has been committed is the creditor 
precluded from asserting his own wrong and 
therefore estopped from denying that he assented 
to the condition? 
It would seem that the strict wording of section 21(2)(b) 
is rather unfortunate as it would seem as a matter of 
strict statutory interpretation that it could be argued 
that section 21(2)(b) could not be used as long as the 
bill was delivered ever with the intention of transferring 
property in it. 
The subsection adds the additional requirement not only 
that the cheque may be shown to be conditional or for a 
special purpose only but also that it must be shown to 
have been delivered not for the purpose of transferring 
the property in the bill. Therefore, it would seem that 
if the bill was delivered subject to a condition or for 
a special purpose only as long as it was delivered for the 
purpose of transferring the property in the bill then 
section 21(2)(b) could not apply. 
However, if this interpretation is correct then section 
21(2)(b) would be of little use, as why would one deliver 
a negotiable instrument unless it was with the immediate 
or contingent purpose of transferring the property in it. 
It might be that the subsection is meant to be concerned 
only where delivery is not for the primary or immediate 
purpose of transferring the property in the bill. 
Therefore, for example, it could be delivered as security 
and therefore subject to the condition that it not be used 
unless the debtor defaulted on some agreement. Such could 
85 
also be reasoned to apply in cases of cheques proffered 
in full and final satisfaction if it could be argued that 
it was not intended that the cheque be used unless the 
condition had been agreed to. 
Indeed, such is very similar to a deed being delivered in 
escrow. Halsbury states193 that the English equivalent of 
section 21(2)(b) is akin to escrow except that for escrow 
the deed must be delivered to a third party whereas 
pursuant to the equivalent of section 21(2)(b) the 
negotiable instrument may be delivered to one of the 
parties thereto. 
Indeed in the early New Zealand case of Russell v 
Hellaby194 a cheque was delivered for the purchase of a 
motor vehicle, subject to the condition that certain 
matters would be put right. The matters were not put 
right and the purchaser returned the car and stopped the 
cheque. It was held that pursuant to section 21(2) (b) the 
cheque was delivered pursuant to a condition and for a 
special purpose only and not for the purpose of 
transferring the property in the bill. It was held the 
fact that the cheque had been delivered pursuant. to a 
condition and the condition had not been fulfilled was 
sufficient to prevent property passing in the bill and was 
a good defence to action by the plaintiff on the cheque. 
It was held that if the cheque was stopped then the 
parties reverted back to the same position they were in 
if the cheque had not been made. 
Therefore it would seem that section 21(2)(b) can be used 
where a cheque is sent pursuant to a condition that 
payment is not meant to be effected on it if the condition 
is not fulfilled. This would support the analysis that 
s 21(2)(b) is concerned that the cheque be delivered not 
only on a condition or for a special purpose but not for 
the immediate or dominant purpose of transferring property 
in the bill. 
It would also seem that section 21 (2) (b) is simply a 
procedural section which allows evidence outside the bill 
to be admitted where it would otherwise not be. This 
would seem clear as a matter of statutory interpretation 
from the opening words of section 21 ( 2 ) (b) that the 
delivery "may be shown to have been conditional, It 
Therefore, having overcome the first hurdle of showing 
that section 21(2)(b) may be invoked in such instances as 
evidence may be admitted to show that the delivery was 
conditional, what effect does this have. In other words, 
what is the effect of conditional delivery. Section 21 
193Laws of England, 4th ed. Volume 4, para 347. 
194[1922] NZLR 195. 
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tells us that until delivery of the instrument occurs, the 
contract on the bill is incomplete and revocable. 
Therefore it would seem that delivery completes the 
contract on the bill and makes it irrevocable. If 
delivery is conditional does this mean it has not occurred 
until the condition has been complied with, or has 
occurred and can be vitiated if the condition is not 
complied with. 
The word irrevocable would suggest the latter 
interpretation is the correct one, however, paradoxically 
the word incomplete would suggest the former. On balance 
it would appear that the former interpretation is more 
tenable having regard to the wording of section 21(2)(b) 
that the delivery may be shown to be conditional "and not 
for the purpose of transferring the property in the bill". 
So therefore applying this logic until the condition is 
met delivery has not occurred and therefore the contract 
on the bill is incomplete. 
Delivery passes property in the bill to the party intended 
to hold it. Once they have the property in the bill they 
may extract payment. 
It would therefore follow that if payment was extracted 
when the party extracting it held no property in the bill 
then that party would be dealing with the property in the 
bill in such a manner that was inconsistent with the 
owner's rights and conversion would have been committed. 
Or as Salymond states195 : 
"The wrong of conversion consists in any act of 
wilful interference with a chattel done 
without lawful justification, whereby any person 
entitled thereto is deprived of the use and 
possession of it." 
It would seem negotiable instruments are capable of being 
converted, however, as a general rule currency is not 
although banknotes, coins or money that is in some way 
specially identifiable may be 196. Therefore a cheque 
is banked and the condition repudiated it would seem that 
conversion has been committed. 
This leads one to the next question as to whether if 
conversion has been committed in such circumstances the 
creditor is precluded from asserting his own role and 
therefore estopped from denying that he has assented to 
195(1905) 21 LQR 43, cited in Todd Law of Torts (1991), 
1st ed., at page 489. 
1965ackwell v Barclay's Bank [1986] 1 All ER 676; 
International Factors Limited v Rodriguez [1979] QB 351 
(CE??) 
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the condition. This will be dealt with in more detail in 
the next chapter. 
The next case following Homequard which dealt wi th a 
cheque proffered in full and final satisfaction which 
dealt with section 21(2) (b) was Brown v Reardon197 the 
facts of which have been dealt with earlier .198 
As will be recalled, Casey J. on appeal held on the facts 
that the correspondence amounted to a modification, of the 
unequivocal condition about settlement originally imposed 
by the appellantls solicitors, to an arrangement that 'the 
respondentls solicitors could hold the cheques until they 
replied after seeking further instructions. Casey J. held 
that their action in banking the cheques was in breach of 
that arrangement but not of the original terms relating 
to settlement which were no longer operative. 
Casey J. stated at worst it could be said that Mr 
Reardon I s solicitors were wrong in taking the cheques 
without authority and could be liable in conversion 
applying section 21(2)(b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 
1908. He referred to Mahon J.'s dicta at the end of his 
judgment in Homeguard where he relied on section 21(2)(b) 
as an additional ground of liability as the creditor had 
no legal right to bank the cheque without accepting the 
condition upon which it was sent. Mahon J. stated the 
section provided that property did not pass in the bill 
if it was conditional or for a special purpose only which 
had not been fulfilled. 
Casey J. stated that in the course of submissions he had 
expressed his view that notwithstanding the use of the 
words II additional ground" Mahon J. may have only intended 
these observations as a support for the conclusion that 
the creditor must be regarded as assenting to the 
conditions of tender in taking the cheque rather than 
deliberately intending to commit a wrong as he felt echoed 
Baron Bramwell's comments in Crofts v Lumley, which he had 
cited earlier. 
As can be seen Casey J • dealt with the provision of 
section 21(2) (b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 as 
cursorily as Mahon J. did in Homeguard. No thorough 
analysis was undertaken as to what the section really 
meant or was concerned with. It was merely held that a 
conversion had been committed in the creditor banking the 
cheque and repudiating the condition. However, Casey J. 
expressed the view that section 21(2) (b) could not be 
1975upra at note 66. 
1985upra at page 30. 
88 
availed itself as a stand-alone cause of action available 
to a debtor in such circumstances. 
The next case along 
21 ( 2 ) (b { was that of 
Limited 99. The facts 
earlier2oo • 
the chain dealing with section 
Kirkland v Lindisfarne Landscape 
of this case have been dealt with 
As can be seen this is a case where it would seem that 
there was a high degree of merit in the debtor's actions. 
After holding for the debtor on the accord and 
satisfaction argument on somewhat tenuous grounds vautier 
J. went on to deal with the application of section 
21(2)(b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908. Vautier J. 
stated that in his view the banking of the cheque 
"constituted an irretrievable manifestation of assent by 
the respondent to the condition imposed by the appellant" 
was strengthened by the fact that the terms of delivery 
of the cheque fell as Mahon J. had pointed out within the 
scope of section 21(2)(b) of the Bills of Exchange Act. 
He stated accordingly the property in that cheque could 
not pass to the respondent until it had complied with the 
condition. He stated that the respondent had clearly 
fully appreciated that the cheque was in its hands only 
on a conditional basis and by proceeding the very next day 
to bank the cheque it had demonstrated it his view that 
it was accepting the condition notwithstanding its 
expression on the previous day of an unwillingness to do 
so. 
Therefore, as can be seen, vautier J. as in Homeguard 
viewed section 21(2)(b) although preventing property 
passing in the cheque, merely as adding additional 
support for his conclusion that the banking of the cheque 
constituted an irretrievable manifestation of assent to 
the condition imposed on it. This, it is submitted, is 
correct as far as it goes as s21 would seem to be merely 
a procedural section and not one which would be available 
as a stand-alone cause of action. However, Vautier J. 
also failed to deal with the interpretation of and 
rationale behind section 21 (2) (b) of the Bills of Exchange 
Act 1908. 
The next case to deal with section 21(2)(b) was that of 
Equitable Securities Limited v Nei1201 • In that case the 
debtor owed the creditor monies which were secured under 
first and second mortgages. In the mortgagee sale under 
1995upra at note 69. 
~OSupra at page 32. 
~1[1987] 1 NZLR 233. 
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the first mortgage the property realised insufficient 
funds to payoff even the first mortgage. Bankruptcy 
proceedings were instituted against the debtor and the 
claim was settled. The debtor's solicitor sent to the 
creditor's solicitor a cheque and stated that it was 
tendered in full and final settlement of the balance 
outstanding from the debtor to the creditor. The cheque 
was then duly banked by the creditor's solicitor. 
A short time later the creditor's solicitors wrote to the 
debtor's solicitors acknowledging the cheque but seeking 
a substantial amount due under the second mortgage. The 
debtor's solicitor had been unaware of the second 
mortgage. She responded saying the cheque had been in 
full and final settlement of all claims. 
In the District Court Judge Callendar entered judgment for 
the debtor. The debtor had argued an accord and 
satisfaction had been effected but on this argument the 
plaintiff had succeeded as it was held no consideration 
had been supplied as the debt in question was an 
undisputed unliquidated sum. 
However, the debtor also argued that section 21(2)(b) of 
the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 applied as the cheque had 
been delivered subject to a condition which was clear in 
its meaning and that on the basis of the reasoning of 
Mahon J. in Homequard the creditor was as a matter of law 
precluded from disclaiming the condition once he had 
banked the cheque. This argument succeeded. The . creditor 
then appealed to the High Court. 
In the High Court the appeal was allowed by Chilwell J. 
on the grounds that the condition accompanying the cheque 
was unclear and a fair interpretation would be that it was 
in full settlement of the bankruptcy proceedings. There 
is, however, very little in the judgment to suggest that 
Chilwell J. doubted the reasoning of Mahon J. in 
Homeguard. Such reasoning was merely distinguished on the 
facts. 
Professor D.W. McLauchlan in his article Cheques in Full 
and Final Satisfaction: accord despite discord?202 states 
that he feels the District Court judge's decision was 
understandable given the way Mahon J. expressed his 
reasoning in Homeguard. However, the learned author 
states that if Mahon J. was correct the same argument 
regarding the tort of conversion might in logic be 
applicable in a situation where the creditor banks the 
full payment cheque but proceeds for the balance on the 
grounds of want of consideration. Indeed, this is what 
occurred in the following case. 
202Supra at note 10. 
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In James Cook Hotel Limited v Canx Corporate Services 
Limited203 the defendant had sent the plaintiff a cheque 
representing 28% of a liquidated and undisputed debt due 
to the creditor in respect of accommodation provided for 
the Stevie Wonder concert party. The letter sent with the 
cheque stated that the cheque was tendered in full and 
final settlement of the account and that banking of the 
cheque would be deemed to be acceptance of the offer. 
A week later the plaintiff's solicitors replied stating 
that the cheque was not accepted as full settlement of the 
account and unless full payment was made within 21 days 
the cheque would be banked in part payment and proceedings 
issued for the balance. No reply was received to this 
letter and the cheque was therefore duly banked and 
proceedings issued to recover the balance. 
In this case counsel for the defendant conceded that the 
debt was never in dispute and that there was no question 
of accord and satisfaction "in a strict contractual 
sense". He nevertheless argued that pursuant to section 
21(2)(b) of the Bills of Exchange Act 1908 the banking of 
the cheque in part payment had discharged the debt. In 
doing so he argued that section 21(2)(b) constituted a 
further hitherto unrecognised exception to the rule in 
Foakes v Beer. The issue was ably dealt with by Greig J. 
The defendant claimed support for its contention from the 
three New Zealand authorities of Homeguard, Brown v 
Reardon204 , and Kirkland v Lindisfarne Landscape Limi ted205 • 
However, Greig J. stated that although all three of these 
cases made reference to section 21 and at least two of 
them appeared to put some reliance upon the provisions of 
that section in at least obiter, all three were 
distinguishable from the present case as none of them 
dealt with the situation where the rule in Foakes v Beer 
applied, but were strictly cases of accord and 
satisfaction. 
Greig J. referred to Mahon's "further argument" where the 
action of the creditor in banking the cheque and ignoring 
the condition was said to be a conversion or a tort. The 
conversion it was argued would preclude the respondent 
from asserting the right to act in that way and thus claim 
the right to commit a tort. He stated that latter aspect 
had not yet been relied upon in this case by the 
defendant. He stated that it did not strictly fall to be 
decided but he expressly reserved his views upon it noting 
the contention against it mentioned by Professor D. W. 
203[1989] 3 NZLR 213. 
204Supra at note 66. 
205Supra at note 69. 
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McLauchlan in his article Cheques in Full Satisfaction: 
accord despite discord?206. In this article Professor 
MCLauchlan stated that even if banking the cheque and 
repudiating the condition amounted to conversion, why did 
it necessarily follow that the creditor must be taken to 
have agreed to that condition. McLauchlan posed the 
question as to what was the basis for a finding that tort 
equalled contract. The learned author hypothesised why 
could it not be that the creditor admitted that he had 
committed the tort but denied the contract. The learned 
author stated the creditor ought to be entitled to say 
"sue me for damages: if you do I will counter-claim for 
the full amount of the debt, and if you don't I will sue 
you for the balance anyway". The learned author further 
hypothesised was not the same argument regarding the tort 
of conversion applicable in the situation where the 
creditor banked the full payment cheque intending all 
along to claim the balance on the ground that any 
agreement would not be binding for want of consideration. 
Whether conversion can lead to an estoppel will be dealt 
with in the next chapter. 
In relation to section 21 Greig J. stated as follows207 : 
.. Section 21 of the Act is a section about 
delivery. Delivery is an essential element for 
the conclusion and giving effect to a bill or 
cheque. Issue or first delivery is essential to 
make the cheque complete. Subsections (3) and 
(4) of 21 provide for presumptions as to valid 
delivery in certain circumstances. Subsection 
(2) provides for two things. One is limitation 
in para. ( a) of the authority of the person 
making the delivery. Unauthorised delivery is 
not delivery as defined. Paragraph (b) allows 
the immediate party and others (except the 
holder in due course) to show that it is 
conditional and not for the purposes of 
transferring the property in the bill. The 
first purpose of that subsection is to allow 
evidence to be given of that which would 
otherwise be extrinsic and inadmissible. • •• It 
is to that extent a rule of procedure or 
evidence not a rule of substantive law. 
Furthermore, it is limited to conditions which 
show that delivery or the transfer was not for 
the purpose of transferring the property in the 
bill. A typical example is a transfer in escrow 
or a payment on some other condition which means 
206Supra at note 10. 
207Supra at note 203 page 218. 
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that the cheque is not delivered and is 
otherwise incomplete." 
It is submitted, that Greig J.'s analysis of section 21 
is indeed correct, and that such allows extrinsic evidence 
to be given that delivery is incomplete. For as the 
section states, until delivery has occurred the contract 
on the bill is incomplete and revocable. His Honour 
however, it is submitted, failed to deal with the question 
as to whether conversion could be committed if evidence 
was admitted by virtue of s21(2)(b) that such cheque was 
delivered on a condition. His Honour further failed to 
analyse the effect such conversion might have. This 
failure may however be explainable as, due to his finding, 
such did not need to be considered. 
Greig J. went on to note that if the defendant's 
contention were correct then it would provide a complete 
defence to Foakes v so long as a bill of exchange, 
promissory note or cheque was used in the partial payment 
in satisfaction of the whole. He further stated that the 
application of section 92 of the Judicature Act would be 
very limited if section 21 had the effect contended for. 
This argument will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 
8 of this paper. 
The next case dealing with section 21(2)(b) of the Bills 
of Exchange Act 1908 was that of D.F.C. New Zealand 
Limi ted and D. F • C. Financial Services Limited v Wellington 
City Counci1208 • The facts of this case have been dealt 
with earlier209 • Master Williams in this case went 
thoroughly through the case law to date. He agreed with 
the decisions in Equitable Securities and James Cook Hotel 
to the effect that the court may admit evidence that the 
cheque was delivered on the conditions set out in Mr 
Shilson's letter of 22 September and for that special 
purpose. He held21o : 
"For the reasons earlier set out, it has been 
held that Mr Shilson made those conditions clear 
to Mr Jones. Since, first, the delivery of 
D.F.C.'s cheque to Mr Jones was clearly intended 
by the parties to transfer property in the 
cheque and, secondly, since section 21(2)(b) is 
intended to be procedural and not substantive, 
it follows that it does not create a separate 
cause of action. It follows that the second 
plaintiff cannot succeed on its cause of action 
208Supra note 37. 
209Supra at pages 18 and 19. 
210Supra at note 37 at page 34. 
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in the application of the summary judgment to 
that extent is accordingly dismissed." 
It is submitted, that although the second point made by 
Master Williams in the above quotation is correct that the 
first is not. As delivery of the cheque is conditional, 
then it is not complete and the contract on the bill is 
incomplete and revocable and property in the bill is not 
intended to pass. As stated above, it is submitted that 
in such circumstances, that although s21(2)(b) affords no 
separate cause of action, it may allow evidence to be 
admitted which would show that conversion has indeed been 
committed. The real question now in all these cases is 
does this conversion lead to an estoppel denying the 
creditor the right to repudiate the condition. 
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7. Estoppel by Conversion? 
As was stated in the previous chapter, Professor 
McLauchlan in his article Cheques ln Full and Final 
Satisfaction: accord despite discord?211 stated that there 
was no such thing as estoppel by tort. This is not quite 
true, as there exists a doctrine known as estoppel by 
negligence. This is a species of estoppel by conduct and 
as such as been described as a rule of evidence212 • The 
party in whose favour estoppel by negligence operates is 
the victim of the fraud of some third person facilitated 
by the careless breach of duty by that person to the other 
party. 
Cross states that estoppel by negligence "has been 
criticised by some as misleading as it is merely a branch 
of estoppel by conduct. He states further that213 : 
"It is possible that when the cases and 
underlying principles come to be authoritatively 
reviewed it would seem that the requirements of 
duty of care and proof of carelessness can be 
dispensed with. All that is necessary, it may 
be urged, is proof of intentional words, acts or 
conduct, which can reasonably be construed as a 
representation by the representor to the 
representee who need not be in that direct 
relationship." 
Therefore, according to the reasoning of Cross it can be 
argued that if one party by his words conduct or indeed 
negligence has represented to the other party that a state 
of affairs exists he will not be allowed to go back on 
that representation. In the present case, therefore if 
it could be said that the creditor in banking the cheque 
which was subject to a condition had led the debtor to 
believe that such condition was accepted then he would be 
prevented from asserting that it was not. Therefore, as 
can be seen this is merely the question of fact involved 
when one is ascertaining whether or not the creditor has 
agreed to the condition or offer by words or conduct. 
This may also be done by his negligence. 
However, the law does not seem to have gone so far as to 
assert that a person is precluded from setting up his own 
wrong. Public policy can invalidate contracts, but there 
appears to be no rule of law that public policy can impose 
contracts, and this would be effectively what would be 
211Supra at note 10. 
212Cross The Law of Evidence, 1969, 4th ed. 
213Ibid para 3.57 at page 159. 
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occurring if the creditor was held to be precluded from 
asserting the true state of affairs which may be that he 
has committed a wrong. 
Halsbury214 discusses the matter of damages for conversion 
of a negotiable instrument. He states that such is the 
face value of the instrument and where a bill of exchange 
is converted the converters normally claim the amount of 
principal and interest due. The writer could find no 
authority for the proposition that conversion could lead 
to an estoppel, or indeed the broader principle that a 
person may be estopped from setting up his or her own 
wrong. 
214Supra at note 193 volume 45, para 1461. 
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8. Section 92 of the Judicature Act 1908 
In all cases , involving cheques proffered in full and 
final satisfaction, the same is for a lesser sum than the 
creditor feels is owing to him. At common law, the rule 
is laid down in pinnel' s Case215 that: 
"Payment of a lesser sum 
satisfaction of a greater 
satisfaction for the whole." 
on the 
cannot 
say in 
be any 
This rule was approved by the House of Lords in Foakes v 
Beer216. In this case Mrs Beer had obtained a judgment for 
£2,090 19s against Dr Foakes. sixteen months later a 
written agreement was entered into, which was drawn up by 
Dr Foakes' solicitor whereby Mrs Beer undertook not to 
take "any proceeding whatsoever" in consideration for Dr 
Foakes paying £500 immediately and then paying certain 
specified instalments "until the whole of the said sum of 
£2,090 19s shall have been paid and satisfied". Some five 
years later, when Dr Foakes had paid the sum under the 
settlement agreement Mrs Beer claimed £360 for interest 
on this judgment debt. 217 The House of Lords upheld her 
claim, and in doing so approved the rule outlined above 
in Pinnel/s Case2W • 
Some commentators219 have argued that the rule in Foakes v 
Beer is outdated. Chitty argues that the rule in Foakes 
v Beer may sometimes have performed the function of 
protecting the creditor against exploitation by a debtor. 
However,the learned author argues that this function is 
now more satisfactorily performed by the expanding 
doctrine of duress, and that the rule no longer serves any 
useful purpose. Chitty states: 220 
"In some circumstances an agreement to accept 
part payment of a debt in full settlement may be 
a perfectly fair and reasonable transaction." 
However, it is submitted, that although a strict 
application of this rule may prove harsh in certain 
circumstances 1 that a reasonable compromise has been 
215(1602) 5 Co. Rep. 117a 
216Supra note 5. 
217Beer v Foakes (1883) 11 QBD 221, 222. 
218Supra at note 215. 
21ge • g • : Chitty on Contract Supra note 54 at para 227. 
22oIbid. 
113. 
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introduced through section 92 of the Judicature Act 1908. 
This section states: 
flAn acknowledgement in writing by a creditor or 
by any person authorised by him in writing in 
that behalf, of the receipt of part of his debt 
in satisfaction of the whole debt shall operate 
as the discharge of the debt, any rule of law 
notwithstanding." 
This section was originally passed in an amending act in 
1904 and is now section 92 of the Judicature Act 1908. 
This provision is a statutory exception to the rule in 
Foakes v Beer. 
The wording of the section would seem to be equally 
applicable to a receipt of part of a disputed or 
unliquidated debt or in a receipt of part or an undisputed 
or liquidated sum. However the cases seem only concerned 
with the application of such section to the latter 
situation. This may be as the former situation is already 
adequately protected by the principle that payment of a 
lesser sum in such circumstances constitutes 
consideration. 221 
Prior to the decision in Homeguard there were very few 
cases which even mentioned section 92 of the Judicature 
Act 1908. This may be as if the provisions of such 
section are clear, creditors would not normally seek to 
sue to enforce the balance where it is clear they were 
precluded from doing so. The first of such cases was a 
decision of Stout C.J. in v The Wellington Loan 
Company ( Limited) 222. This was a case concerning an action 
for wrongful arrest. The arrest appears to have taken 
place for the non-payment of a debt, although the reasons 
for the arrest are not expressly enunciated in the 
judgment. 
Stout C.J. held that the plaintiff was non suited and 
there was therefore no question to leave for the jury. 
His Honour held firstly that the debt in question had not 
been released. His reason for holding the same was as 
follows: 223 
fl ••• it appears to me clear that this debt has 
not been released. Under the English Common 
Law, even up to the present time there needs to 
221Couch v Branch Investments (1969) Ltd, supra at note 
222[1911] 31 NZLR 217. 
223Ibid at page 218. 
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have been a statute passed lately - no debt 
could be released by payment of part of it; the 
whole of the debt had to be paid in full. There 
could not be release of a debt unless you got 
the release under seal; you could not by mere 
oral bargain have your debt released by paying 
part. Thus if a person owed another person £20 
and paid him £10 even if the party agreed to 
accept the £10 in full settlement it would not 
be in full. We passed an amending act, and now 
section 92 of the Judicature Act 1908, allows 
part payment of a debt to be deemed full payment 
if an acknowledgement to that effect is given in 
writing. There was an acknowledgement of 
receipt in writing, but it did not acknowledge 
that the debt was released. On the contrary on 
the face of the receipt it says that all that is 
released is the principal sum and costs. There 
is no mention whatever of interest, and interest 
was due and that interest has not been paid." 
It was held secondly that in order to bring a writ for 
wrongful arrest the plaintiff had to have the original 
judgment set aside and that had not been done. 
Cheshire and Fifoot224 state that historically there have 
been four exceptions to the rule in Foakes v Beer. These 
are as follows: 
1. Payment by cheque or promissory note - now 
overruled by the English Court of Appeal in 
D. & C. Builders Limited v Rees225 • 
2. Section 92 of the Judicature Act 1908. 
3. Accord and satisfaction where the 
consideration is seen as compromise of a 
claim where there is a bona fide belief 
that the amount is owing. 226 
4. Promis sory estoppel. 227 
224Law of Contract, supra at note 49. 
225Supra at note 46. 
226This matter has been dealt with in Chapter 5 of this 
paper. 
227This matter has been dealt with in Chapter 5 of this 
paper. 
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Cheshire and Fifoot228 state that the requirements for 
satisfying section 92 of the Judicature Act 1908 are as 
follows: 
1. There must be an acknowledgement of receipt 
of part payment in full satisfaction of the 
debt. 
2. This acknowledgement must be in writing. 
3. It must be signed by the creditor or any 
person authorised by him in writing. 
If these requirements are fulfilled then the receipt 
operates as a discharge for the whole debt. As can be 
seen in the case of Meikle dealt with above the claim 
failed as there was not an acknowledgement that the whole 
debt was released. 
The next case dealing with s92 was that of Chambers and 
others v Commissioner of Stamp Duties and others229. In 
that case a mother held a mortgage of land from her son 
to secure a named principal sum together with "further 
advances" and interest, with a provision for acceptance 
of interest at a lower rate for prompt payment. 
The interest on this mortgage fell into arrears. The 
mother, with the intention of forgiving the interest in 
arrears took the steps detailed below, as consequence of 
which both mother and son believed that all arrears up to 
a certain date had been forgiven. 
There were two types of remission. In the first the 
mother agreed to remit the interest due and write it off. 
Sometimes the mother had capitalised the interest and then 
written it off. In the second class the mother had 
rendered an account for the interest at a rate lower than 
that provided for in the mortgage. 
In the mother's account book and the accounts rendered to 
her son, she had indicated a complete forgiveness of the 
interest. Her accounts at the date of death showed none 
of the said arrears as due and owing. 
In 1937 the mother and son executed a memorandum of 
reduction of mortgage debt by which the principal sum 
secured was reduced to four percent. No reference was 
made therein to the arrears of interest. 
The son, believing that all arrears of interest prior to 
the memorandum of reduction had been effectively forgiven 
22~aw of Contract, Supra at note 49 page 106. 
229[1943] NZLR 504. 
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made no application under the Mortgagors and Lessees 
Rehabilitation Act 1938 for the adjustment of his 
liabilities thereunder. 
On the death of the mother the Commissioner of Stamp 
Duties took the position that the arrears had not been 
legally forgiven and were an asset in the estate. These 
proceedings were then commenced by consent against the 
Commissioner of Stamp Duties. 
In the High Court Blair J. held that all but one debt were 
legally owing to the mortgagee. He held that one debt had 
been legally forgiven as evidenced in writing in the hand 
of the deceased so as to satisfy section 92, but the 
others had not. 
His Honour stated that the elements necessary to obtain 
the benefit of that section were: 
(a) an acknowledgement by the creditor of his 
acceptance of part of the debt in satisfaction 
of the whole debt; 
(b) That acknowledgement must be in writing; and 
(c) Such an acknowledgement may be gi ven by an 
authorised agent of the creditor; but if so then 
the authority to the agent must be in writing 
from the creditor, and such authority must be an 
authority to give such acknowledgement. 
There were instances where there were written 
acknowledgements of remissions or forgivenesses signed by 
the deceased mother's husband on his wife's behalf, but 
there was nothing in the nature of written authority from 
his wife to him to make any such acknowledgement. Blair 
J. therefore held that section 92 was no help to the 
plaintiff in such situation. 
However, there was one account from the mother to the son 
showing the interest as at a certain date with receipt of 
certain monies paid in reduction thereof. At the bottom 
of that document there was in the mother' s handwriting the 
following: 
"Received payment. 
Margaret Chambers 
with thanks, 10 February 
1936" 
Blair J. stated that one could stretch that document 
insofar as it was a receipt for payment of money as an 
acceptance of part of the debt within section 92 of the 
Judicature Act 1908. The receipt was for one half year's 
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interest paid on 10 February 1936 but it was held it also 
was in effect a receipt for the other half year's interest 
previously paid on 9 September 1935 and stretching that 
process he would apply it to both half year's payments. 
Therefore it was held that there was a binding acceptance 
of interest at a lower rate in discharge of that debt. 
Counsel for the son had also submitted that at common law 
in cases such as this, payment of part of a debt 
constituted a discharge of the whole debt. Blair J. 
however stated that the fact that the legislature deemed 
it necessary in the year 1904 to enact what is now section 
92 of the Judicature Act 1908 afforded some indication 
that it was deemed desirable to afford some relief to the 
rigour of the law and further afforded indication that the 
common law was too harsh. He stated that one might go so 
far and say that having provided a means whereby the 
rigour of the common law was mitigated then it may well 
be that the rigour remains unless properly got rid of by 
taking the appropriate steps under section 92. 
Blair J. stated that as he understood the common law the 
general rule was that acceptance of a smaller sum in 
satisfaction of a debt for a larger amount was not binding 
as there was no consideration. His Honour stated that 
there had been a great many decisions which may be said 
to be exceptions to that general rule but these cases when 
examined were not really exceptions to the general rule 
that the only way to discharge a contract by performance 
is to perform fully everything which the contract requires 
to be done. 
His Honour further stated that these so-called exceptions 
when examined would be found to be ones where a new 
contract had been entered into in substitution for the old 
contract. However, performance of part of an existing 
duty was not such consideration, which would be necessary 
for a contract in substitution. His Honour further stated 
that in some old cases relating to acceptance of part of 
a debt in discharge of the whole, the court had in effect 
found a substituted contract although it must be confessed 
that it looked as if the court had stretched the position 
somewhat to find something new in the situation. 
His Honour held that he was unable to find in respect of 
any of the reductions of interest made by the mother in 
her account anything in the nature of a substitute 
contract which would have the effect of validly 
discharging the plaintiff's common law liability in this 
contract constituted by the mortgage. 
Therefore, as will be seen the case although succeeding 
on one debt failed on the others primarily as there was 
no signed authority by Mrs Chalmers given to her husband 
to make acknowledgement of receipt of payments in 
satisfaction of the debt. 
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It is submitted, that this particular requirement seems 
unduly harsh, and one could be thrown back on the general 
rules of agency to determine the same. If, therefore, it 
could be shown that the person making the acknowledgement 
had either express authority to make the same or had been 
held out to the debtor in such a way as to suggest to it 
that person had authority then this should be sufficient. 
The next case dealing with the matter was that of Re 
McCathie (deceased) 230 • In that case the deceased and the 
defendant had entered into an agreement where the 
defendant purchased from the deceased a property 
compr~s~ng 450 acres and certain stock and implements for 
£19,300. This was to be satisfied in a variety of ways, 
the last of which was to pay the sum remaining outstanding 
of £7,462 in cash on the day of settlement. 
There also existed a deed of forgiveness of debt which 
recorded the deceased forgiving the sum of £3,500 from the 
total outstanding of £7,462. This was signed by the 
defendant probably on the same day as he signed the 
agreement for sale and purchase, i.e., 3 May 1957. 
However, due to an oversight, it was never signed by the 
deceased. 
Subsequently a further deed was prepared and this time 
executed by the deceased on 30 June 1958. The same stated 
that the sum of £3,962 which remained owing as "the 
balance of the said sum of £7,462" was forgiven. 
In connection with this latter deed a gift statement was 
completed. This was signed by the deceased. The date of 
his making it was 1 July 1958 and the portion headed 
'Particulars of Property' contained the following: 
"Forgiveness of the balance of the cash payable 
by the Donee to the Donor under Agreement for 
Sale and Purchase bearing date 30 May 1957 made 
between the Donor and the Donee." 
This deed was presented for stamping on 1 July 1958 and 
gift duty was duly paid on it. 
After the deceased's death the defendant took title to the 
land and the original transaction was settled. 
The question which remained to be answered in this case 
was whether the defendant still owed the £3,500. 
It was argued by the defendant that section 92 of the 
Judicature Act 1908 operated in his favour. 
~0[1969] NZLR 393 
103 
It was submitted by the executors that it was a well-
established principle of law that a release of debt is 
ineffective unless it is made under seal, or unless some 
valuable consideration is given in return for it. It was 
further argued that the document in the form of a deed 
signed by the defendant but not by the deceased and 
referring to the forgiving and releasing of the amount of 
£3,500 fell short of what was required to establish a 
release by way of gift in law. 
Counsel for the defendant referred to the operative part 
of the deed which stated that "in consideration of the 
natural love and affection which the Donor bears towards 
the Donee he the Donor does hereby forgive and release 
unto the Donee the sum of three thousand nine hundred and 
sixty two pounds being the balance of the aforesaid 
sum of £7,462". 
Counsel for the defendant then submitted that this was an 
acknowledgement in writing that the deceased accepted 
£3,962 in satisfaction of the whole amount of £7,462 and 
that pursuant to section 92 this operated as a discharge. 
Counsel for the executors I argument in reply was that 
there was not the slightest indication in the deed that 
the deceased was accepting anything less than was owing 
to him, and in fact no part of the debt of £7,462 was ever 
" received" by the deceased at all and that if the document 
was an acknowledgement of "receiving" anything at all it 
was an acknowledgement of receiving the whole of the debt, 
the sum of £3,962 being the "balance" left over after that 
already received. Moller J. upheld the submission and 
held that section 92 was of no assistance to the defendant 
in this case. 
As can be seen this decision also appears somewhat unduly 
harsh. There seems to be no logical reason why any sum 
should have to be received in order for a debt to be 
discharged. There appears to be no rationale for saying 
that the debtor must in fact receive some monies in order 
to be able to validly forgive that which is owing. Surely 
a creditor should be able to acknowledge in writing that 
he was writing off such debt. The answer to this may be 
that such can be effectively done by deed, however, this 
appears, it is submitted, unduly technical and there seems 
no reason in logic why the same could not be done by an 
acknowledgement by the creditor in writing. 
In Homeguard Mahon J. states that by section 92 of the 
Judicature Act 1908 a legal balance was struck between two 
practical but conflicting considerations. His Honour 
states231 : 
231Supra at note 1 at page 
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"On the one hand, there was the robust criticism 
of Pinnel's Case founded on a basis not only 
conceptual but pragmatic; on the other, there 
was the danger of permitting a mere payment on 
account to be the subject of controverted and 
uncertain testimony as to whether it was a 
sequel to an oral agreement wholly discharging 
the debtor. Section 92 recognised and 
alleviated the type of criticism advanced by Sir 
George Jessel and Lord Blackburn, but at the 
same time protected a creditor against fraud by 
adopting the basic mechanism of the Statute of 
Fraud itself; that is, by requiring the debtor 
to produce evidence of the extinction of his 
liability and acknowledgement in writing signed 
by the other contracting party. 
In New Zealand therefore, as from 1904 where it 
is sought to establish that a monetary liability 
was represented by an undisputed and liquidated 
sum, but that the liability has been 
consensually discharged by payment of a lesser 
sum, the debtor must produce as evidence of that 
transaction either a formal deed or a written 
form of acknowledgement which complies with the 
terms of section 92, otherwise the rule in 
Foakes v Beer will apply and the agreement will 
be nudum pactum and unenforceable. In order 
successfully to invoke section 92, its terms 
must be strictly complied with. A wri tten 
acknowledgement by the creditor in the exact 
terms of the section must be proved. Cf 
Chambers v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1943] 
NZLR 504." 
It is submitted firstly that the authority of Chambers v 
Commissioner of Stamp Duties is not an exception to that 
general rule, but authority for the situation that 
acknowledgement in exact terms of section 92 need not be 
provided. However, with respect, Mahon J. 's analogy with 
the Statute of Frauds is a good one. It, is therefore 
submitted, that as long as acknowledgement of ei ther 
receipt of part payment in discharge of the full, or 
discharge for the full debt is provided in writing then 
the requirements have been satisfied. If section 92 was 
amended along these lines, then it is submitted that it 
would provide more effective relief to the harsh 
consequences which can result from a strict application 
of the rule in Foakes v Beer. 
None of the cases subsequent to Homequard concerning 
cheques proffered in full and final satisfaction appear 
to analyse section 92 of the Judicature Act 1908 in 
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detail, although many of them mention it in passing232 • It 
is submitted, that the reason for this is that in the 
majority of the cases concerning cheques proffered in full 
and final satisfaction the creditor has not in fact agreed 
to release the balance, as if it had done so it is not 
likely to have issued proceedings for the balance. It is, 
indeed, this genuine lack of agreement which is a strong 
reason for not imposing agreement on the parties, by 
conduct or otherwise if it is clear that none existed. 
It is therefore submitted that section 92 of the 
Judicature Act 1908 affords a useful tool to debtors to 
have the balance of their debt effectively written off by 
the creditor, where that is the clear intention of the 
parties. However, in this regard it is submitted that to 
make section 92 more practicable that firstly monies need 
not be actually received by the creditor and secondly that 
the authorisation for the person signing such 
acknowledgement on a creditor's behalf need not be in 
writing, but that the usual rules as to agency should 
apply, and where it can be shown that there was an agency 
in fact, or that the person held himself out in this 
regard that such should be· sufficient. 
232e • g ., NZI Finance Limited v Barber supra at note 82, at 
page 11. 
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9. Policy Considerations 
The rule in Homeguard even if wrong in principle had the 
benefit of certainty of application. The law in its 
present state, it is submitted, 1S not only not in 
accordance with basic principle but affords no certainty 
to the parties. 
There are strong policy considerations, it is submitted, 
which need to be taken into account in laying down a rule 
that either allows the creditor to bank the cheque and 
repudiate the condition, or that makes banking of the 
cheque deemed to be acceptance whether or not such has in 
fact occurred. One can foresee injustice in either set 
of circumstances. For example a debt may be genuinely 
disputed on reasonable grounds. The debt may be for $600, 
where the debtor alleges only $300 is due and the creditor 
alleges that the full $600 is due. By way of bona fide 
compromise the debtor may send the creditor a cheque for 
$450 in full and final settlement of the claim, thereby 
effectively "splitting the difference". The creditor may 
receive such cheque and while accepting that such is a 
fair compromise may bank the cheque, repudiate the 
condition and sue for the balance which may be 
subsequently found to be owing . with such a scenario one 
can see that the justice may be completely on the debtor's 
side. 
However as an alternative scenario a debt may be genuinely 
disputed but on unreasonable grounds. The debt may be for 
$600, the debtor claiming that $300 only is due. The 
debtor may send a cheque for $300 in full and final 
settlement hoping that the same will be banked by the 
creditor's office system without the creditor realising 
in fact that such condition was attached. The cheque may 
be so banked by the creditor's office system with the 
creditor himself receiving the letter with the full 
payment condi tion the next day. The credi tor may 
immediately on receipt of the same write back to the 
debtor saying that the cheque is not accepted in full and 
final satisfaction, and a court may hold that by virtue 
of his banking the cheque he is precluded from suing for 
the balance. One can see that in this situation the 
justice is clearly on the side of the creditor. 
It is submitted, that there are in reality only two 
reasons why a debtor would send a cheque with his offer 
to give such an amount in full and final settlement. The 
first would be where he hopes that such would act as an 
irresistible treat to the creditor who may feel that he 
is better to take some money now as opposed to having to 
claim for monies that might not eventuate in the future. 
The second possibility is that the debtor intends to trick 
the creditor into receiving the same in full and final 
settlement hoping that he will bank it without noticing 
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the condition or alternatively will bank it not realising 
the significance of the condition. 
It is submitted that the first alternative put forward 
above can equally be achieved by a debtor offering this 
money in settlement with payment within say seven days by 
bank or trust account cheque. Further, numerous cases to 
date highlight the difficulty in cheques being banked by 
creditors' office systems without appreciation of the 
consequences. 
These policy considerations are well discussed in American 
case law. In Homeguard Mahon J. held that the law in New 
Zealand was the same as that in the United States of 
America in that banking the cheque tendered in full and 
final satisfaction effected an accord and satisfaction at 
that point. However, although this may effectively be the 
United States common law, since 1968 when the Uniform 
Commercial Code was adopted by most of the States in 
America, there has been considerable debate as to whether 
the code overrides the United States common law mentioned 
and followed in Homeguard. 
The common law in the United States is as follows 233 : 
". •• if a debtor offers its creditor a sum of 
money in full settlement of a disputed claim, 
and the creditor uses the offered sum, the 
creditor is bound by the proposal. The creditor 
is held to have accepted the settlement and the 
original claim is fully satisfied. Attempts by 
the creditor to protest the full payment 
condition of the offer will be unsuccessful. 
The common law doctrine does not permit the 
creditor to take the benefit of the offer 
without also accepting its burdens." 
However, some courts in light of this have suggested that 
section 1-207 of the Unified Commercial Code has 
overridden the United States common law doctrine of accord 
and satisfaction. Section 1-207 states234 : 
"A party who with explicit reservation of rights 
performs or promises performance or assents to 
performance in a manner demanded or offered by 
the other party does not thereby prejudiced the 
rights reserved. Such words as 'without 
233you can't have your cake and eat it too: accord and 
satisfaction survives the Uniform Commercial Code 
Patricia B. Fry, North Dakota Law Review Volume 61 
353. 
234Ibid at page 354. 
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prejudice', 'under protest' or the like are 
sufficient." 
Therefore, some courts and commentators have suggested in 
the united states that a creditor may cross out the 
payment conditions and write such words as 'under protest' 
and then proceed to bank the cheque and sue for the 
balance. As in New Zealand and Commonwealth law the debt 
needs to be undisputed or unliquidated before 
consideration can be deemed to have been provided. The 
banking of the cheque is merely deemed under common law 
to be acceptance of the full payment offer. 
The stipulation of the Uniform Commercial Code is slightly 
different to the stipulation under New Zealand common law. 
Under the Commercial Code as outlined above the creditor 
has to write such words as 'under protest' in order to be 
able to proceed to accept the balance; whereas under New 
Zealand law as it presently stands the creditor has to 
wri te back to the debtor straight away or wi thin a 
'reasonable' time stating that the full payment condition 
is not accepted. 
However, in the united states as in New Zealand at the 
present time there has been a divergence of opinion over 
such issue. united states writers and courts dealing with 
the decision as to whether the Uniform Commercial Code 
overrides the united states common law in such 
circumstances have put forward strongly differing points 
of view. Corbin235 states: 
"It is unfair to the party who writes the check 
thinking that he will be spending his money only 
if the whole dispute will be over, to allow the 
other party, knowing of that reasonable 
expectation, to weasel around the deal by 
putting his own mark on the other person's 
check .•• " 
Further, in the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision of 
Flambeau Products Corporation v Honeywell Information 
Systems Inc236 the court reversed the lower court's 
decision to the effect that the section 1-207 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code overrode the united States common 
law concerning full payment cheques. 
In that case the cheque 
satisfaction of a dispute 
depository used by Honeywell 
Contrary to its authority 
sent in full and final 
was received by a lockbox 
to process incoming cheques. 
under its agreement with 
235Corbin on Contract Vol VI A at page 396. 
236 116 wis. 2d 95, 341 NW 2d 655, 37 UCC Rep. Serv 1441 
(1984). 
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Honeywell the lockbox processed and deposited the full 
payment cheque. Immediately Honeywell learned of the 
cheque being deposited it wrote to Flambeau indicating 
that it did not agree to the deduction and demanding the 
remaining balance plus interest. Honeywell, however, did 
not return the proceeds of the cheque to Flambeau. 
Flambeau brought an action for declaratory release against 
Honewell and was granted summary judgment by the trial 
court. 
On the first appeal, the case was remanded to the trial 
court because the record contained no evidence of a 
dispute at all on liquidated claim. However, after trial 
on remand judgment was once again granted to Flambeau on 
the grounds that an accord and satisfaction had been 
effected. Honeywell then appealed to the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals which ruled that section 1-207 operated to 
permit Honeywell to retain the process of the cheque 
without being bound by an accord and satisfaction. The 
Court of Appeals stated that the American common law was 
harsh and that by it creditors were subjected to the 
overreaching of debtors. 
However, the Supreme Court overruled this decision. It 
stated that one of the purposes of the Code was to 
simplify, clarify and organise the laws governing 
commercial transactions. This court further stated that 
applying section 1-207 to the full payment cheque would 
not actually accomplish these purposes. It felt instead 
it would eliminate a simple technique for settlement while 
permitting sophisticated parties to arrange their affairs 
to secure the benefits of the full payment cheque. 
The court stated that the common law doctrine of accord 
and satisfaction rested both on principles of contract law 
and public policy. The public policy it stated was that 
of encouraging the informal resolution of disputes without 
litigation and the policy of fairness. It disagreed with 
the view of the Court of Appeal that it would be unfair 
to require Honeywell to return the proceeds if it was to 
preserve its claim for the balance and stated237 : 
"The interests of fairness dictate that a 
creditor who cashes a check offered in full 
payment should be bound by the terms of the 
offer. The debtor's intent is unknown, and 
allowing the creditor to keep the money 
disregarding the debtor's conditions seems 
unfair and violative of the obligation of good 
faith which the UCC makes applicable to every 
contract or duty." 
237 I bid, 341 NW 2d at 663, 37 UCC Rep Serv at 1451. 
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Therefore as can be seen policy seemed to be foremost in 
the Court's mind. However, it is submitted that the 
useful settlement tool is simply accord and satisfaction 
simpliciter. That is a debtor may simply offer a sum in 
full and final satisfaction indicating that the money is 
readily available upon the offer being accepted. At law, 
as was discussed earlier, consideration is afforded where 
a bona fide dispute is settled, whether or not such 
dispute existed upon reasonable grounds, as long as the 
same is not vexatious or frivolous. This by itself 
provides a useful tool for settlement and means that 
parties can settle a claim genuinely in dispute without 
need to resolve who would eventually succeed. It is 
further submitted that sending a cheque in full and final 
settlement can merely lead to a form of entrapment where 
a creditor banks a cheque unaware of the condition or 
banks the cheque in ignorance of its consequences. 
Patrick J. Boyle in his article on the recent Missouri 
Court of Appeals decision in the United States238 briefly 
summarises the policy considerations put forward by 
various courts and commentators for and against allowing 
the Uniform Commercial Code to override the United states 
common law concerning full payment cheques. He states239 
that several authors had asserted that the applications 
of the Uniform Commercial Code section 1-207 to full 
payment cheques would destroy a valuable settlement tool 
and constitute an added burden on the court system. The 
learned author states that this viewpoint did not appear 
to be correct. The Court of Appeals in the Majestic case 
to which he was referring had observed that a suit for the 
balance of the debt rather than a suit for the entire debt 
placed no additional burden on the court system. 
In addition the learned author states that the courts had 
correctly pointed out that the creditor who received a 
full payment cheque from the debtor would not necessarily 
reserve his right to sue for the balance of the debt. The 
court further stated that even if the creditor did reserve 
his rights he would not necessarily bring suit to enforce 
his rights. The learned author further stated that 
commentators who disagreed with the application of section 
1-207 also believe that the debtors will lose the benefit 
of full payment cheques because creditors can accept or 
reject a cheque and still have a right to collect the 
balance. The debtor would then have no choice but to sue 
238Ma jestic Building Material Corp v Gateway Plumbing Inc: 
Missouri Courts Alter the Common Law Accord and 
Satisfaction Doctrine by applying UCC Section 1-207 to 
Full-Payment Checks. Saint Louis University Law 
Journal vol 31, 133. 
239Ibid at page 148. 
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for the amount disputed or pay whatever he felt to be the 
correct amount and wait to be sued. 
The learned author states that this rule was also 
incorrect. He states commentators had observed that a 
debtor might negotiate an executory settlement agreement 
with a creditor prior to tendering a full payment cheque. 
He felt, it is submitted correctly, that this approach 
would preserve the full payment cheque as a settlement 
tool although he felt that the practice would be slightly 
less convenient. 
The learned author further states that other commentators 
in the United States had argued that the common law 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction in the united states 
may be commercially unreasonable because the doctrine 
forced a creditor to refuse an amount which was clearly 
owing to him merely to preserve his right to sue for the 
entire disputed amount. The learned author states that 
it was unfair to allow a debtor to use an amount that was 
owed to a creditor to pressure a settlement and he felt 
the proper decision was reached in Majestic. 
In a later article, Pamela K. Strom Amlung analysed a 
recent Ohio Supreme Court decision which held that section 
1-207 of the uniform Commercial Code overrode the united 
states common law as to cheques proffered in full and 
final satisfaction240 • In that case the decision was 
reached by a majority. The majority cited a commentary 
by White and Summers on the Uniform Commercial Code that 
characterised the typical debtor who used a payment in 
full cheque as a chiseller who was attempting to get away 
with paying less than he truly owed. 241 Based on this 
line of reasoning the majority concluded that the framers 
of the Code must have intended to prevent debtors from 
taking advantage of creditors. The court. also, the 
learned author stated, concluded that the Ohio General 
Assembly adopted section 1-207 with the intention that 
creditors would be protected from losing rights when 
cashing payment in full cheques. In doing so the court 
expressly overruled the common law doctrine of accord and 
satisfaction and announced the following rule242 : 
24oOhio I S interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code 
section 1-207 - your can have your cake and eat it too: 
AFC Interiors v DiCello, 46 Ohio St. 3Dl, 544 DE 2D869 
(1989) . 
241White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code para 13-
24 (3D ed. 1988). Cincinnati Law Review vol. 59 page 
1006. 
242Ibid at page 1006. 
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.. when the creditor receives a payment in 
full check for an amount less than that alleged 
due, he may negotiate the check without losing 
his rights to collect the remainder alleged due, 
if he explicitly reserves those rights by 
endorsing the cheque in a manner sufficient to 
alert the debtor that the check was not accepted 
as full payment ... 
The dissenting judges in this case argued as one of their 
reasons for dissent that the doctrine was a useful 
settlement tool. In support of this conclusion the 
learned judges followed the reasoning of a Supreme Court 
of Maine decision243 . The Supreme Court of Maine had held 
essentially that in issuing a payment in full cheque the 
debtor compromised his own right of withholding payment 
in exchange for a chance that the cheque would settle the 
dispute. If the creditor could reserve his right and 
still accept the payment the debtor would have no 
incentive for issuing the cheque. 
It is submitted that although it is indeed correct that 
a debtor would have no incentive for issuing the cheque 
in such circumstances, that such does not in reality lead 
one anywhere. If the debtor's aim was to settle the 
dispute, the same could effectively be done by an offer 
of payment in full and final satisfaction with an 
indication that the money was ready to be handed over. 
The learned author of the article aforementioned stated244 
that the underlying policy by the majority's decision was 
the belief that the full payment cheque placed the 
creditor at the mercy of the debtor who wrote the cheque. 
The majority,the learned author stated, favourably cited 
a dissenting opinion from an Ohio Appellate Court which 
advocated placing the risk of loss upon the debtor who 
wrote the payment in full cheque not the credi tor245 • 
It is submitted on balance that policy dictates an 
interpretation of any rule in favour of the creditor. The 
argument which is used in a large majority of the States 
in the united States in favour of the common law rule that 
banking of a cheque proffered in full and final 
satisfaction is deemed to be acceptance of the same, is 
that such is a useful settlement tool. This, it is 
submitted, would not be negated by such an interpretation. 
243Stultz Elec. Works v Marine Hydraulic Eng'g Co., 484 
A 2d 1008, lOll, 1011-1012 (Me. 1984). 
244Supra at note 240 page 1015. 
245Inger Interiors v Peralta 30 Ohio App. 3d 94, 98, 506 NE 
2d 1199, 1202-1203 (1986). 
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It is submitted that such useful settlement tool could 
just as equally be preserved as it is at present in New 
Zealand by a debtor making such offer without enclosing 
a cheque for the same. Such, it is submitted is equally 
tempting to a creditor where he has been told that the 
money is immediately available. 
However, it is submitted that if an interpretation in 
favour of the debtor prevails then such allows the debtor 
to take advantage of the creditor's office system which 
may bank the cheque without noting the condition, or the 
creditor's ignorance in not realising the implications of 
banking such cheque. Therefore, it is submitted that the 
reasoning of Mahon J. in Homeguard which followed the 
American 'rule of law' is not only not correct in 
principle, but is also not correct in policy. 
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10. Conclusion 
It is submitted that the decision in Homeguard is 
incorrect as it is not in accordance with established 
common law principles; and neither are the cases to a 
large extent after it which either follow it or attempt 
to distinguish it. It is further submitted that it is not 
correct, in policy as it allows debtors to take undue 
advantage of creditors' office systems or ignorance of the 
law. 
It is submitted that all such cases have overlooked the 
well-established common law rule that silence cannot 
amount to acceptance and that acceptance needs to be 
communicated either expressly or by conduct. Such conduct 
it is submitted must amount to the clear and unequivocal 
assent to the offer and it is submitted that in general 
banking a cheque simpliciter does not as there is more 
than one reason why a creditor may bank a cheque. It is 
submitted that that further overlooks the rationale behind 
the rule in Felthouse v Bindley that there should be no 
onus on the offeree to reject the offer. 
It is submitted that if the common law principles 
enunciated above were followed sufficient certainty would 
be created as a creditor would never be taken to have 
assented to the debtor's offer unless he has expressly 
stated that he has, or has acted in such a clear 
unequivocal fashion that on the balance of probabilities 
no other reasonable interpretation could be placed on his 
actions. 
This does not mean that the debtor would have no remedy 
where a creditor had wrongly banked a cheque proffered in 
full and final satisfaction while repUdiating the 
condition. The debtor would have an action in conversion 
on the cheque or in restitution seeking the monies to be 
paid back to him. However, in many cases if the creditor 
was held to be entitled to the balance the balance could 
be counter-claimed and offset against the sum to which the 
debtor was entitled. 
The doctrine of accord and satisfaction is merely a 
division of the law of contract, which seeks to enforce 
agreements not impose them. 
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